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War College: May-June 1984 Full Review

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW



MAY-JUNE 1984



NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

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Rear Admiral James E. Service, USN
President, Naval War College

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Editor	Frank Uhlig, Jr.
Managing Editor	Robert M. Laske
Editorial Assistant	Mildred A. Imondi
Art Work, Production, and Composition	
Anthony Sarro	Eleanor C. Silvia
Roger Levesque	Carole F. Boiani

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Cover: Three 1,000-pound Argentine bombs crash into the port side of the British destroyer *Coventry* on 25 May 1982 during the war in the South Atlantic. The ship did not survive, but most of her people did. Official Royal Navy photograph.



President's Notes


A great source of the strength of the Naval War College (NWC) program is in its faculty. It is an unusual faculty in several ways. First, because it teaches both levels of advanced professional military education—the College of Naval Warfare and the College of Naval Command and Staff—colocated in Newport as component units of the Naval War College. That enables us to use our faculty in a most efficient manner, because of the economics of using them twice rather than only once at the senior level. Second, because it contains a heavy inter-service emphasis. Of 52 military faculty, 34 are Navy, 6 are Army, 5 are Air Force, 6 are Marine Corps and 1 is Coast Guard. (These faculty members from other services reflect the fairly large number of students from other services—another distinctive positive aspect of our curricular experience.) Third, because the faculty has over two dozen highly qualified civilian academicians—far and away the largest such group outside of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, one of the elements of the National Defense University in Washington.

In this our centennial year it is interesting to compare this faculty with the first faculty of the Naval War College; we find the pattern has not changed greatly except in size, a tenfold increase compared to a twentyfold increase in students. A century ago, the seven-man faculty included Lieutenant (later General and Chief of Staff of the Army) Tasker Bliss and Professor J.R. Soley (who taught international law and later became Assistant Secretary of the Navy). The faculty then as now represented a deliberate and careful *balance*. For that is the key word in our approach to a soundly based War College education.

The character of the faculty remains balanced because our academic and research mission remains much the same as it was in 1884: to provide a place where the professional study of war and its problems can be thought about and solved. To do that we need to teach how to approach national security policy problems and the strategic issues that arise in warfare, we need to examine how forces are procured under conditions of fiscal constraint, and we need to formulate war plans and test naval operations in realistic gaming scenarios. These three themes, taught in three departments, demand a different mix for each. Strategy and Policy has the largest civilian group, and its military faculty are chosen for their academic achievement; Defense Economics and Decision-Making has more military, but features a faculty who have the required academic and practical expertise; the Naval Operations faculty—almost solely military—is chosen for its operational expertise.

The military-civilian mix extends to our Center for Naval Warfare Studies (our research arm which interacts with and buttresses our academic program) and to our Center for Continuing Education (which brings War College programs to nonresident students).

Within the civilian faculty itself there is balance. A half-dozen highly qualified civilians provide long-term continuity. A dozen or so have multiple-year or renewable appointments. A further half dozen or more, by their one-year tours, ensure a continuous infusion of new thinking. The interchange within these groups assures a desirable balance between continuity and change. It is a system whose roots are deep, and which continues today to provide a first-class solution to the Navy's needs at the graduate level in professional military education. It is a faculty selection system which the other services admire highly and which has helped us to put meaning behind our centennial slogan of "A Century of Excellence."



JAMES E. SERVICE
Rear Admiral, US Navy
President, Naval War College

The CIA and National Security

Admiral Stansfield Turner, US Navy (Retired)

I cannot stand behind the podium in Spruance Hall without recalling that it may well have been from behind this podium that my naval career came to an end. It came to an end because in 1974 I invited a Naval Academy classmate of mine, the then-Governor of Georgia, Jimmy Carter, to come to the War College and address the student body. The reason I say this may have been the beginning of the end is that while Jimmy Carter and I were not close friends, two and a half years later President Carter, I am told, remembered me.

I was on duty in Naples, Italy when I received a phone call that said, "The President of the United States wants to see you tomorrow." With that I called in my four closest advisors, three Navy commanders and an Army lieutenant general. As preparations were made for the trip, I said, "What do I think about while going across the Atlantic? What is the President going to talk to me about or ask me to do?" We went over a lot of possibilities and in the middle of it I said, "What about the CIA—I read two weeks ago that the President's original nominee for the position withdrew after the Senate objected to him."

We discussed very briefly the possibility that I might go to the CIA, but the discussion terminated when the lieutenant general said, "Stan, the President is your classmate and friend. He wouldn't do that to you."

Well, the next morning he did. When I walked out of the Oval Office—not much more than 24 hours from the time I had been alerted—I knew that 31 and a half years of a naval career were behind me. I was in a new career as chief of the spies.

Initially I found it really was not very different from my past work, as the CIA has many military characteristics. The people are very dedicated. You need not be concerned about calling them in at midnight on a Saturday. The organization is very operationally oriented and I have as much pride in the

The Admiral Raymond A. Spruance lecture delivered at the Naval War College.

Admiral Turner is the former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and past president of the Naval War College.

secret operational accomplishments with the CIA as I have in the military operational accomplishment in which I have participated. The CIA has very high standards of professionalism and high quality people, so in these respects, I felt quite at home.

It was not very long, however, before I began to appreciate that the CIA was also different, quite different from the military or from any other element of our Government. It is unique in three ways. First, it operates outside the normal process of our democratic governmental system. Secondly, it is not really one CIA but essentially three semi-autonomous agencies in one. Thirdly, it is—as it should be—more independent of higher authority in the Government than any other agency.

The CIA has to be an exception in our normal democratic process. Our Government is run on the principle that the citizens are the ultimate authority of what the Government will and will not do. Citizens, though, simply cannot be privileged to see enough of what the CIA is doing to exercise that ultimate control through the Congress and through their President. But this is the price that we must pay for the secrecy that is so essential in the operation of a professional intelligence service.

Secrecy in the CIA, though, is different from that in the military. In the CIA, secrecy shrouds the very core, the essence of the activity of the agency. In the military, it is really something on the periphery—the characteristics of our weapons, contingency plans, etc.—not the basic nature of the business. The citizen does know how the Defense Department intends to defend our country; he does not know what the CIA is doing to protect the nation. Thus, from its founding in 1947, the CIA was implicitly given authority to operate outside the normal checks and balances of our governmental process which cannot operate without an informed citizenry. Such exemption from prevailing rules is fundamentally an unsound situation. Unaccountable power is subject to misuse. Planners and operators will be less careful and thorough when there is no third party scrutiny. Unfortunately, the record shows that the CIA has made some mistakes and paid a price for being less than thorough.

There were also some ill-advised intelligence efforts that were fruitless—the Bay of Pigs, the opening of US mails, and the administering of drugs to unwitting Americans. When actions like these were uncovered in the intelligence investigations of 1975, the country decided to set up a series of oversight and control procedures for intelligence. In effect, we established surrogates for the citizens as the ultimate control. The surrogates for the public are the Congress with its oversight committees and the National Security Council (NSC).

Oversight was a revolution for the intelligence professionals and was difficult to accept. Nevertheless, I believe that it has worked well and that it

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has achieved two objectives for our country. First, it has reduced possible abuse of this special trust of being allowed to operate with less control and supervision than any other element of Government. For instance, it is less likely today that someone in the CIA may, on his own initiative, undertake some ill-considered operation without the Director's approval. To begin with, it is understood that he would be disobeying an explicit presidential order to clear sensitive operations with the NSC. Besides, he is aware that he might have to testify under oath before Congress about what he had done. He would be in an unhealthy position of having to disclose to the Congress what he might have withheld deliberately from his Director.

The second objective that oversight has achieved is that it forces the CIA to do a better job in its planning. This can make our intelligence more effective. I found, for instance, that when proposals came to me for risky, secret operations, they were better conceived when the staff believed that I was going to have to sell them to the NSC. I too did a better job and insisted on thorough staff preparation because I knew the project was going to be thoroughly examined. Thus, there are benefits to the quality of our intelligence employing an oversight process.

Some of the staunchest supporters of intelligence neither understand nor appreciate this. They have given attention only to the fact that oversight can lead to leaks, though I do not believe this is a serious problem. Some of these supporters are in favor of relaxing all controls, unleashing the CIA, and returning to "the good old days." For instance, when the Reagan administration came into office, they tried to weaken the presidential executive order on intelligence written originally by President Ford and strengthened somewhat by President Carter. The changes proposed were so substantial that even Senator Barry Goldwater, a marvelous man, a strong supporter of intelligence and hardly a flaming liberal, objected to these changes. The end result was that the Administration loosened controls on the periphery, on the fringes, which was quite unnecessary.

At the other end of the spectrum, there are still some civil libertarians who would like to tighten those controls even more. Fortunately they are quiescent for the moment but there is, I believe, a deep, latent distrust of the CIA among a significant number in our society. Such distrust could erupt at the least excuse and I happen to believe that another round of intense public criticism of the CIA could be fatal for the agency and a disaster for the country.

It is time to abandon these extreme attitudes. The one side needs to recognize that we do have oversight, that it is effective, though it will never be 100 percent insurance against excesses or mistakes. The other side must recognize that oversight is a strength to intelligence, not just a risk to secrecy. Too little oversight could risk recurrence of improper or illegal actions, and that in turn could unleash that latent distrust on the left.

Unfortunately, the second unique characteristic of the CIA leaves it less well prepared to avoid errors of the past or to produce the best intelligence. This characteristic is that the organization is composed of three agencies. But why? The reason being that incompatibilities exist in the five basic functions assigned to the CIA: spying (or human intelligence); technical collection such as photographs or electronic eavesdropping; analysis or an interpretation of this collected information; counterintelligence overseas, and covert action.

The first three of these—spying, technical collection, and analysis—are the basic functions of intelligence and are easily perceived as being incompatible. Spying demands great secrecy. You've got to protect the identity of your agents. Secrecy has historically led to abuse and has generated the demand for oversight. Analysis, on the other hand, involves very little risk and there is little need for oversight. Some secrecy is necessary, of course, but it also needs a great deal of openness. The analysts must be able to interact with people in the academic world, the business community, and the public in order to avoid a self-centered and very over-confident attitude toward their analyses.

The technical collection people come out somewhere in between. They need secrecy for their inanimate inventions, their devices. They also need some oversight because these technical devices can intrude into the lives of Americans improperly. So the needs and the outlook of the technical collection people are similar to those of the spies and the analysts but they are not coincident with either.

It is because of these differing methodologies that these three operating departments of the CIA have, for over the past 30 some years, developed an intense desire to protect their special interests. They have built a vast network of bureaucratic rules to protect their independence from each other and their independence from the director of the CIA lest he adjudicate among them. They prefer to take their chances on compromising their differences rather than having them adjudicated in favor of one or the other. They are accustomed to having a director who manages the external relations of the agency with the Congress, the President and the public, but who leaves the management of the CIA to the three department heads. This, it seemed to me, was an unworkable and unwise arrangement—to have decentralized and divided authority, particularly when we were in a new era of oversight.

The CIA needs well-coordinated planning to insure that its resources are being used to the country's best advantage and not just to the advantage of these departments. Spies must dovetail with the technical collectors and both must be sure they are collecting what the analysts need to interpret. If they do not have this kind of planning, the Congress—which under oversight does

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review the CIA's budget very carefully—will not give them the resources they need.

The CIA also needs to insure that these three departments are not so independent that only they decide whether their actions are within the bounds of propriety and legality. To correct this situation, I brought into the CIA an excellent administrator as the Deputy Director, Ambassador Frank Carlucci, later to be the Deputy Secretary of Defense. We attempted to establish sufficient centralized controls and planning mechanisms to give us the assurances we felt we needed. We made a lot of progress, but the bureaucrats resisted strongly, not out of willfulness or spite, but out of a conviction that good intelligence demands decentralization.

As hard as I have searched, I cannot find evidence to support decentralization. I cannot find proof that wild schemes of the past hatched under inadequate supervision, had actually produced significant intelligence. What I did find was that the secrecy of spying engenders a mystique, a mystique that misleads people into believing that you can only spy if you are totally unsupervised. This simply is not so.

Some future director of the CIA will have to complete this transition to one agency instead of three if the CIA is to achieve full effectiveness. It is important to our national security interests that this be done because the CIA is the cornerstone of United States intelligence operations. I say the cornerstone because the CIA is the only element of our intelligence community which is not associated with a policy-making department of our Government.

Our intelligence community is made up of intelligence components in a number of different departments of Government. There is the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the State Department, an intelligence element in the FBI, and the Department of Defense has its Defense Intelligence Agency, the DIA. In addition there are the four military intelligence organizations, the National Security Agency, and the departments of Treasury and Energy also have intelligence operations. Note, however, that all of the parents of the intelligence organizations listed here are very much a part of the policy and decision-making process in our Government. That raises problems. The very worst kind of intelligence is that in which the policy-maker is told only what he wants to hear. There is a strong ethic in American intelligence that even those intelligence organizations, which are a part of a policy-making department, must stand tall. They must be willing to tell it like it is even if they cannot support their department's policies. That makes nice theory, but the practical side is another matter.

One method used to buttress that ethic and reduce bias in our intelligence is to have competition in analysis or interpretation of the intelligence

information. We never want only one agency to do all the interpretation on a given topic, lest it be influenced by its policy-makers. For instance if we are going to study a political issue, some political trend in the world, the lead will probably be done by the State Department. The CIA and the DIA can also make useful political inputs. The CIA is considered to have the greatest strength in the economic area. The State Department does respectable economic work and, of course, the Treasury Department would participate. If it is a military subject, the DIA will take the lead normally, but the CIA could play a very important role as well.

There are several weaknesses in this system of back-up intelligence analysis. The first is that the State Department, while it does excellent intelligence work and is very seldom influenced by policy considerations, is such a small intelligence operation that it cannot do justice to everything that it undertakes. However, the major weakness of this back-up system is the inability of military intelligence to provide truly competitive analysis. There are two reasons for this. One is a lack of capability and the other is an inability to divorce themselves from policy. The lack of capability goes back to the origins of the DIA. Mr. McNamara simply drew people from the service intelligence organizations and put them in the DIA. There were many exceptions but, in general, the services did not give up their best people and much of that attitude prevails today. Given a choice, a service military intelligence officer would prefer to be assigned to his basic service intelligence organization than to the DIA because it is more career-enhancing. In fact, as long as we have four separate service intelligence organizations, we are not going to have a really solid DIA. Parenthetically, I happen to think we do not need four service intelligence organizations—at least above the tactical level.

The problem of conflicts between defense intelligence and policy influence is an even more serious issue than that of the competence of the DIA. The ethic of intelligence is independence from policy. However, the ethic of the military profession is responsiveness to command. The commander is right, once he has made up his mind and enunciated his decision. Supporting him is a must if we are to avoid chaos on the battlefield. Thus, the intelligence officer who tries to buck the system with unpopular conclusions is often looked on poorly within a military environment. Whether deliberately or not, the military hierarchy can impose enormous pressures to conform. For example, every year the intelligence community produces a number of national intelligence estimates. These are studies or interpretations of one or several major issues facing the country. They are the product of the entire intelligence community. Of course, with that many participants there is seldom total agreement. So when we come to a big issue, we have to find ways to present the disagreements—this is the essence of having competitive analysis.

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If you put too much emphasis on the dissenting views, you end up confusing the policy-maker who reads the study. If you put in too few dissents, maybe you have overlooked that one view which really is important. I felt that it was important to put in as many views in these estimates as could explain exactly why they disagreed with the majority view. Thus, the decision-maker could clearly see the contrast in the reasoning between the different outlooks.

The biggest problem I experienced in doing this was that I could seldom get the Defense Intelligence Agency to produce a meaningful explanation of its position. They believed what they believed and they believed it very strongly, but they could not give reasons for it. Sometimes it was because of a lack of competence, sometimes it was the result of pressures against saying anything that could endanger some military policy, or endanger some military program that was up for consideration by Congress. Unfortunately, what this means is that US military estimates are built on CIA analysis much more than they should be. The DIA should be our best source of military analysis. The good, professional officer who seeks unbiased intelligence today should appreciate the benefits of using the CIA as a foil by calling on them for a second opinion.

Why is it important that you and I, as citizens, understand these three points of uniqueness about the CIA? I think it should be obvious to all of us that intelligence is of growing importance to our security and to the foreign policy in this country. For instance, for well over a decade we have been engaged in serious arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. We have superb intelligence systems that can peer into the Soviet Union and check on whether they are fulfilling the obligations of the treaty. Also, for 38 years we have lived with a delicate balance of nuclear terror between us and the Soviet Union. Yet, we have somehow found it tolerable because we are sufficiently confident of our intelligence system not to worry that we could suddenly find ourselves at a great disadvantage.

If the United States is going to continue to benefit from reliable intelligence, it needs a more sophisticated approach to manage our overall intelligence system. Attitudes of the American public swing from one extreme to the other, from drumbeat condemnation of the CIA, to not being able to do enough for the boys in the spy cloaks. Neither is a sensible attitude as it demonstrates a failure to understand the nature of the responsibilities that we have placed on the intelligence professionals in the CIA. First we ask them to operate largely outside the checks and balances of our governmental system—this permits them unusual freedom and subjects them to temptations not prevalent in any other Government agency. Next, we assign them five intelligence functions, each of which drives them to react in a somewhat different manner. Third, we make the CIA the cornerstone of our intelligence activity, expecting it not only to carry out much of the production of intelligence but also to keep the entire system honest—to free it from improper influence by policy-makers.

In my view, the professionals of the Central Intelligence Agency deserve


great credit for having done as well as they have since its inception in 1947. We have been the beneficiaries of their dedication and hard labor. But after giving the CIA that deserved credit, I want to add that we must also recognize that these three hazards of doing intelligence in the American way will continue to exist to one extent or another into the indefinite future. If eternal vigilance is the motto of the US Navy, something akin to that should be our approach to American intelligence—not because we should mistrust the CIA or its people, but because we should recognize that we have given them an exceptional challenge to meet. We should each want very much that they continue to meet that challenge every bit as well in the future as in the past.



“For a long era, happily past, our Navy had a cult of prejudice against the student officer. The academician was supposed to be irreconcilable with the well qualified seaman-fighter. The latter needed to be rather ‘rough and ready’ and above all practical, and these qualities were assumed to preclude intellectuality. The career of Jones will belie these theories. He bowed to none in seamanship, whether in gale, battle, or normal circumstances, and as a fighter was peerless—yet was an indefatigable student. In interludes between stirring events, he devoured all professional and many other books available to him—frequently by midnight oil or candle after a hard day’s work.

“Moreover Jones constantly sought opportunities for professional study through observation. He was not content to be proficient merely as a single ship commander. He tried earnestly to acquire knowledge of fleet tactics and practices through experience as an observer in active fleet operations.”

From a book review by Captain Dudley W. Knox, USN (Retired) of Lincoln Lorenz’s *John Paul Jones: Fighting for Freedom and Glory*, US Naval Institute, 1943.



FALKLAND OPERATIONS

I

“Super Etendard” Naval Aircraft Operations During The Malvinas War

Commander Jorge Luis Colombo, ARA

Preparation For The Mission

The squadron was incorporated into the armada during the last months of 1981 after the aircraft and pilots arrived from France. At that time the level of flying experience in the Super Etendard was very low (45 flight hours per pilot). The only training thus far had been basic training conducted outside the country. No one had flown the aircraft at night nor had there been any tactical training. Neither had the French Navy provided any attack doctrine that pertained to the new aircraft. The only thing known about the aircraft was the technique of flying it.

During the months of December 1981 and January, February, and March of 1982, we were in the process of evaluating the aircraft's central inertial system and its radar in the air-to-surface mode. Towards the end of March each pilot had accumulated about 80 flight hours. By the time hostilities commenced the individual experience level was at about 100 hours.

On Wednesday, 31 March, the order came down for the squadron to prepare the air-to-surface attack system or, in other words, the Exocet missile for use in the least possible time. Our initial evaluation resulted in a request for one month's time in order to peak the system and to train the pilots in a technique that was virtually new to us. There were no formulated tactics at hand.

This article originally appeared in the October-December 1982 issue of *Boletin Centro Naval*, Republica Argentina. Permission granted for republishing by Captain de Fragata Osvaldo Agustin Garuti, Director. Translated from Spanish by Commander Marshall V.S. Hall, US Navy.

Captain de Fragata Jorge Luis Colombo was the Commanding Officer of the Argentinian Second Naval Air Fighter-Attack Squadron.

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On 1 April we began preparations such as testing: the attack unit which interfaces with the Inertial Navigation System and the Digital Calculator, also the Agave radar system, the Aerodynamic Center, the Information Exchange Unit, etc. It was also necessary to install and test the missile launchers. Most important of all, we had to attach the missile training shape and ensure that everything functioned correctly. During the first part of April we still trusted that French technical assistance from Aerospatiale would be forthcoming by mid-month. Under the terms of a contract the firm was supposed to ensure that the Super Etendard-Exocet system functioned correctly. Within a few days, and with understandable pessimism, we received the news that French assistance would not be forthcoming. This meant that we would not receive valuable information which related in a direct way to system readiness. As a secondary consequence, but one not less important, we were denied the opportunity to avail ourselves of the invaluable experience and knowledge of the designers and manufacturers of the system. If a problem were to occur which exceeded the limits of our basic skills, it would likely remain unsolvable.

"Argentine naval aviation opened the eyes of the world to a new chapter in the doctrine of naval air operations for all modern navies of the West."

The squadron officers, chief petty officers, and petty officers, together with the engineers and technicians of Naval Air Arsenal* Number Two from Espora Naval Air Base, were confronted with a true challenge: make the Super Etendard and its Exocet missile system operational without outside assistance. If this were not enough, it had to be done within thirty days. Working day and night without rest they did it in only fifteen days. The talent of squadron personnel, combined with that of the engineers and technicians, allowed accomplishment of a task which at first had seemed impossible. The Exocet was operational. This missile would leave the rail and it would impact if launched under suitable conditions.

While the technical preparation of the missile required effort and imagination, the tasks of pilot training and operational planning did not require less.

The technique of launching the missile, even though fairly complicated, was more or less known. What it required, however, was intensified training in the use of the aircraft's radar and, among other things, training associated with flying in pairs at more than 500 knots while grazing the water and at the same time maintaining absolute radio silence so as to not announce position. Working in the zone around Puerto Belgrano, and with

*"Arsenal" in Spanish denotes a yard or workshop activity as well as the ordnance related meaning common to English language.

all types of ships including merchant ships and warships, we repeated the missile launch sequence hundreds of times until a minimum level of training in this very complicated work was attained.

But this was without doubt the least difficult aspect of the training. The determination of acquisition tactics was not as difficult as the study of radii of action in the outer range limits of the Super Etendard, or the determination of the flight profile most suitable to ensure penetration through the English defensive system without being detected by radar or electronic countermeasure systems. Moreover, we had to determine the feasibility of operating from Puerto Argentino. Configured for real operations, with missiles and supplementary fuel tanks, we flew from both dry and wet airstrips which simulated the length of the airstrip in the Malvinas.

On a dry airstrip we found that we could comply with the values of the braking curves. This demonstrated to us that we would be able to land at Puerto Argentino but with a very small margin of safety. On a wet airstrip we could not land.

As regards the takeoff, it could be done in the aforementioned configuration but it would be at the design limit without a safety margin. Final conclusion: we would not operate from Puerto Argentino, except to use it as an emergency divert field in the event of battle damage. Accordingly, the need for inflight refueling imposed itself.

Our imperative need was a flight profile which assured several things. First among these things was the ability to operate more than 400 nautical miles from the coast (probably more like 500 nautical miles) since the English ships we were to attack certainly would not operate within this distance from the continent. The flight profile also had to include provision for inflight refueling and, based on the fundamental need to avoid detection, there was also a requirement for an attack leg at maximum velocity beneath the extremities of the radar horizon. Finally there would be missile launch and subsequent evasion.

One thing we could not evaluate was the real capability of English electronic countermeasures. This was especially the case with their first line ships (*Sheffield*, the first of the Type 42 class, had undergone two years of intensive modernization at an approximate cost of \$70 million US). This incertitude led us to a nonpermissive emissions control plan wherein only a minimum number of radar sweeps were allowed when within an anticipated range. In this way we would avoid radar interference (jamming)* and total failure of the mission. In concrete terms, we had to adjust the planning and execution of the flight so as to enter the launch area as discreetly as possible.

*The parentheses are the author's. He uses, however, the Spanish words for "scope blockage" which is best translated as "jamming."

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We would remain very low in altitude, we would launch and then we would exit even faster than we approached. This was the only way of assuring that the mission would be executed professionally while at the same time conserving our scarce and valuable assets. As much as possible we also had to allow for a certain degree of flexibility so as to adjust to the specific situation. Accordingly, success was assured.

We studied the radar curves of the Argentine Type 42 destroyers. The destroyers ARA *Hercules* and ARA *Santisima Trinidad* provided the necessary information. Evidently, the most effective English antiair defense system was equal to that which was installed on these two ships. Then we analyzed the characteristics of the Sea Dart missile (an area defense missile) which was frightful by virtue of its range, precision, and velocity.

Once we had determined the interesting points in its flight profile we practiced against our destroyers. Squadron pilots were embarked on board to observe the results of our attacks as displayed on their radar scopes. Of course, these personnel plus the captain and officers of the ship were given preflight briefings and later they put forward analyses.

We lacked training in inflight refueling. We obtained a KC-130 from the Air Force for exercises. These exercises took place many miles from the coast in total electronic silence. Correct execution of these exercises had the potential to determine subsequent mission success.

Finally, we practiced the complete operation. Takeoff from Espora Naval Air Base, inflight refueling at more than 300 nautical miles from the coast, communication with the explorer aircraft which gave the position of the enemy, followed by attack, escape, and then return to base.

We had asked for thirty days in order to train and peak everything. It took only fifteen days. The squadron was ready.

Execution of the Mission

So far no single detail had been overlooked. But one thing preoccupied us: we had to repeat the same training in the actual zone of operations. That theater was very different. Weather conditions, among other things, were different there.

On Monday, 19 April, two aircraft flew from Espora to Río Grande Naval Air Base. The next day two more aircraft followed. These four Super Etendard aircraft and five Exocet missiles were to constitute the only operational capital that the squadron would have throughout the entire campaign.

Flights in the zone commenced the same day that the squadron arrived at Río Grande. The training was basically the same that had been conducted thus far. The only thing to change was the area of operations. The necessity and utility of the previous phase of training was immediately apparent. Sea state, wave height and almost always a strong wind had presented us with

very distinct radar work and new factors to bear in mind. It was the same with operations from Rio Grande Naval Air Base.

On Friday, 24 April, we met with the Air Force pilots who were operating from the Naval Air Base in their Mirage-Dagger aircraft. They had asked for this briefing in order that we might tell them how we were going to attack. They were interested in knowing how our flights had been developing and also in our planning. It was the first time that they had been confronted with the problem of attacking surface ships. Most of all they wanted to learn about our tactics. They showed particular interest in the analysis of enemy radar capabilities and in enemy evasion methods.

They put forward the possibility of a joint operation. They had in mind the air-to-air capability of their fighter escort aircraft which were armed with Shafrir air-to-air missiles. In order to evaluate this possibility a flight of two Super Etendards and two Daggers was planned for the following day. This single practice with an air escort never came off because after the two Super Etendard aircraft took off both of the Air Force fighters developed problems. One could not take off and the other had to return to base a little after it was airborne due to a fuel system malfunction. After this we never again tried or practiced making our attacks with an escort provided by the Air Force. The reason is very simple: the Super Etendard had established discretion as the basis of its success. This discretion entailed the total absence of radio communications between attacking aircraft and, most important of all, approaching the target at great velocity from far away and at low altitude. The operations also included inflight refueling in order to effect attacks 500 nautical miles from the continent. None of this was possible with an Air Force escort. Our flight profiles were simply incompatible. Operations with a Dagger escort would have entailed the complete loss of our most precious operational characteristics: surprise and discretion. These characteristics were at the same time our best defense. They ensured that we could execute an attack without the enemy being able to launch his aircraft or missiles to impede it or later pursue us. With the exception of inflight refueling, the only joint operation carried out was with Air Force A-4s during the last attack which was made against the aircraft carrier *Invincible*. It was not an operation conducted with escort but one in which, at the request of the Air Force, four Air Force Skyhawk aircraft were added to an attack section of Super Etendard aircraft. This was undertaken to increase the probability of success only from the standpoint of quantity of ordnance launched and even at the cost of surprise and discretion. I will return to this operation in more detail later. All in all, and in the interest of historical truth, this must remain very clear: the Super Etendards were always solitary hunters.

I will pass over those missions which did not result in success and will relate only the three that resulted in sinkings or verified damage. The leaders of the missions and therefore those who were in command were always commanders or lieutenant commanders.

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Attack Upon the Destroyer Sheffield. It took place on Tuesday, 4 May 1982. It was to be the only attack made in accordance with the initial plans which called for antisurface exploration prior to the attack. This surveillance was meant to give an initial target position and identification. It was further desired that the same explorer aircraft maintain contact and update target position just before the attack.

With the initial position of the enemy 100 miles or so south of Puerto Argentino and about 380 miles from the Río Grande Naval Air Base, the Naval Aviation Command ordered takeoff at 0945. Two aircraft with one missile each took off to attack the enemy whose position had been updated at 0915 by an explorer Neptune of the armada. At 1004 we made a rendezvous with the tanker aircraft. After receiving fuel and now being some 250 miles from the target we commenced the final attack phase.

At 1030 both aircraft received an updated target position from the Neptune. At the same time the aircraft were in the midst of really bad meteorological conditions which consisted of squalls and clouds common at that time of year in those latitudes. Visibility was diminished to 1,000 meters and the cloud ceiling was at 500 feet. The targets were 115 miles away and consisted of two medium-sized ships and one large ship.

At 1104 both aircraft launched their missile simultaneously. The targets were displayed on their radar sets. They had practiced so many times before and they had launched, without being detected by the enemy, at a range that assured an ample margin for impact. No type of electronic interference was detected and this indicated a complete surprise.

After missile launch the aircraft reversed course and at maximum speed and always at level flight the aircraft retired without being molested. Another conclusive proof that the discretion which had been so many times analyzed and so obstinately searched for had rendered its fruits. The aircraft landed normally at 1210.

It was an efficient operation executed professionally by professionals. The binomial explorer aircraft-attack aircraft thusly demonstrated its power in a totally new way in war at sea.

The Naval Aviation Arm of the Argentine armada became a pioneer in these new tactics which had never before been used by any country in the world. On Tuesday, 4 May 1982, while fighting for a noble cause in a lost corner of the South Atlantic, Argentine naval aviation opened the eyes of the world to a new chapter in the doctrine of naval air operations for all modern navies of the West. No one can doubt this.

I mentioned before that HMS *Sheffield* would be the only ship attacked according to initial precepts. This resulted from the Neptune's being out of service by mid-May. Flying hundreds of hours before 2 April, they had continued their efficient and silent work without pause from that moment on until they arrived at the limit of material endurance. This was especially the

case as it applied to radar and electronic countermeasure systems. Although the commanding officer of the squadron and his personnel contributed a mighty maintenance effort, the aged equipment could not support such intensive use.

This gave rise to work which was notable for the minuteness and the patience it required. It was one of many little known episodes in this war. It was a product of an unfolding genius within a group of senior and junior naval officers assigned to the Operations Center in Puerto Argentino. It was also a consequence of necessity. As the days passed, their work allowed the last two Super Etendard attacks.

The imperative need to obtain enemy position at sea and the absence of explorer aircraft caused the admiral in charge of Malvinas naval operations to order an analysis of all Sea Harrier radar contacts. These positions, together with those that correlated to loss of contact somewhere at sea, and obtained by means of radar installed in Puerto Argentino, were plotted minute by minute, second by second, day and night without cease. Necessarily, an aircraft which appeared on the radar scopes, and which came from the sea, could not be very far from the ship that launched it. This applied to the Sea Harrier which, having completed its mission, returned to its aircraft carrier.

In this manner we obtained the position data which allowed the later attacks. Enemy positions were transmitted to the Naval Aviation Command on the continent. It was this command which planned the attacks during the period 25-30 May. The two missions carried out during this period were very much alike in their conception and planning. In these operations target position information had vital importance but so did the determination of adequate approach sectors to the target. This ameliorated the lack of surface surveillance information which was so particularly suited to a calculated approach and the optimum utilization of the aircraft and its navigation and attack systems. By such means the Super Etendard, without prior surface exploration, was able to sink the *Atlantic Conveyor* and damage the *Invincible*.

Attack Upon the Containership Atlantic Conveyor. The attack was executed on Tuesday, 25 May 1982; a very special day for Argentines [Argentine Independence Day].

The Naval Aviation Command had received an enemy position by the aforementioned means from Puerto Argentino. An order was issued to attack a target located about 100 nautical miles northeast of Puerto Argentino. The flight, which took a double inflight refueling, was the longest of all with a duration of four hours.

The distance from Río Grande Naval Air Base to the objective was about 500 miles. In accordance with the plan, and taking into account distance and flight characteristics, we asked for the tanker aircraft to take position some 160 miles

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east of Puerto Deseado. Although the route to the attack position was very long it would, however, permit passing 100 miles north of the Malvinas Islands at their closest point. This ensured that the aircraft would not be detected by the dozens of English ships which at this point in the campaign were found in the extreme east of the islands.

After takeoff the aircraft refueled in flight without difficulties. The two Super Etendards initiated their final attack leg more than 270 miles from the target.

At 1632 both aircraft launched their missile at about the same range as during the attack upon *Sheffield*. Both missiles were launched under optimum conditions after both aircraft had acquired the echo on their radars.

As before, the aircraft were not bothered before, during, or after missile launch. Afterwards, and in constant level flight, they set course for Puerto Deseado where they intended to land. The distance to Rio Grande was too great.

However, a chance encounter with the tanker aircraft, which had remained in the area of the initial refueling, allowed another inflight refueling. By this means, and now by night, they returned to Rio Grande Naval Air Base.

By practice this procedure had been demonstrated to be successful. The target position provided to the Naval Aviation Command by the armada was precise. It allowed the conduct of an attack which before the absence of effective exploration would not have been otherwise possible.

The *Atlantic Conveyor* went down and with it went equipment and repair parts which were very important logistic support items for British operations. Later this rebounded* through countless specialized English magazines and in General Jeremy Moore's published accounts which appeared in various Argentine and foreign media.

Attack Upon the Aircraft Carrier *Invincible*. During the course of this last attack the only remaining Exocet missile was launched. The attack was conducted on 30 May 1982. It was led by a lieutenant commander naval aviator.

As a result of analyses made in Puerto Argentino by the armada a new position to attack was identified. This time it was the aircraft carrier *Invincible*. It was situated some 100 miles southeast of Puerto Argentino.

Once more the Naval Aviation Command planned this last attack. The order to attack came on Sunday, 30 May.

In seizing this opportunity we had to take into account the probable effect of the mission flown only five days before. That improvised mission, upon penetrating from the northeast, had achieved total surprise. The English

*Rebounded is the most correct translation of "resaltado." Given the English language context "resounded" might be a better choice of word.

naval force would be preoccupied, in the days after this mission, with defending *Invincible* from an attack from the same sector. The English knew perfectly well that we had only one missile remaining.

This implied that an attack from the southeast sector was the only possible way to achieve the surprise which had so far yielded so much profit in our operations. An approach from the southeast compromised the operation in terms of radius of action because it eliminated the alternative of returning to an airfield closer than the airfield from which the aircraft were launched. This was different from the attack on the *Atlantic Conveyor*. We therefore planned, with detailed precision, for a double inflight refueling along the radial from Rio Grande Naval Air Base. The distance was exceptional (about 500 miles from Rio Grande).

Once the flight was completely planned the Argentine Air Force Headquarters made known its desire for a joint operation. They requested that four A-4C aircraft participate in the operation. The request was based on the precision of the Super Etendard inertial navigation system and its radar which allowed reaching the objective in open water. The only way for the Air Force A-4Cs to reach the target was to follow the Super Etendards. In addition they added the prospect of increasing the quantity of ordnance delivered. We ran the risk of losing surprise and discretion; therefore, we impressed upon them the need for the Air Force aircraft to comply with the same flight profile and the same electronic emissions restrictions of the Super Etendard. This was done and the four aircraft of the Air Force accompanied this attack armed with two 500-pound bombs each.

After takeoff the six aircraft transited to the refueling position which was to the southeast of Isla de los Estados. The refueling was accomplished without difficulty. Continuing on a course to the east the second rendezvous with the tank aircraft was effected so as to top off the fuel tanks just prior to initiating the attack.

At a range of about 300 miles from the objective the attack was initiated. The final course for this phase was to the northeast. The English aircraft carrier was surprised upon being attacked from a direction which was more than 100 degrees off its anti-air defense threat axis which was oriented towards the west.

Once more the missile was launched under excellent conditions from a range which assured an impact. The launching aircraft had an echo on its radar confirmed also by the second Super Etendard which did not launch a missile.

Two A-4 aircraft were brought down by missiles after they were signaled the target's position, range, and bearing. The other two afterwards indicated that they followed the missile's trajectory and arrived at the objective which was wrapped in a dense smoke which was a consequence of missile impact only an instant beforehand. After dropping their bombs the two A-4s

returned to Río Grande. After missile launch the Super Etendards effected an escape and returned to Río Grande without difficulties.

Conclusions

Besides having been the first armada in the history of modern warfare to effectively utilize an air-to-surface missile launched from an aircraft, Argentine naval aviation and its Super Etendard aircraft evidenced the following capabilities inherent to this weapon system:

- Attacks were carried out against naval forces in open waters. These forces consisted of well-defended vital units which had an excellent probability of success. In the rigor of truth, the Super Etendards of the Argentine armada were the only aircraft in Latin America able to successfully perform this type of mission against a modern naval force such as the British fleet.

- The attacks conducted by the Second Naval Air Fighter-Attack Squadron with its Super Etendard had an immediate consequence, from the moment of its dramatic entrance with the sinking of *Sheffield*, of substantially modifying the employment of English naval forces. The Super Etendard was a tremendous additional threat to check. The English fleet was obligated to change not only its defensive disposition but also the location of its ships at sea. With justification we can now say, in terms of what happened in the war at sea, that the Malvinas War was divided into two stages: before and after the first launching of an Exocet missile.

- Finally, the English knew perfectly well that only three missiles remained after the first launching. The intelligent measuring out of this threat throughout almost all of the conflict, a correct administration of the means to employ the missile, and the professionalism with which only vital objectives were chosen, significantly altered the normal development of British operations at sea.



FALKLAND OPERATIONS

II

Fighting by the Rules

Commander Christopher Craig, D.S.C., Royal Navy

HMS *Alacrity*, a type 21 general-purpose frigate, sailed from the United Kingdom on 5 April 1982 and accompanied the two carriers, HMS *Hermes* and HMS *Invincible*, throughout their passage south. We were subject to the first Argentine Mirage attack on 1 May, partook in the Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) operations, were involved in a variety of naval gunfire support missions and clandestine operations, ran a number of night transport convoys into San Carlos water after the amphibious landing on 21 May, and had the dubious privilege of being present in the carrier battle group during each of the Exocet attacks. We departed the TEZ just before the fall of Port Stanley. Throughout this period I was, as Commanding Officer, privy to the evolution of the Rules of Engagement and quite naturally held a deep and vested interest in the rules—rules that were necessary to ensure our survivability, to police the TEZ effectively, and yet afforded us the necessary freedom to be militarily effective in pursuit of our aims.

The Royal Navy's Use of Exclusion Zones. From the outset, we in the task force saw the United Kingdom's position as being rooted in a "self defensive" posture under the UN Charter's Article 51. Everything we undertook—deploying the task force, establishing the Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ) and Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ), and effecting a landing—were predicated upon this basic assumption. I believe this has been our national standpoint throughout.

The declaration of the MEZ on 7 April became effective on the 12th. At this stage we had a nuclear-powered attack submarine on station. This MEZ became the Total Exclusion Zone on 30 April. For it to be effective, it was necessary that our carrier air assets, our "police" force, should be within 200 nm of Port Stanley. We had of course given due notice to the world as early as

Commander Craig, Commanding Officer of HMS *Alacrity* during the Falklands

Campaign, is now serving at The Maritime Tactical School.

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23 April that any approach by Argentine units which could amount to a threat to any of our forces would be dealt with appropriately; the scope of this warning was not restricted to the Exclusion Zone.

This leads us to an emotive issue—the sinking of the Argentine cruiser *General Belgrano*. The clear perception of the Commander Task Group, Rear Adm. John Woodward, was that the *Belgrano* formed the southern arm of a three-pronged surface attack force. This threat, coupled with the facts that the *Belgrano* was less than 12 hours steaming from the task force and that darkness was coming on, warranted her being attacked under the terms of the last warning. Her sinking, as you know, had a devastating deterrent impact upon the Argentine surface fleet. Subsequent action led to the loss of the *Sheffield*; after which we reiterated our intentions by warning Argentina that her surface and air units outside their 12-mile territorial limits could well be “in play.” With this background let us take a closer look at the Rules of Engagement (ROE): rules that were staffed and transmitted on the traditional basis that we would observe accepted international law at all times.

Minimum force to ensure survivability was very much the keynote of early operations; hence, anticipatory self defense had to be addressed. Our national ROE publication was our primary source document with the addition of some new rules with specific South Atlantic relevance. The Ministry of Defence produced a library of the rules most likely to be used and, hence, comprehensive pre-briefing of decision makers was possible.

A clear statement of the ROE politico-military environment always accompanied basic rules at any stage. This writer cannot overly stress the importance to the on scene commanders for having this overall perspective to guide their interpretation of the basic rules. Although the staffing and production of the rules were a notable success, the end product could not help but be complex. Identification criteria were established, as were the critical threat ranges of enemy units so as to deal appropriately with hostile intent when the situation warranted.

In the ships of the task force, total familiarity with the rules by the command team involved much care and thoroughness, and extended to the Commander Task Group “quizzing” his commanding officers on their familiarity with the rules extant. It clearly demonstrated the degree that the military bent to political reality and to the constraints of international law, as it always *must*. I believe it also ensured that we had no engagements between our own units—firm identification criteria curbed too ready a trigger-finger!

The following are some of the areas which posed the greatest problems:

- How to deal with the shadower, particularly if it were a Boeing 707 or a trawler.

- Resupply merchantmen and in particular the place of the naval auxiliary in this generic title.

- The safety of civilians adjacent to naval gunfire support targets 10 miles away on a darkened island at night.
- Unidentified air contacts by night or in low visibility.

At this point it would be useful to describe actions in which my ship took part which required clear, unambiguous rules and, yet, where something less than unbridled aggressive action was called for.

On the afternoon of 1 May, we carried out the first, and almost the last, day bombardment of Port Stanley airport. A bombing and strafing attack from three Mirages convinced us all that night bombardments might be a more palatable and enduring prospect for the future. On that day and, thereafter, our targets were clearly delineated and all of the 8,000 shells from HM ships were directed solely onto military targets with safety zones between them and adjacent civil areas. The accuracy of our systems allowed us considerable confidence. Indeed, to my knowledge only two dwellings were damaged by naval gunfire, and then only in the final stages of the advance upon Stanley. Clearly if we had been allowed unrestricted engagements of key military targets, such as radar sites that had been placed near the population centers, we would have been more effective. But it was never considered nor could it be. Similarly, the frustration at being unable to "soften up" the heavy troop concentration at Fox Bay, Goose Green, and other places, was tempered by a clear awareness of the plight of the adjacent Falklanders. Nevertheless, we did ensure that the jockeys of the Port Stanley racecourse were confronted with somewhat uneven going for many months ahead—the Argentinians having placed considerable military presence on the racecourse.

On 11 May the *Alacrity* undertook the first and only complete transit of Falkland Sound by an HM ship before the landings. We were detached from the carrier battle group at midday on 10 May and were to reconnoiter the southern harbors of both East and West Falklands—before attempting overnight, the first penetration of Falkland Sound. The mission was primarily to counter any Argentine resupply efforts, but the verified absence of mines would be most relevant to plans for the forthcoming landing. The ship made the 100-mile transit to the Falklands silently, at 25 knots, relying upon satellite navigation to skirt just south of shore radar detection range. Late in the afternoon, our Lynx flew a two-hour sortie during which the crew reconnoitered the rocky natural harbors south of the two main islands, whilst the ship continued westward almost to the longitude of Weddell Island to the extreme west of East Falkland. Both ship and aircraft were grateful for the thick overcast and the one-half mile visibility in fog which denied the Argentine Air Force an attack opportunity.

Shortly before midnight the ship entered the narrow southern strait of Falkland Sound, still grateful for the cover afforded by continuous rain and a

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100-foot cloud base. At this time there was intense speculation as to whether the Argentines had mined the Sound! Accordingly, we planned our transit at slow speed, in a totally quiet condition and without benefit of our echo sounder. Our anxiety at the possibility of mines was matched by uncertainty over Argentine artillery positions—the narrows of the channel often being little more than two miles across.

After one hour of transit the Lynx was launched to reconnoiter Fox Bay to the south and to act as a diversion. Flying conditions were appalling. At 0035 a moving radar contact was detected in the channel 6 miles ahead of us, proceeding north at a similar speed, 10 kts. I gradually increased speed to close the gap in the hope of identifying the contact in the open waters to the north of Swan Island where there would be room to maneuver and to evade shore fire. When the distance had closed to 4.8 miles we saw the vessel alter sharply to port, then increase speed and change her heading to gain cover of North Swan Island two miles away.

I fired a starshell in the hope of identifying the stranger, without success. Hence, I commenced fire at the vessel at 0112. The first dozen rounds were equipped with airburst fuzing so as to deter the vessel from further flight rather than to attempt to sink her. After two minutes I checked fire to assess the effect. But the quarry continued towards shelter, steering evasively. I then recommenced fire at 0117 with contact fuzing. We saw a number of hits, three of them sizable, even through the soaking gloom. Once more I checked fire, but still the ship continued toward shelter. Again I recommenced fire and, after about forty rounds, there was a large orange flash which rose up into the cloud base—two minutes later the radar contact faded from the screen. The vessel destroyed was later established to be the Argentine naval transport *Islas de los Estados*, which was carrying, according to information obtained from captured Argentines later, 325,000 liters of aviation fuel and some military vehicles.

Life jacket lights were sighted close inshore, some five miles south of the Argentine garrison at Port Howard, hence out of navigable waters and beyond my assistance. *Alacrity* recovered her helicopter, completed her transit at high speed in order to deny Argentine forces any chance to retaliate, and finally passed through the northern channel at 0300. There were no mines along our track!

The lesson here was that I had the rules which gave me the operational flexibility to engage a militarily important target. I had the required identification criteria to engage a valid target before he could escape.

So what are the key “messages” to be learned that would be instructive regarding Exclusion Zones and Rules of Engagement?

Exclusion Zones.

- The exclusion zone can greatly simplify the military commander's

task—especially against submarine and air threats—particularly if the criteria which are deemed to demonstrate hostile intent by intruders are clearly defined.

- Declaration of the zone *must* be early enough to allow the potential foe to respond as you wish—always allowing for the difficulties of strategic communications, particularly with his subsurface units.

- The benefits of exclusion zones will clearly hinge upon:

- (1) Adequate “police” force levels.
- (2) The presence and density of neutrals.
- (3) The complexities of identification criteria required.
- (4) The potential for escalation that their enforcement will generate.

Rules of Engagement.

- In a world where the stakes of escalation become ever higher, the necessity for clear and comprehensive rules is plain.

- Briefing staffs ashore must anticipate the distant military needs whilst their counterparts afloat harness and present their ROE requests with clarity, thoroughness, and an awareness of the political issues involved.

- It is necessary to think through most thoroughly the problem of the innocent intruder or the fleeting submarine contact.

- Educating both the politician and the military man is essential both for the compilation and the transmission of rules, as well as for the swift and responsible interpretation required “in the field.”

I believe that for the Royal Navy in the South Atlantic, both the Exclusion Zones and Rules of Engagement worked well. I never felt my survival to be threatened by too rigid rules, nor was my flexibility of operation unduly impaired, and yet my freedom of action was always tied firmly to the political requirements. Equally important, I believe that throughout the campaign we conducted ourselves within the bounds of international law, and with due awareness and concern to our international reputation for a civilized code of conduct.



Guarding the First Amendment—for and from the Press

Captain Wayne P. Hughes, US Navy (Retired)

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

AMENDMENT I to the Constitution

I'm down here to take an island. I don't need you running around and getting in the way. [And to anyone who tries:] We'll stop you. We've got the means to do that.

Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf III

When the press were not granted immediate and unlimited access to Grenada, then their righteous indignation struck like a hurricane. From the snarls of the cub reporters on nearby Barbados to David Brinkley's stately protestations in Congressional testimony, across the spectrum of the news media we saw our journalists behaving like caged tigers, smelling blood and waiting to pounce: to probe and paw and interview and interrogate and investigate and, yes, bring war back into the family room.

But lo, the American public who "have a right to know" the atrocities of the US Armed Forces and inanities of their generals did not join in the hue and cry. The people seemed content, even glad, to have their government succeed, and to accept that soldiers make mistakes, too, and that war is a bloody business.

This revelation to the press took several weeks to sink in. But by mid-December the proud watchdogs were humbled, and journalism's deepest and most introspective self-examination in my memory was underway. The nature of this chastisement of the press by the people is a subject to which we shall turn in a moment.

Captain Hughes is on the faculty of the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.

The first press suspicion was along lines that Government had learned the value of censorship-by-exclusion from the British experience in the Falklands. Nearer to the truth was that this Administration had taken its lesson from the Vietnam war and determined that the press would not enjoy the uninhibited freedom of reporting that characterized that war. It was a lesson the leaders of government and the armed forces learned too well, and that is the second subject to which we will return.

But first, we have to settle what the argument is about: the freedom of access by the press guaranteed by the First Amendment. The purpose of the amendment is to serve as a check on tyranny, most notably by Government, but also by business, landholders, anyone or any group that abuses its power by purveying false or self-serving information—including the press itself. The argument is about safeguarding this access so that when the wolf is truly in the flock then people who may do something about it (not entirely the same as “The People who have a right to know . . .”) will know and not be numb to the danger, sated by day-to-day media hyperbole. Two hundred years of legal interpretations of the First Amendment aside, this is the essence of what is to be preserved.

“Thus my fellow citizens if an imprudent writer attacks your reputation, dearer to you than perhaps your life . . . you may go to him openly and break his head.”

As to Grenada, access by the press to the scene of action and its participants is a right which we all should wish to see guaranteed. Access for anyone with a press card who wished to be anywhere he wanted any time he wanted is another matter and not a necessary safeguard against depotism. On the contrary unconstrained freedom of access comes closer to creating a tyranny by the press. There are two reasons for this. One is that the reporting by some “journalists” will be sensational, slanted, imperceptive, commercialized, or all of the above, and at the least will inundate, obfuscate and desensitize the public perception. George Orwell, whose year 1984 seems to be concentrated on tyranny of the mind as the greater evil, and it is precisely this that is the peculiar threat of an undisciplined as well as on overdisciplined press corps.

The second hazard is that of self-fulfilling prophesy, in its least harmful form through the creation of media events, and in its worst the danger of reporters who become advocates, and then themselves participants who would steer events. To him who sighs and says, no one can observe without forming opinions, I say, ah, just so. The opinions held, not to say roles played, by reporters concerning the overthrow and assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem—which were brought to light with the help of *The Wall Street Journal*—go a long way toward explaining the hostility of those men subsequently toward the war. As the *Journal* editorized (2 November 1983):

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"The anti-Diem faction dominated by press through the efforts of three young men in Saigon—David Halberstam of *The New York Times*, Neil Sheehan of UPI and Malcomb Browne of AP. The pro-Diem faction was represented by Marguerite Higgins of *The New York Herald Tribune*, who had already covered two other wars. The significance of this is that those who championed the coup have written the popular history of its aftermath. Mr. Halberstam's writings are best understood as an attempt to blame the outcome in Vietnam on everything but the coup. Mr. Sheehan, by then with the *Times*, was the recipient of the Pentagon Papers leak He used the papers, an enormous and ambiguous record from which nearly any lesson could be drawn, to advance the preposterous notion that we had entered the war by stealth, without anyone in the public or Congress noticing."

I still have a letter from Mrs. M. Tregaskis dated 19 July 1977, commenting on a footnote to an essay published in the Naval Institute *Proceedings*, in which I said:

"The most extraordinary thing about the reporting of the war was that responsible individuals in the news media thought they were reporting it objectively To prepare for the next war, some ground rules had better be established in advance defining the proper degree of journalistic freedom."

She wrote:

"As an experienced reporter of wars in Asia I wish to . . . agree with you.

"The most extraordinary thing about the reporting of the Vietnam war, however, is quite different: No one, anywhere, seems to have questioned why it was reported in the manner you describe. I will tell you why

"There would be no authorized press corps whatsoever. No member of the press would be authorized to receive the basic military assistance granted to the press in every other war No member of the press would be authorized military travel orders . . . [or] in-country medical care For the first time when Americans have fought in war, billets, status and mobility were denied There would be no censorship of whatever press were available in-country.

"The decisions caused havoc in the mechanics of war reportage . . . in practical terms, this meant that anybody could go to Vietnam. And anybody did. All one had to do was to talk an editor into a letter, buy his own commercial ticket to Saigon, present the letter to MACV and RVN Information, and immediately receive press cards, no questions asked. Letterheads came from small publications. Some of the newspeople were recent journalism graduates, some had never seen a bloody nose, some sought sensationalism, some had no background in the writings of Lenin, Stalin, Mao, Ho Chi Minh, or General Giap. Most had no experience in war.

"A few responsible newspeople did go to Vietnam. They were voices in the wilderness . . . From experience I know that no war can be objectively covered without orders and censorship . . . it is the temper of the time to shrink from the idea of censorship. That is unfortunate."

And then she writes a sentence for all of us to ponder: "Censorship in war is valid, and necessary to preserve objectivity."

At Grenada the press were, in the attempt, excluded for about forty-eight hours.* Looking back we may believe that nothing, literally nothing, was concealed that the First Amendment was framed to uncover. Is a "forty-eight hour exclusion" as exercised at Grenada a good model to adopt for the future? It depends, as for instance, on questions of the security of future operations. But in general, I think not. Obviously Metcalf did not decide on the policy for handling the press at Grenada. It was the style of implementation that was his own. Considering that some elephants have to be hit on the head with a 4x4, Metcalf was probably the perfect officer to get their attention. After the dust settled I wonder whether he did not win more respect than less by his unequivocal stand in the heat of the moment. We may believe that the real Metcalf spoke some weeks later when he was addressing his fellow officers in San Diego. "If I had somebody come to me and say 'OK, here is a group of eight press people . . . how would you feel about taking them with you?' I would have taken them along." On the other side of the coin as he also said, he would have worried about the influence of a large number of reporters on his mission. This is a better model to adopt for the future than a total exclusion, no matter how temporary. Why, then, can't we adopt it?

We probably can, but to do so we must first recognize the Achilles heel of the press, its secret sorrow in exercising its freedom protected by the First Amendment. It is the irony of the press that, like our elected officials, it also is not independent of the people. The press serves the people, but on the darker side it is beholden to them. Thrilling though it was to see the press battered by public opinion, which as John Chancellor reported, ran 5 to 1 in support of the press ban in Grenada, it was an ominous turn of events. First, because we saw the public suspicion that results when press reporting is believed to be laced with sensationalism. Second, and more subtly with the recollection that the early days of Mussolini, Hitler, and the Russian Revolutionaries were also popular with the people, it is a mixed blessing to see a chastened press reorienting itself to the attitudes of its customer.

A totalitarian government finds a free press intolerable, and so controls or manipulates it. But under any government someone will control the press—that is to say, direct its operations and policy. The advantage of a "free" press is the diversity of that control. Nevertheless, there is a touch of irony in that while we

**Time* was pleased to report some agents in place. There may have been other reporters on the island, but their reporting was stifled by lack of means of transmission.

are proud to have a press that is the Voice of The People, in a democracy the people collectively can be a great tyrant, short of vision, and interested in personal comfort, self-satisfaction, tangible goods, and entertainment, as well as knowledge, open discussion, and the preservation of life and liberty. In our democracy, governments—federal, state, and local—along with interest groups and businesses, all cater to these public interests. While I wouldn't change this, we must appreciate one consequence of the power of the people as it effects our "free" press.

The news media are businesses. Most of them are very big businesses. The greatest of them are components of gigantic entertainment businesses: CBS, NBC, ABC, and CNN. The least among them have components of the entertainment business: even a little independent newspaper carries Miss Manners, Goren on Bridge and the comics, and my wife knows I do not submit to my morning addiction of gathering up the *Monterey Peninsula Herald* merely to see whether the Marines have been bombed again.

In the truly big businesses, the Dan Rathers and Roger Mudds command salaries that define them as celebrities, and their networks function under a veneer of social responsibility so thin that it is transparent to all, in a cynical atmosphere of scoops, ratings, personal prestige, and power reminiscent of Hollywood's Sammy Glick. No wonder that the controversial, the confrontational, the self-proclaimed crisis, the ninety-second interview, and the predatory search for venality in eminent men have become not merely a part, but very nearly the whole part, of television journalism. Since nearly 10 minutes of every 30 minute newcast is now given over to advertising, which will go to any extreme to capture the viewer's attention, the television audience can never be sure whether they are being enticed, entertained, or informed.

As many mourned, when Walter Cronkite retired the last of the career journalists—Eric Severeid, Edward R. Murrow, Huntley and Brinkley—passed from the scene, replaced by anchormen who earned their reputations as personalities like Ted Koppel and Tom Brokaw, or as demon-hounds like Mike Wallace, Barbara Walters, and Rather. We may know as we know the spirit of J.P. Morgan and Leland Stanford that television news wanted to be on the scene in Grenada for blood in proportion to public interest as 100 is to one.

Newspapers and magazines are better guardians. How to make them better still as the watchdogs of democracy ought to be a question of the most fundamental nature. Op-Ed pundits are flagrant pamphleteers. Investigative reporters at their worst become as scandalous in their distortion of truth in the name of sensation as the scandals they portray (H.L. Mencken said never aim lower than the mayor; a crooked alderman cannot win you a Pulitzer Prize). And who will sit in judgment of the long-term consequences of Hearst's role in fomenting the Spanish-American War, McCormick's grandiose Anglophobia, or the direction of Luce's China policies, as

compared with the modern editorial policies of *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, or *U.S. News and World Report*? For better and worse, newspapers mold events as well as report them.

Still, newspaper journalists are steeped with good intentions. *Time* ran a cover story so professionally self-critical that I thought until near the end of it that there would be nothing else to say. More than a year ago in "A Newspaper Editor Looks at the Press," Michael J. O'Neill of the *New York Daily News* wrote: "No code of chivalry requires us to challenge every official action. Our assignment is to report and explain issues, not decide them. We are supposed to be the observers, not the participants—the neutral party, not the permanent political opposition. We should cure ourselves of our adversarial mindset." And he went on to say much more that needed to be said and heard by his fellow journalists. Last December *The Wall Street Journal* reprinted from Benjamin Franklin in "Notable and Quotable":

"My proposal then is to leave the liberty of the press untouched, to be exercised to its full extent, force and vigor; but to permit the *liberty of the cudgel* to go with it *pari passu*. Thus my fellow citizens if an imprudent writer attacks your reputation, dearer to you perhaps than your life . . . you may go to him openly and break his head . . . If however it should be thought that this proposal of mine may disturb the public peace I would then humbly recommend to our legislators to take up the consideration of both liberties, that of the press and that of the cudgel, and by an explicit law mark their extent and limits and, at the same time they secure the person of a citizen from assaults, they would likewise provide for the security of his *reputation*."

When the press looks itself in the eye with such wit and wisdom then we may give a cheer for it as a worthy medium of both entertainment and enlightenment. The American press has, on the face of it, no peer in the rest of the world. Television news at its graphic best is an unparalleled medium of communication and it is a deep frustration to watch it sink into the bondage of show business. It remains in the interest of all of us to continue to sanction the news media in their watchdog role and to be charitable of the occasional bully of the language or the video tape. For what are journalists but policemen and who carries more derision on his shoulders than a policeman on his beat? Still, there are "Georgia cops" of the news business, too, and we may ask for standards of comparable propriety from the guardians of our minds as of our persons.

If press freedom is, as it were, too important to be left to the journalists, who will watch the watchdogs? That is the harder question, even after setting aside questions of constitutionality. A government organ? Another instrumentality of government!? No matter how independent, as with lifetime appointments of judges or the freedom of maneuver of the Federal Reserve Board, this solution is not for me. The history of both these

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examples speaks for itself. A self-appointed body, then, like the American Bar Association, the Motion Picture Association of America, the National Safety Council, the Consumers Union, or the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church? Better. But the press already has its Society of Professional Journalists and other associations, and I doubt that they could or should act in a self-governing capacity.* Free the press from the profit motive, then, with a BBC or PBS on the grand scale? Not in my game plan. I still cling to the hope that competition will engender and not stifle quality, creativity, originality and acumen in journalism as in other forms of business.

So I do not encourage an instrumentality of press restraint in peacetime. But there can and must be delimitations in time of war. The press, which after Grenada were quick to point out a tradition of front line coverage in all prior wars, omitted to mention that on most of those occasions restraints had been imposed by the government.

That these days the mechanism of restraint will be hard to come by illustrates as well as anything the nature of the First Amendment problem in war. Equitability is difficult when big entertainment businesses are the target. But once the dollar values and egos are recognized for what they are—threats to, not defenders of, a free press—then good men could agree on a plan, under the Metcalf model, in about thirty minutes.

I had a dream. It was that Admiral Metcalf asked me which eight of the press to take with him, and that this was my list:

1. *Time* or *Newsweek* (by flip of the coin; for guarding the public interest there was not enough difference to matter).
2. *The Los Angeles Times* or *The New York Times* (by similar lot).
3. *The Wall Street Journal* or *The Christian Science Monitor* (by lot again, but I hoped the *Journal* would get the nod).
4. AP or UPI.
5. *USA Today* or the *Armed Forces Journal* (not exactly symmetrical, but on balance should average out).
6. *The Louisville Courier-Journal* (besides being competent, employed one of my best friends. A little cronyism was inevitable).
7. A Wild Card (some allusion to sports had to be brought in).
8. *Izvestia* (for many reasons, all having to do with keeping the role of the press—ours and theirs—in perspective).

No paper from Washington DC was invited: too close to the seat of government.** No photographers were allowed, and only two polaroid

*After the Grenada backlash the society's solution was to launch a program to explain First Amendment freedoms and conduct a public survey.

**At a panel discussion on "Communications Media," reprinted in the *Naval War College Review* in February 1971, Neil Sheehan made an assertion that I took to heart. He said the American press are not too critical but not nearly critical enough of Government. The press is too ready to serve as the mouthpiece of Government and mindless partner of it. My tongue-in-cheek solution is to leave the Washington press

cameras, which were enough to reproduce any vital evidence the Armed Forces photographers had covered up.

No TV networks were represented at the outset for the reasons aforementioned. I conceded that eventually coverage would have to include the networks, who after all have among the most powerful lobbies in Washington. But I held out against those grating closing lines, *à la* "This is Sam Donaldson, CBS News, Grenada," which tell so much about the rise of the cult of personal reporting on television. There was a time when the sense of personal reputation in the by-line outweighed the cloak of anonymity of the AP dispatch. But the rush to status by thunder and lightning seems to have overtaken the temperance of individual accountability.

Of course daydreaming and whimsy do not solve the problem. If we are serious then eight journalists is not enough to cover a war, and there really are vital questions: of mobility around the scene of combat and I know not what else. In addition there is the issue of censorship. We have, recall, that curious statement of Mrs. Tregaskis, "Censorship in war is valid, and necessary to preserve objectivity." What did she mean? I venture this: that the specter of an outside check is worth more in raising the level of accuracy, restraint, and self-discipline among the biased, the ignorant, and the innocent than the cost perchance of suppressing, for the moment, facts that belong in the record. I do not know how to establish all the rules of press restraint to balance the threats of ideological tyranny by the Government off against that of the press. But on the evidence from Vietnam, both the Government and the press are capable of twisting the facts, and the sickly atmosphere of confrontation and distrust that occurred then is not one that serves the public interest to repeat. The time to work out the balance, with the interests of press, government, and public all represented, is before the war begins. Establishing a *modus vivendi* in time of peace will hardly reduce the trauma of it. Nothing involving government, big business, and press censorship would or should be decided quickly. But if we can manage it, almost any plan with these three interests all represented will offer more hope of safeguarding the First Amendment for and from our free press than doing nothing and risking either overweening censorship or overwrought war reporting. Besides, the process may afford us, the people, some titillating headlines and—what else is important?—some more entertainment.



corps at home. My serious advice for anyone who would understand the role of the press in wartime is to read Sheehan and then S.L.A. Marshall's rebuttal in the April issue. Marshall also advanced wartime censorship as necessary and urgently so.

The Government's Need for Secrecy vs. the People's Right to Know

Nick Kotz

When defending our importance to the country, we in the press are fond of quoting Thomas Jefferson: "Were it left to me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers or newspapers without a government, I would not hesitate a moment to choose the latter." But only on the rarest occasion do we acknowledge that the father of the Constitution, the sage of Monticello, also said of us: "I do not take a single newspaper, nor read one a month, and I feel myself infinitely happier for it."

The first statement was made before Thomas Jefferson became President. The second came afterwards, when he had to grapple as President with reporters and editors, and with disagreeable situations which won less than total public approval.

The living first amendment is much more complicated and nettlesome than it is in Jefferson's sublime idealization. In essence, the first amendment says that Congress shall make no law restricting freedom of speech or of assembly or of religion. Unfortunately, most of the first amendment issues which arise between news media and government, and particularly between news media and the military, are drawn far too narrowly. At stake are not the parochial needs, interests or convenience, either of the news business or of the military profession. The public's long-term interest in our self-governing democracy usually lies beyond and well above most squabbles about secrecy between press and President, news media and Navy.

Let me begin by stating unequivocally that the government does have a need for secrecy. There are few reporters (certainly not this one), there are few Americans who question the need of the government for secrecy to protect our national interests. The more difficult questions are these: How many secrets? About which matters? And for how long?

What are legitimate security information needs? At the risk of oversimplification, there are perhaps two basic needs: first, information about imminent ship or troop movements which would endanger American lives by

supplying such information to an enemy. Second, information about a weapons system or a strategic plan which would endanger American lives or critically compromise our long-term national security, again by supplying such information to an enemy. And I would submit to you that we in the American press, as patriotic American citizens, have an outstanding record of maintaining vital secrets of national security.

When such secrets are revealed, I would contend strongly, it is most often by government officials—for their own official or unofficial purposes.

The critical issue, however, does not involve the rights of the government nor the rights of the press. The crucial issue involves the fundamental needs in our American society for freedom of speech and, secondly, for ready access and availability of information by American citizens; and not just about military matters but about all aspects of our society. I would argue this case not only on grounds of democratic idealism—the obvious needs of an informed public to make choices in self-governance—but also on practical grounds, with which we live each day.

We live in a highly complex, highly bureaucratized, highly dangerous world. And in it, I would contend, secrecy is a major enemy. It is the enemy of efficiency, of creativity, of cooperation, of progress, of wise decision-making. Secrecy covers up inefficiency; it obscures wrong-headed concepts; and, yes, it conceals outright corruption. Most often, secrecy is maintained primarily for the convenience of the secret keeper, either to enhance his or her power, to make him look good politically, or to avoid embarrassment. All of those aims may be helpful to the President of the United States or the president of General Motors or the president of a major university, but they are most often contrary to the public interest.

We have far too much official secrecy in this country and, as a practical matter, it does not serve our military well, nor does it serve us well as a country. But first, let's dispose of the recent matter of Grenada. The government was wrong in not taking the press along. The public was entitled to an independent view of what happened from the outset, and contrary to what immediate polls show, I think that the government's credibility will be hurt in the long run. But the issue, again, is not press vs. government. The issue is the credibility of all of our large bureaucratic institutions, the credibility of the press, the credibility of the government, of industry, of labor, of the universities. And secrecy harms the credibility of our major American institutions. A National Opinion Research Center poll published on 12 December 1983 in *Time* Magazine showed that only 13.7 percent of Americans placed a great deal of trust in the press. The trust rating for television was 12.7 percent. Lest federal government executives begin to gloat at these statistics, it should be noted that their own trust rating was a meager 13.3 percent.

Operationally, how could Grenada have been handled? The chief of Navy information could have called six print reporters (all of whom he knows well)

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and perhaps one TV crew, telling them to get their boots and to be at Andrews Air Force Base in one hour. I think most military information officers will attest that these six men and women, patriots all, would not have violated one iota of American security on that operation. They would, however, have provided an independent view of what was happening there.

Yes, there would have been squawks. Five hundred editors would have complained; three networks would have complained; the news magazines, if all of them were not included, would have been unhappy. But the public would have had an independent view from the outset and security would not have been violated.

In fact, Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf, commander of the Grenada operation, later told an interviewer he would have allowed a pool of eight journalists, but did not want to deal with a press corps numbering in the hundreds. So, let's not get hung up in a discussion of the logistical problems of taking along complicated TV crews and herds of reporters. That is really not the issue.

I would like to illustrate how different forms of secrecy have hampered our society. The first example is from industry. Think about General Motors and the ill-fated Corvair. Think about Ford and the Pinto which sometimes exploded when somebody banged into its rear end. Think of all the other "goof-ups" that have happened in our auto industry—errors which were basically covered up by bureaucratic secrecy—and consider whether in the long run our most important basic American industry has been badly crippled because, in the short run, we had too damn much secrecy.

Item number two, the FBI. In an operation called COINTELPRO, the FBI tried to destroy a man by the name of Martin Luther King, Jr. Because of secrecy that abomination of everything this country is all about went on for seven years.

Item number three involves the military—and here I only want to pose a question. If the flow of military information had been adequate, had been free enough to examine the extensive reliability studies that existed in the government's hands about the helicopters being used on the Iranian rescue mission, I wonder whether there would not have been twice as many helicopters taken along, even though that would have, to some extent, made the mission more detectable. Writing later about the failed mission, its commander, Colonel Charles Beckwith, blamed excessive secrecy for numerous failures of coordination and execution in the mission.

Item number four, military procurement. You pick the example. Take any of a dozen recent weapons development programs from the M-16 rifle to the Maverick missile and ask—why we do not have better weapons? Why doesn't the military, responsible for defending us, have better weapons, more reliable weapons, at more effective cost? One reason, I strongly contend, is excessive secrecy, which has covered up conceptual flaws, inefficiency and failures—

problems which if they had been exposed at an early stage would have cried out for eliminating some weapons systems entirely, and most certainly for basic overhaul of concepts, for changes in design, and for getting tough with contractors.

A Navy captain recently spoke to a class of mine at American University about this issue. This captain was the project officer in charge of one of our important missile systems. He was describing with considerable frustration how the military-industrial-political bureaucracy works.

"You know what happens," he said. "Early on in the game when you try to point out that the damn thing doesn't work, and that the costs are out of hand; they say to you, 'please don't say anything, it's too early. If you point that out now, we won't get the rest of our funding.'"

"Later on in the game—when the situation is running out of control—and you again try to raise the issue within the councils of the government—you are told, 'you're right, the thing doesn't work, but it's too late and we've got to make the best of it.'"

Item number five—Vietnam. We could talk about it all day long. Essentially, secrecy was used selectively. We got over-optimistic body counts; we got low counts on infiltration rates; we were not told about the bombing that went on in Cambodia. Essentially, what was the product of all of this secrecy? We did not deny any information to our enemy. The enemy knew and we knew the enemy knew. The American people, and unfortunately people in crucial decision-making positions in the military itself and in our Congress, were deceived. Walter Cronkite did not lose the war. No amount of secrecy could have won the war in Vietnam.

Three current examples of policy matters are as fresh as your daily newspaper. The *Washington Post* recently carried a front-page story about a secret Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting on 8 November 1983 in which the JCS, by a 3-2 vote favored a joint space command. The two dissenting votes were cast by the CNO and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Someone violated the secrecy of that JCS meeting—someone, I would venture, whose interest is served by further public debate of that very important issue. No matter whoever leaked the vote to the press, the point is that the public interest requires that this kind of basic policy issue be decided openly, so that the dissenting views can be thoroughly aired, so that best judgments can be exercised. After all, the Navy might be *right* and the public and Congress might agree!

The second example of secrets appearing in the paper was in the same day's *Washington Post*. It involved a current disagreement between the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency over the percentage of the Soviet gross national product being put into its defense effort, and the annual increases in Soviet defense spending. The CIA is using a much lower

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number for rises in Soviet defense spending than is the DIA. And the DIA will not give its methodology to Congress. There are those within the government—some who suspect, others who acknowledge—that the DIA may be blowing up its numbers as a means of making a better case for greater defense spending. If that is the case, it is a monstrous deception for our military, for us as citizens, for our entire society. It is a most dangerous game. It is folly for us not only to deceive ourselves as a people; I think it is folly in this dangerous game of world survival for us and the Soviets to deceive each other about such basic matters.

The third current example concerns a bitter October 1983 controversy *within* top councils of the Reagan administration over who had leaked to the news media a Mideast strategy discussion. FBI interrogations were called for, lie detector tests threatened, firings and resignations intimated after the press reported that some administration officials had recommended to the President air strikes against Syrian positions in Lebanon.

When the dust had cleared the results were predictable. No leaker was removed or punished. But it was deduced that the information was probably put out by government officials, acting in good faith, trying "to send the Syrians a message." This scenario is typical of what happens all the time. The government is a huge bureaucracy—and even within its highest reaches—it speaks with many voices. And most often, those many voices represent *not* confusion and weakness but the characteristic of democracy that best distinguishes it from those bureaucratic dictatorships which are autocracies that speak with one voice, from which no one dares dissent, even if the voice blunders horribly.

Far too often, secrecy is used as a matter of political convenience, to gain an advantage, to avoid an embarrassment. Secrets are revealed, willy-nilly, by policy holders to make a point, to win an argument, to serve as propaganda.

Lyndon Johnson, when he was President, had an obsession about keeping his options open until the very last moment of decision. He would get furious when anything was printed which limited his options. He knew well that surprise is an element of power, not just military power but political power as well.

We all like to keep our options open. I like to keep my options open. But really the ultimate issue is that if the President or the CNO is permitted always to keep his options open, then what options do we have as citizens? Once the President has committed us to a war, we have to fight it, we have to pay for it, and we do not have any options.

I want to sum up by quoting Edward Teller, the father of the hydrogen bomb. Dr. Teller, no particular ally of the news media, said this about secrecy:

"Secrecy strikes at the root of our difficulties. Openness which is natural in free countries has been the life blood of science. Secrecy has not prevented our

most powerful enemy from developing the most powerful weapons we possess. It is not even obvious that our secrecy measures have slowed down Soviet progress. It is quite obvious, however, that secrecy has impeded our own work. Because of secrecy, we have had to limit the number of people who can contribute to our weapons. Due to secrecy it has been difficult to exchange information with our allies. It has also led to less than complete realism in planning our common defense. Secrecy has also prevented full public discussion of the possibilities of the future development of our weapons," and so on.

And Dr. Teller concluded: "This is only one facet of the more general truth that the democratic process does not function well in an atmosphere of secrecy."

Lord Acton is famous for his dictum that "power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely." Less well-known is his statement, "everything secret degenerates, even the administration of justice."

The Reagan administration is proposing right now a broad increase in secrecy, not only employing lie detector tests, in limiting Freedom of Information requests for information, but requiring thousands of military officers and defense officials to sign oaths never to reveal details of their public service throughout their lifetimes, without government approval. I would submit that, what will degenerate in that kind of secrecy process is not only justice, but our ability to make intelligent decisions in our own self-interest, and our ability to defend our national security and democratic way of life.



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Edited with commentary by Craig L. Symonds

287 pages, paperback. \$7.50 from the Government Printing Office.

The Naval War College Press, 1976.

Television and the Vietnam War

Major Michael C. Mitchell, US Marine Corps

The Vietnam war was the first major American conflict to be presented to the public through the medium of television. Inasmuch as a case may be made that television has a potential for influencing American national security policy through public opinion, considerable controversy has centered on the coverage of that war by the major networks. Roger Mudd, reflecting upon the impact of television on the conduct of military operations in Vietnam, once wondered "whether in the future a democracy which has uncensored television in every home will ever be able to fight a war however moral or just."¹ With television we are faced with a form of technology that has the potential not only to inform but also to change the course of events. If we, in the military, are to successfully operate in a wartime environment that is subject to the close public scrutiny provided by television, then we must ascertain its potential and its limitations.

Responsibilities of the Networks in Broadcasting the News

Television plays an extremely important role in the conduct of American public affairs. Because the people of this country can elect and instruct their leaders only when they have free access to information obtained in a context of open debate, the individuals involved in the production of network news have certain responsibilities in the public affairs arena. The American public has a right to be informed and the networks, as the controllers of a major means of communicating information, have an obligation in this process. This obligation to accurately inform the public was succinctly described in the report of the Hutchins Commission on Freedom of the Press. Published in 1947, this report stated that the mass media have five basic responsibilities.

1. To provide a truthful, comprehensive, and intelligent account of the day's events in a context which gives them meaning.
2. To provide a forum for the exchange of comment and criticism.
3. To project a representative picture of the constituent groups in the society.
4. To present and clarify the goals and values of the society.

An artillery officer by trade, Major Mitchell holds an advanced degree in operations research.

5. To provide full access to the day's intelligence.²

Publication of a list of responsibilities by a commission with no enforcement power does not necessarily guarantee that these responsibilities will be met. In order to ensure that television stations serve the public interest, the Federal Government regulates the television industry by requiring stations to be licensed by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). In order to obtain and retain this license, each station must adhere to the tenets of the FCC's Fairness Doctrine.

Basically, the Fairness Doctrine imposes four fundamental requirements on the networks: The networks must present "accurate and comprehensive news in a meaningful context." The broadcaster has a right to proffer his own opinions concerning controversial affairs, but he must also present "all other major views on that issue." The networks have an obligation to actively seek out annunciators of these opposing views. The networks must provide "a reasonable opportunity" in regard to currency, time, audience, and quality for the presentation of these opposing views.

Currency: Although the presentation of opposing views need not be simultaneous, all presentations should be made "during the period when the issue is still current."

Time: Equity in the Fairness Doctrine does not require precisely equal time, only that a "reasonable opportunity" for the expression of opposing views be provided. "If a broadcaster airs an attack on an issue or a set of ideas, he is expected to provide a 'balance' by airing a defense or an affirmative analysis of that issue or set of ideas."³

Audience: The opposing views need not be presented before the exact same audience but an effort must be made to ensure that the sizes of the audiences are comparable.

Quality: The individual allowed to present opposing views should be "of approximately the same stature, prestige, or capacity to articulate his position."⁴ What this requirement means is that there must be "equity of conceptual policy" (a difficult standard for the networks to meet because they cannot always ensure the intellectual abilities of spokespersons). Nonetheless, "what they must *not* do is to seek in any way to *diminish* or *augment* the potency of one side or another by any act of selectivity or editorial stress."⁵

To do all of these things, says the FCC, is to display fairness in broadcasting—to fail to do any of them is to be guilty of biasness; and a serious breach of the Fairness Doctrine through the display of such bias may precipitate the loss of or failure to renew a broadcast license (although no television station has ever had its license denied for Fairness Doctrine violations).

In addition to the requirements imposed upon them by the FCC, the networks are also restricted by the broadcast industry's two major ethical

codes. The *Code of Broadcast News Ethics* of the Radio Television News Directors Associations "pledge(s) its members to provide a news service as accurate, full, and prompt as human integrity and devotion can devise."⁶ This code does not require its members to seek balance among opposing views and, therefore, fails to meet the full requirement of the Fairness Doctrine. In comparison, The *Television Code* of the National Association of Broadcasters requires that news reporting be "factual, fair, and without bias" and that the stations provide an "adequate and well-balanced" news schedule.⁷

Television's Portrayal of the War in Vietnam

During the early stages of the war, Southeast Asia in general and Vietnam in particular were considered by many Americans to be outside of this country's sphere of interest; consequently, coverage of events in Vietnam by the television networks was characterized by what might be termed "benign neglect." But as the United States began a gradual military buildup in that area, Vietnam became "an American story" with American commentators consistently showing support for the war effort. However, the North Vietnamese and Vietcong Tet offensive of January-March of 1968 soon changed this relationship and surfaced the congenital adversarial relationship between a free press and government. Prior to Tet the Administration had led the public to believe that victory in Vietnam was well within the grasp of the United States and her allies. However, the attack on the American embassy in Saigon and the initial general impression of a US disaster presented by the networks caused such trauma that the American public simply could not recover. In retrospect, it has since become clear that the import of the assault on the embassy was exaggerated and that for the North Vietnamese, the Tet offensive was a *military disaster*. However, the net effect of television's coverage of the events of Tet was to exhort the American public into its first real misgivings about the war and to initiate the movement of the public into active dissent.⁸

The inaccuracy and subjectivity of network news coverage of Tet and the subsequent failure of the networks to correct the false reporting of the initial stages of the offensive drew much public criticism. Charges of partial reporting and advocacy analysis by commentators were leveled at the television industry by individuals both inside and outside of the Administration. As the war dragged on, the debate between those who believed television programming to be biased and those who believed it to be fair increased in intensity, and triggered several studies of the subject. The most damning of these was Ernest Lefever's analysis of CBS Evening News programming of 1972-1973. In this study, all CBS Evening News programs of this period were appraised by subject and theme analysis and the 1972 broadcasts by viewpoint analysis. A "viewpoint coding system" was developed to determine the viewpoint of all programming content on

national security affairs, using the Administration's official position as the point of reference. In brief, three specific viewpoints were identified.

Viewpoint A: "the threat to U.S. national security is greater than that on which present policy is based or we ought to do more to deal with the threat";

Viewpoint B: "the threat is approximately the same as that on which present policies are based and government efforts are generally appropriate"; and

Viewpoint C: "the threat to the U.S. national security is less than that on which present policy is based or the government ought to do less in response to the lesser threat."⁹

Lefever concluded that the Fairness Doctrine allows the networks to advocate any one of these particular viewpoints as long as they give a "reasonable opportunity" for the expression of the others. This, however, CBS Evening News failed to do. For example, in 1972, of 1,719 total sentences of programming devoted to Vietnam, 25 sentences (1.45 percent) expressed Viewpoint A, 493 sentences (28.68 percent) expressed Viewpoint B (which was based on the Administration's official position), and 1,201 sentences (69.87 percent) expressed Viewpoint C.¹⁰ CBS Evening News coverage for 1972 and 1973 weighed heavily on criticism of the US armed forces and devoted almost no programming to positive reporting on the military. Lefever's group found that:

"The citizen-viewer who relied solely on CBS-TV Evening News during 1972 would have received a vivid, dramatic, and clearly etched picture of the Vietnam War—U.S. participation in this essentially civil conflict in Southeast Asia was cruel, senseless, unjust, and immoral; the South Vietnam government was corrupt, repressive, unpopular, and an obstacle to peace, and its armed forces were inefficient and cowardly; and, in contrast, the North Vietnam government had the support of its stoical people, its armed services fought courageously, and it treated American POWs well. The responsible course for the United States, according to this portrayal, would be to cease bombing military targets in the North, speedily withdraw its troops from the South, and show less concern with the fate of South Vietnam."¹¹

In regard to meeting the requirements levied upon it by the Fairness Doctrine (and the television industry's own broadcast codes), Lefever found that "CBS Evening News was seriously deficient in presenting a fair, full, and meaningful picture of national security developments"¹² and that CBS openly advocated Viewpoint C without providing a reasonable opportunity for the expression of other opinions.¹³ Consequently, in the opinion of the researchers CBS Evening News had effectually failed to fulfill the requirements of the Fairness Doctrine and the broadcasting codes. In fact, they concluded that, "all evidence suggests that CBS Evening News employed

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various techniques of selective reporting and presentation to advocate a position opposed to U.S. military involvement in Vietnam. It failed to present a full or fair picture of opposing viewpoints on the issues of peace negotiations, the problem of American POWs, the nature of the U.S. military presence, or—on a larger canvas—the significance to the United States of the struggle between Communist and non-Communist forces in Southeast Asia.”¹⁴

Although Lefever’s study looked most scrupulously at CBS Evening News, he considered his findings to be indicative of the broadcast industry at large. The evidence appears to support him. Edward Epstein, in his studies of the news media, found the networks to be liberally slanted and “loaded with bias.”¹⁵ Edith Efron, in her content analysis of all ABC, CBS, and NBC evening news broadcasts during the 1968 Presidential election campaign concluded that “the networks actively slanted their opinion against U.S. policy on the Vietnam war.”¹⁶ Individuals both inside and outside the news industry generally agree that the media’s coverage of events during that war was prejudiced. The bigger question that must be answered, however, is, “Did this bias actually affect wartime national security policy and, if so, how?”

The Effect Of Network News Bias On Vietnam War Policy

From the early days of the Vietnam war, television’s impact on government policy had been heavily debated. Because over half of the American people received the majority of their news concerning the war through the medium of television,¹⁷ the potential ability of the networks to narrow the limits of public debate and, thereby, to affect public opinion by manipulating the news worried policymakers. As Lefever noted in 1974, “if the mass media persist in excluding a significant sentiment or preference from public debate, that preference will eventually be ruled out as an alternative deserving serious policy consideration.”¹⁸ The implication was that, because the public could only be expected to support those policy options about which it had some familiarity, policymakers, who required the consensus of the people, would be limited to electing from among only those options that were aired by the media.

But do the networks, in fact, possess an ability to affect public policy through their influence on public opinion? The director of CBS News in Washington, William Small, has written, “When television covered its ‘first’ war in Vietnam it showed a terrible truth of war in a manner new to mass audiences. A case can be made, and certainly should be examined, that this was cardinal to the disillusionment of Americans with this war, the cynicism of many young people towards America, and the destruction of Lyndon Johnson’s tenure of office.”¹⁹ Indeed, to assert that television has no ability to alter public opinion is to deny that advertisers have a justifiable reason for buying airtime from the networks.

This argument seems quite persuasive, yet there is still no consensus that television’s coverage of the war turned the public against the Administration’s

policy. A survey conducted in 1967 for *Newsweek* suggested that, rather than turning the public away from the war, television coverage had actually encouraged a majority of viewers to support the war effort, and another *Newsweek* survey, conducted in 1972, showed that the public may even have developed a "tolerance of horror" in the news programming originating in Vietnam.²⁰ In addition, Edward J. Epstein's survey of television producers and news editors for his 1973 book, *News From Nowhere*, related that over two-thirds of those interviewed felt that network news had had "little effect" on American public opinion of the war. Epstein stated that "an opinion commonly expressed was that people saw exactly what they wanted to in a news report and that television only served to reinforce existing views."²¹

Quite obviously, then, considerable disagreement exists as to the extent to which (and the direction in which) network news coverage of the war affected public opinion. However, it may not be absolutely necessary for television to *actually change* public attitudes in order to have an effect on public policy. Because politically minded policymakers are susceptible even to *potential* changes in public opinion, the networks may directly affect government policy by playing on politicians' perceptions of the power of television. The change in war policy during the Johnson administration provides a case-in-point.

As previously stated, prior to 1968, the television networks "belonged" to the oval office. The media in general and the networks in particular had accepted, literally without question, the President's position on intervention in Southeast Asia and the government's official reporting of the progress of the war. However, the shock of Tet in 1968 focused public attention on Vietnam and made it patently obvious that the Administration had been purposely painting an inaccurate picture of the war. There is no available evidence that the manner in which the networks presented the events of January through March of 1968 caused a change in American public opinion of the war, but Peter Braestrup, in his study of the media's reporting of the Tet offensive, observed that there were "unmistakable reflections of strong media themes . . . in the Congressional rhetoric and in the discussion by the politically active and media-sensitive elites outside Washington."²² Indeed, while media coverage of the Tet "crisis" may have had barely a noticeable effect on the American public as a whole, it appears to have had a great influence on the country's leadership. Again, Braestrup found that "the press, politicians, and official Washington, through mutually reinforcing alarms, seem to have been more excited about the specific import of Tet than was the general public."²³ And no one, it seems, was more affected than Lyndon Johnson.

When Walter Cronkite lashed the Administration in his post-Vietnam visit report immediately following Tet, it apparently affected the President

in two ways. "First, he realized that he had lost the center, that Walter both was the center and reached the center, and thus his own consensus was in serious jeopardy. Second, because he liked and admired Cronkite so much and thought him so fair a reporter, he found himself believing that if Walter Cronkite was reporting these things, he must know something."²⁴ It was then that Johnson began to change the direction of his wartime policy.

Thus, whether or not television's coverage of the Tet offensive had any *real* effect on American public opinion may have mattered very little. It is quite possible that the actual change in public opinion itself was not what redirected Johnson's policy concerning the war but, rather, it may have been the President's *perception* that this opinion was being (or would be) changed and that his party would, consequently, suffer a concomitant loss of electoral support that caused him to change his course. That is, rather than affecting policy through the manipulation of public opinion, television may directly affect the government's position by playing on the policymaker's fear that television will affect opinion.

The Causes Of Network News Bias

We have seen thus far that the network's coverage of the war was, in fact, biased and that this coverage at least facilitated the redirection of government policy concerning the war. But what were the causes of this bias? A sudden seizure of antiwar feeling among broadcasters? An ideological conspiracy by the media against the government? Or were the problems more complex than simple ideational differences? Were they organizational? Technological? Was it inevitable that the war would be presented by television in the manner in which it was? In order to answer these questions, we must study the people, the processes, and the technology that mixed together to give us our first "living room" war.

The People. One of the most obvious shortcomings of network news coverage of the war had its source in the individual limitations of the correspondents themselves. Most of the newsmen assigned to cover the conflict lacked the necessary background regarding the historical, cultural, political, and military morass of Vietnam. Consequently, most were unable to understand (much less convey to the public) the meaning and relationship of events as they hurriedly piled up. In addition, because journalists were rarely kept "in-country" by the networks for periods longer than six months, they were unable to acquire the day-to-day knowledge of the war necessary for giving comprehensive coverage of events. All of this added up to what at times proved to be inadequate, incomplete, and inaccurate reporting.

The Processes. David Brinkley once remarked, "news is what I say it is. It's something worth knowing by my standards."²⁵ This is essentially correct.

News is what Mr. Brinkley and his fellow newscasters say it is because they choose what will (and what will not) be broadcast as the news. News broadcasting is an entirely selective process; no facts or opinions are televised which the correspondents, editors, and producers have not chosen. What are the consequences of this selection process? In analyzing which events to broadcast, the amount of time to be allocated to each comment, and what emphasis to place on each event, the reporter, the editor, and the producer are all guided by their personal philosophies and preferences, and "in providing connective tissue and interpretive background, a newsman sometimes moves, consciously or subconsciously, into advocacy."²⁶ As Frank Shakespeare, the former director of the US Information Agency and vice president of CBS, has stated, the problem is that television news is "clearly liberally oriented" because the "overwhelming number of people who go into the creative . . . and . . . news side of television tend by their instinct to be liberally oriented."²⁷ Therefore, the process by which war news was selected for broadcasting naturally caused the news to be slanted towards the left.

Another process that affected the "message" transmitted to the public by network news was the manner in which the news was "reconstructed." With the exception of planned events, very few newsworthy occurrences were covered by television as-they-happened. Rather, what was seen on the news was a reconstruction or even a reenactment of the story. This reconstruction process tended to cause events to be related in a manner which fulfilled the preconceived notions of the reporting news correspondent. Just as a painting is more the artist's perception of his subject than a completely accurate portrayal of it, so a filmed reconstruction of a story is a reflection of the newsman's perception of the event. If that perception is inaccurate, so will be the newscast.

After an event had been chosen as being newsworthy and subsequently reconstructed for the cameras, bias again was able to creep into the story through the editing process. A two to three minute news story may be edited down from more than an hour of film, and what the film editor chooses to leave in or delete will be based on his own personal decisions (with guidance from the producer) as to what is newsworthy. In this manner, however, very important aspects of the Vietnam "story" were omitted simply because the editor did not realize their significance.

We can see, then, that, rather than presenting the unedited world of events, network news followed set procedures, from the selection of material to be presented, to the reconstruction of events, to the final editing of the film for showing. These connective processes of selection, reconstruction, and editing allowed for the possible injection of personal bias regarding the war at each stage of the programming process.

The Technology. It should not be forgotten that television is, above all else, an entertainment industry and that, consequently, network news programming is

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sensitive to the exigencies of the marketplace. In its efforts to attract and maintain audiences, therefore, television has often sought to broadcast news events more for their dramatic value than for their informational content. This "element of theater" inherent in television news programming often causes the networks to substitute action for news. In fact, cameramen in Vietnam were often told to "shoot bloody" by focusing on military action. This emphasis on combat scenes, however, caused the less visible but more important political considerations to be overlooked.

Related to this theatrical component of television is the fact that television is a visual medium and, therefore, the newsworthiness of events is often judged by "visual criteria." Vietnam news items tended to be presented in terms of "visual facts," that is, those that were well-disposed to being filmed were chosen for coverage. This caused those events which were less amenable to filming (but which might have been equally important) to be ignored.

Time limitations imposed on network news also served to distort television's coverage of the war. Rather than reporting on the war as a long continuous event, television reported it as a series of two to three minute "visual incidents." In reality, however, the mix and flow of events is often of more relevance and importance than the short announcements of isolated occurrences fed to us by the networks. In addition, this requirement to compress the presentation of news items into short broadcasts forced commentators to oversimplify. Often extremely complex issues involving many conflicting and confusing viewpoints were narrowed down to a simple conflict between two well matched sides. Consequently, the television audience was provided with a seemingly simple view of what was, most certainly, a very unsimple situation. As K.C. Jacobsen observed, "this compression of time (and issues) that television gave us was deadly to any real understanding of the war and precluded any realization on the part of the American people that the Vietnam problem was a long-term one."²⁸

It appears from the foregoing that, at least during the Vietnam war, network news was shaped by structures that were both implicit and imposed. Government regulations, economic necessities and uniform procedures for selecting, editing, and producing programs all led to a news presentation with a definite cant; this slant proceeded as much from organizational structures as from the individual biases of commentators. Because of this reality, the overall picture of the war in Vietnam presented by the networks was incomplete, far from accurate, yet probably inevitable. Can this situation be changed so that future conflicts will not have to be fought under the burden of network news bias?

In developing a means of dealing with the inherent bias of television newscasting during wartime, it is important to realize that, for a democracy,

active censorship cannot be the answer. In the short-run, restriction of the media through legislative requirement or denial of battlefield access may serve to limit public opposition to wartime policies, but, in the long-run, the harm caused by the suppression of the traditional free exchange of information would be a disaster. We could not morally justify fighting a war to protect our way of life if we obviate that way in order to achieve victory. If we firmly believe our method of government is correct, then we must learn to protect it without prostituting it.

However, the military must not lose sight of the fact that its foremost responsibility is to prosecute wars. Neither time nor resources (both precious commodities in war) should be spent in the support of the news gathering function. What both the military and the media need to do is to learn each other's particular responsibilities and limitations, to accept each other as imperfect occupiers of the battlefield, each having a particular mission to fulfill, and then to establish mutually agreeable working compromises that allow them both to meet their objectives. If the military and the networks find themselves unable to coexist during a national crisis, it could only exacerbate an already dangerous situation. In a war it could possibly lead to failure and failure in warfare in a thermonuclear age could be unforgivable.

Notes

1. Phillip Knightley, *The First Casualty: From Crimea to Vietnam: the War Correspondent as Hero, Propagandist, and Myth Maker* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975), p. 14.

2. Ernest W. Lefever, *TV and National Defense—An Analysis of CBS News, 1972-1973* (Boston, Va.: Institute for American Strategy, 1974), pp. 1-2.

3. Edith Efron, *The News Twisters* (Los Angeles: Nash Publishing, 1971), p. 20.

4. Lefever, p. 7.

5. Efron, p. 21.

6. Lefever, p. 9.

7. Although it might appear that, because of these externally and internally imposed requirements, network news programming is denied the First Amendment right to be biased, it is important to note that a fair assessment of these requirements indicates they are not censorial in nature. Actually, the intention of the Fairness Doctrine and the two television codes is to ensure that the networks themselves do not censor views opposed to the editorial beliefs of the members of the programming industry.

8. An excellent analysis of the news media's coverage of the Tet offensive is provided in Peter Braestrup's, *Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1977).

9. Lefever, p. 75.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 88.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 126.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 139.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 142.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 131.

15. Edward J. Epstein, "The Strange, Tilted World of TV Network News," *Readers Digest*, February 1974, p. 142.

16. Efron, p. 47.

17. Knightly, p. 410.

18. Lefever, p. 153.

19. Edward J. Epstein, *News from Nowhere: Television and the News* (New York: Random House, 1973), p. 9.

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20. Knightley, p. 411.
21. Epstein, *News from Nowhere*, pp. 225-226.
22. Braestrup, p. 671.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 703.
24. David Halberstam, *The Powers That Be* (New York: Knopf, 1979), p. 514.
25. Efron, p. 6.
26. Lefever, p. 11.
27. Epstein, *News from Nowhere*, p. 200.
28. K.C. Jacobsen, "Television and the War: The Small Picture," *Naval Institute Proceedings* March 1975, pp. 59-60.



Bureaucrateez

In Spring 1977 you were kind enough to publish a short article I wrote on the American use of the English language. I wrote it in the belief that, if the USA were to retain (as it should) the leadership of the free world against the Warsaw Pact threat, the correlation of her and her allies' policies and strategies was essential and that, in turn, this demanded clear and simple communication between us all. I expressed concern that clarity was on the wane and received much American support for this view. I hoped that improvement might occur.

The memorandum below might interest you as a possible indication of where clarity now stands. It is the content of a routine inter-division memorandum at a Nato MSC's headquarters. Its author is a member of the US armed forces. The recipient challenged me, as a graduate of the USN War College and a fellow countryman, to translate it. I failed. My USN colleague, another War College graduate, also tried, but with no better results. My question is, "Is this an isolated example of "Americanese" (hopefully) or is clarity still waning?" No non-native English-speaking officer has a chance of understanding the memorandum.

Captain P. McLaren, Royal Navy

An Inter-Division Memorandum

1. Where funds are finite all things cannot have equal importance. As a management tool for the CinC, Areas of Concern, as a conceptual device, has meaning only if it leads to aggregation and the assignment of relative importance to projects. If it cannot do this, it is a sterile exercise since mere register of concern per se will not automatically translate into action.

2. Indeed it cannot as long as prioritization continues to exist only at the project level—where they assume lives of their own not necessarily in tune, or in pace, with broader objectives.

3. On the premise that Areas of Concern should exist as a meaningful management tool we propose that boundaries and definitions of Areas of Concern be more explicit in terms of the constituent mission areas, and then that the Areas of Concern be ranked according to their relative importance and the constituent projects than be reprioritized in consonance with their parent Areas of Concern.

4. Otherwise there is no seeming practical justification for the Areas of Concern concept.

Weapons Development, War Planning and Policy: The US Navy and the Submarine, 1917-1941

J.E. Talbott

In revolutionizing war at sea, the submarine exerted a decisive influence on politics ashore. Germany's resort to unrestricted submarine warfare provoked American entry into World War I. The German Government's wager that strangling British seaborne communications would force Great Britain from the war, leaving France to bleed to death alone before American assistance arrived, proved to be a disastrous miscalculation. But the gamble nearly paid off. Indeed, a German submarine campaign pursued without restraint from the outset of the war might soon have left Germany master in the West, able to discount the likelihood of an early American intervention and free to deal with a Russia verging on collapse.¹

What was to be done about this revolutionary weapon became a leading question of postwar naval policy. After nearly being brought to ruin by the German U-boat campaign, Great Britain favored abolishing the submarine. But the weapon offered other naval powers too many alluring possibilities to make abolition a likely prospect. Arms control treaties negotiated in the 1920s and '30s brought the submarine under the international law of war at sea, which did impose on warships certain rules with respect to the treatment of merchant vessels, their crews and passengers. These rules on submarine warfare *remained* in effect in the US Navy even after Germany resorted again to an undersea campaign against British shipping in World War II.

Hours following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, however, Adm. Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), ordered US naval forces to "Execute against Japan unrestricted air and submarine warfare."² Stark's order of 7 December 1941 relieved American submarine commanders of the need to discriminate between Japanese warships and merchant vessels. Their new instructions, as the Commander of Submarines, Pacific, later put it, were to "sink 'em all."³ So it happened that throughout the Pacific War, the US Navy pursued methods that in 1916 President Woodrow Wilson had

Professor Talbott is a professor of history at the University of California at Santa Barbara.

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condemned as "utterly incompatible with the principles of humanity."⁴ The resort to practices the United States had earlier made the grounds for hostilities against Germany is one of the ironies that has marked the history of modern warfare.⁵

Most writers have asserted that the decision to wage unrestricted submarine warfare was made and executed in reprisal for the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. In his vast naval history of World War II, Samuel Eliot Morison wrote that "The enemy, by his calculated breach of treaties and international law at Pearl Harbor, had absolved the United States from observing any rule restricting methods of naval warfare unless dictated by self-interest and the danger of retaliation."⁶ Theodore Roscoe's quasi-official study remarks that in the face of the demands of war, "the polite little law book went overboard."⁷ A later history of American submarines in World War II sees Admiral Stark's order as an attempt on the part of the high command to take responsibility for the actions of subordinates with respect to violations of the rules on submarine warfare.⁸ The most recent study of submarines in the Pacific War tersely notes that, on account of the Pearl Harbor attack, "The London Submarine Agreement (*sic*) had been renounced by Washington."⁹ And a standard text on international law claims in several editions that the United States employed its submarines against Japanese merchant vessels "as a retaliatory measure."¹⁰

"One of the most important consequences of the world wars of this century . . . the decision-making process is no longer centered at the top . . . their choice is limited by previously made decisions and arrangements in the construction of the implements of war."

All these accounts square with the official explanation for the order to wage unrestricted warfare against Japan. As Rear Adm. Richmond K. Turner, head of CNO's war plans division, remarked to a British admiral on the day of the Pearl Harbor attack, "In retaliation for Japanese bombing of open towns in Oahu . . . orders had been given to U.S. Submarines in the Pacific to sink at sight Japanese merchant ships of all types."¹¹ And in an affidavit submitted in 1946 to the war crimes trials at Nuremberg, Fleet Adm. Chester W. Nimitz, former Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, testified that unrestricted submarine warfare had been undertaken as an act of reprisal against Japan.¹²

According to an unpublished study by the late Samuel Flagg Bemis, however, the decision for unrestricted submarine warfare in the event of war with Japan preceded Pearl Harbor by several weeks, and possibly by several months. Presented to a seminar at the Naval War College in November 1961

and then put aside with the author's note that "It is not considered in the public interest to publish this study at the present time," Bemis' paper remained classified until 1978.¹³

Bemis points out that in the spring of 1941 the President of the Naval War College recommended revising the forthcoming edition of the Navy's rules of warfare to allow so-called "war zones" to be proclaimed in the expanse of ocean between Japan and the Philippines, the Sea of Japan, and the waters around the Netherlands East Indies. Into these areas, the War College draft read, "all merchant craft would enter at their own peril and risk and cannot expect to receive the traditional warnings before being attacked . . . sink vessels in war zones at sight."¹⁴

Passed along from CNO to the Secretary of the Navy, the Naval War College's recommendations came before the advisory committee of senior officers known as the General Board, which rejected the War College's proposals. "These [war] zones," Adm. W. R. Sexton wrote, "have no justification in international law, and the United States and other nations have vigorously protested the establishment of such zones."¹⁵

But the matter did not rest there. Despite the General Board's action, the Strategic War Plans adopted in May 1941 authorized the commanders in chief of the Pacific and Atlantic Fleets to declare "strategic areas" from which all merchant shipping would be excluded.¹⁶ To be sure, the war plans make no mention of unrestricted submarine warfare. But strategic areas were clearly meant to provide submarines with hunting grounds within which any vessel could be sunk on sight.

In any event, Bemis found more direct evidence on the timing of the unrestricted warfare decision. On 14 November 1941, Admiral Stark drafted an important cable to be sent to Adm. Thomas C. Hart, Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet (CinCAF). Dispatched to Hart's Manila headquarters on 27 November, Stark's instructions could not have been more explicit: "If formal war eventuates between U.S. and Japan quote Instructions for the Navy of the United States governing Maritime and Aerial Warfare unquote will be placed in effect but will be supplemented by additional instructions including authority to CINCAF to conduct unrestricted submarine and aerial warfare against Axis shipping within that part of the Far East Area lying south and west of a line joining Lat. 30 north long. 122 E and Lat. 7 north long. 140 E which you will declare a strategical area."¹⁷

Drafted three weeks before the Pearl Harbor raid and received in Manila ten days in advance, Stark's instructions make clear that if it were American policy to wait for the Japanese to strike the first blow, it was not American policy to defer how to respond until after the blow had been struck. Bemis' findings diminish reprisal to no more than a justification for a submarine campaign devised and pursued on other grounds.

Content to demonstrate that the decision to wage unrestricted submarine

warfare preceded Pearl Harbor instead of following it, as the reprisal thesis maintains, Bemis did not consider the connections between US policy, naval strategy, and weapons development. Taking such connections into account shows that, far from being an *ad hoc* response to the deepening crisis with Japan, unrestricted submarine warfare was the probable outcome of decisions made as early as 1919 and pursued throughout the interwar period.

At the end of the First World War, the London Naval Planning Section, an office of the American naval command in Europe, recommended that the United States align itself with Great Britain in supporting abolition of the submarine. "The chief reason why the United States should not build submarines," the London planners advised the CNO, "is that public opinion would never permit their use in the same manner as that of our adversaries. Their chief use would be in the destruction of enemy merchant shipping. This the national conscience would not permit, certainly not after the German manner."¹⁸ But Woodrow Wilson had lost interest in the submarine question; he opposed including abolition of the weapon on the agenda of the Paris Peace Conference.¹⁹

The London Planning Section's recommendations had no support elsewhere in the Navy, let alone at the White House. By 1919 the attention of naval officers in Washington had already turned to the Pacific, where they expected sooner or later to be required to defend American interests against a military challenge from a restless and ambitious Japan.²⁰ Capt. Thomas C. Hart, former commander of the small force of US submarines in Europe and head of the Navy's newly created Submarine Section, argued that in the event of a Pacific war, "the submarine will be an extremely valuable weapon for . . . operations against Japanese commerce. There is no quicker or more effective method of defeating Japan than the cutting of her sea communications." Submarines, Hart predicted, "would put Japan in the same position that the German submarines did the British Islands—if they were used to attack communications."²¹

But in 1919 US submarines could not have performed such a mission. The American submarines of the First World War—small, cramped and unseaworthy, had barely been up to operating in the narrow seas around England. The postwar S-class submarine marked something of an improvement, but it was slow, limited in range, and alarmingly susceptible to accidents.²²

Indeed, an expedition meant to demonstrate the utility of the submarine in the defense of the Philippines wound up exposing the inadequacies of the Navy's most advanced operational vessel. On 31 May 1921 Captain Hart put to sea from New London, Connecticut in the submarine tender *Beaver*, bound for Manila in the company of 10 S-boats, a voyage he had proposed as chief of the Submarine Section 18 months earlier. Struggling after the *Beaver* in the manner of ducklings pursuing their mother, strung out for a hundred miles on the surface of a sea in which no enemy lurked, bedeviled by frequent breakdowns,

the S-boats barely passed a test far less severe than most they could expect to meet in wartime.²³ Hart's voyage made clear that any submarine capable of finding employment in the Western Pacific had first to be capable of getting there.

Since before the First World War, younger submarine officers had urged the building of a fleet submarine—a powerfully armed boat of great range, excellent seakeeping qualities and fast enough to act in concert with the battleship squadrons that composed the main striking power of the fleet. As Lieut. Chester W. Nimitz had confidently predicted in a 1912 article: “The steady development of the torpedo together with the gradual improvement in the size, motive power, and speed of submarine craft of the near future will result in a most dangerous offensive weapon, and one which will have a large part in deciding fleet actions.”²⁴

The fleet submarine had been conceived with Atlantic operations in mind. But in 1920 the Navy's Director of Plans advised the Chief of Naval Operations that “the design of our [submarine] craft should be such as to meet the conditions that will exist in a Pacific campaign.”²⁵

The vast expanses of an ocean nearly empty of repair facilities demanded that an American submarine be designed with an eye to self-sufficiency. Japanese control of the Western Pacific would in all likelihood preclude an early challenge from the US fleet. But a submarine capable of operating alone would have a good chance of eluding enemy naval forces and bringing the war to Japan's home waters. Such a weapon, a young submariner explained to the General Board, would be “able to lie off the enemy's ports and sink what shipping we could . . . whether merchantmen or men-of-war.”²⁶ Indeed, the War Plans Division already envisaged for the submarine a vital strategic role in the event of war with Japan. “Such an economic blockade,” its 1920 memorandum concluded, echoing Hart's views, “would probably be the only way in which we could exert decisive pressure upon the enemy”²⁷

A speed of at least 21 knots on the surface had been regarded as the essential requirement of a genuine “fleet” submarine. But independent operations in the Pacific would require such qualities as long cruising radius, ruggedly designed machinery, ample stowage for ammunition and supplies, and habitability; but speed would need to be sacrificed to get them. Reducing the rate at which a submarine burned fuel, for instance, would increase its cruising radius. In fact, an ability to cover the great distances of the Pacific mattered less than an ability to keep the sea for long stretches of time (in terms of fuel consumption, these qualities amounted to the same thing).²⁸ For the longer a submarine kept station near an enemy's lines of communication, the more likely it was to encounter targets of opportunity in the shape of enemy merchant vessels.

How fast did the submarine in question need to be? According to experts in the Bureau of Steam Engineering, it required only “sufficient speed to overhaul the average merchantman or to escape from a heavily armed naval

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auxiliary." Sixteen to 18 knots, instead of the suggested fleet submarine's 21, were enough.²⁹

Trading three knots in favor of other qualities had immensely important implications. Conceived as an auxiliary to the battleship, the fast fleet submarine conformed to the ideas of Alfred Thayer Mahan, the strenuous advocate of concentrating force with a view to a decisive engagement with the enemy fleet. Submarines made self-sufficient at the expense of speed, however, could be pressed into the service of an entirely different strategy: the dispersal of force characteristic of commerce-raiding, the "*guerre de course*" that Mahan had disdained.³⁰

A submarine capable of operating against Japanese seaborne commerce in the manner that submariners prescribed remained a submarine of the imagination well into the 1930s. Important technological problems had to be resolved before such a vessel actually put to sea. Resolving these problems was complicated when the General Board recommended in 1921 that the development of naval aviation, a far more glamorous and open pursuit than the secret and furtive-seeming work of the submariners, be given priority over the submarine.³¹ And in a navy that continued to be dominated by battleship sailors, whatever the pretensions of the aviators, *guerre de course* exerted considerably less appeal than the grand fleet actions dear to Mahan. Finally, national policy came to exclude the strategy advanced by Hart and other students of a Pacific war from the uses US submarines could be put to.

Restrictions on submarine warfare were the consequence of American efforts to keep naval arms limitation talks from foundering on the submarine question. Alarmed at the prospect of a new and potentially ruinous naval arms race, Great Britain in 1921 proposed limitation talks among the principal naval powers of the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, and Italy. Sensing the mood of public antipathy to arms spending in the United States, the Harding administration seized on the British proposal, and in late 1921 a naval conference convened in Washington.³²

The submarine question immediately threatened to disrupt the talks. Believing it had most to fear from the submarine, Great Britain renewed its proposal to abolish the weapon. British officials privately conceded that abolition was an unlikely prospect, but nevertheless pressed ahead with their proposal, in the hope of benefiting from the pressures of strong public sentiment against submarine warfare.³³

The French adamantly opposed abolishing the submarine. In 1921 France had relatively few submarines—in which its navy saw a cheap substitute for the capital ship—and wanted more. The experience of the late war gave French naval officers reason to believe that submarines based in the Channel ports might be useful in the event that French and British interests diverged.³⁴

The United States found itself caught between its World War I associates. Senior naval officers were not enthusiastic about putting limitations on submarine warfare, let alone abolishing the submarine. And arms control was the province of the State Department, not the Navy, so in the end the General Board endorsed the principle that "Submarines shall conform in all respects to the rules for surface vessels of war."³⁵

Senator Elihu Root made this principle the basis of a series of resolutions he presented on behalf of the American delegation in the hope of mediating between France and Great Britain, and averting the collapse of the Washington Conference. Root also aimed to assuage American public opinion, in which abolishing submarines had strong support.³⁶ His initiative succeeded. The British were already prepared to fall back to limiting submarine warfare; the French, still unhappy with some aspects of the Root resolutions, were willing at least to reserve judgment on the issue. Having broken the impasse over submarines, the Conference moved on to questions that most participants considered far more important.³⁷

Despite the General Board's reservations about the Root resolutions, at later arms-control conferences the US Government continued to advocate rules for submarine warfare along the same lines. Several of these meetings adjourned short of agreement, but talks in London in 1930 produced a major naval limitation treaty.³⁸ Once again Great Britain and France found themselves at odds over the submarine question but, in the end, Article 22 of the London Naval Treaty continued to prescribe for submarines the rules of warfare that applied to surface ships:

"(1) In their action with regard to merchant ships, submarines must conform to the rules of International Law to which surface ships are subject.

"(2) In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to stop on being duly summoned, or of active resistance to visit and search, a warship, whether surface vessel or submarine, may not sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant vessel without having first placed passengers, crew, and ship's papers in a place of safety. For this purpose the ship's boats are not regarded as a place of safety unless the safety of the passengers and crew is assured, in the existing sea and weather conditions, by the proximity of land, or the presence of another vessel which is in a position to take them on board."³⁹

Observing these rules would have required a submarine to operate on the surface, surrendering the elements of stealth and surprise that made it such a formidable warship, giving away its position to merchantmen equipped with radios, exposing its fragile hull to gunfire and aerial bombardment, imposing on its captain the impossible burden of taking aboard his vessel passengers for whom there was no room. The rules transformed the submarine from a deadly weapon into a vulnerable target; they rendered a shark a sitting duck.

By adhering to them, a submarine captain was sure to subject his vessel and

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crew to great hazards. Or his navy could choose to desist from commerce-raiding as a form of submarine warfare, the choice the rules were meant to encourage.

At the same time that the Washington Naval Conference limited submarine warfare, it had other consequences that seemed to enhance the potential strategic value to the United States of conducting unlimited warfare in a Pacific campaign. In exchange for Japan's acceptance of the short end of the famous 5:5:3 ratio in capital ships (an early example of an arms "freeze," as the formula affirmed the status quo in the battleship and cruiser strengths of the British, American and Japanese navies), the United States and Great Britain agreed not to improve the fortifications of their naval bases in the Western Pacific. As none of the American bases in the Philippine Islands, Guam or the Aleutians were adequately fortified, Japan's position in the region was greatly strengthened.⁴⁰ The threat of an early American fleet intervention in the event of war with Japan was virtually removed. For all its firepower and mobility, the battle fleet at sea required massive logistical support from ashore, from bases relatively close at hand. But after 1922 the one major fortified naval base allowed the United States in the Pacific was Pearl Harbor, 4,850 miles from Manila and 3,400 miles from Tokyo Bay.

War Plan Orange, which laid out the scenario for a war between the United States and Japan, sought to overcome these formidable distances by means of wishful thinking. Executing the plan depended on the Army's ability to defend Manila Bay until the fleet arrived from Pearl Harbor or possibly even the West Coast. That the army garrison in the Philippines could hold out as long as such a movement of men and ships would require, especially in the likely event that Japan controlled the surrounding seas, was a doubtful assumption indeed, as many critics—especially army officers—pointed out. The 1935 revision, which substituted leapfrogging through the Marshalls and Carolines for steaming directly to the Western Pacific, a course of action requiring the defenders of Manila Bay to hold out even longer, made Plan Orange more unrealistic than ever.⁴¹

But the long-range submarine was meant to be free both of such impediments as encumbered the movements of the fleet and of the circumstances that, in the wake of the Washington Conference, vastly complicated the making of war plans. Free of dependence on heavily fortified naval bases, able to evade detection in enemy-controlled waters, the long-range submarine would be able, without delay, to take the war to Japan.

Designers and builders of warships have not always paid much heed to the opinions of the men who sail and fight them.⁴² Between the wars, however, submarine officers themselves exerted a considerable influence on the design and construction of the fleet submarine. That the most experienced submarine officers continued after 1922 to advocate building a long-range

submarine does not mean that they set out deliberately to build a weapon incompatible with the rules of submarine warfare, or to circumvent the war plans of their own navy, which conformed to these same rules. Such considerations as naval professionalism, the ambition to come to the notice of superiors and rise in the naval hierarchy themselves, the challenge of problem-solving and a concern for their own safety, were all more likely to have influenced the submariners' recommendations on submarine design than an urge to meddle in policymaking.⁴³

By 1939 the Navy was able to put to sea essentially the submarine that most submariners had advocated since 1919. "The radical increase in performance characteristics built into submarines now reporting to the Fleet," Rear Adm. H. G. Bowen, chief of the Bureau of Engineering, assured the CNO in January 1939, "represents an advance over anything previously attempted That these vessels have successfully passed trials and performed long shakedown cruises without serious derangement is a tribute to the inherent correctness of their design."⁴⁴ Such submarines were easily capable of mastering the conditions that had nearly defeated Hart's arduous expedition of 1921.

The first of the new submarines completed sea trials and joined a Navy still committed to War Plan Orange as its strategy for war in the Pacific. A 1934 memorandum on implementing the Plan instructed the Blue (US) commander in chief "to *operate submarines* in accordance with the same international laws as are applicable to surface vessels."⁴⁵ Submarines were to act in support of fleet operations, especially against larger enemy warships; to watch the harbors of the Japanese Mandated islands, in order to be able to report enemy fleet movements; and to defend Pearl Harbor—duties that all appeared to conform to the rules on submarine warfare. The 1936 version of Plan Orange continued to prescribe for submarines the roles of watching enemy harbors, operating against the enemy fleet, and defending Pearl Harbor.⁴⁶ The submarine force carried out these missions in tactical exercises with the fleet.⁴⁷

By the late '30s, however, Plan Orange had come under severe criticism, not only from the Army, which faced the impossible task of holding out in Manila until the fleet sailed to its rescue—and regained control of a base essential to its operations—but from within the Navy as well. Against the concept of an American battle fleet advancing across the Pacific in search of a decisive encounter with its Japanese counterpart, Adm. Harry E. Yarnell, 1937-38 Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, urged "the prosecution of [a] naval war of strangulation." In Yarnell's view, the potential enemy's economy made a more inviting target than its navy, a thought that decades earlier had occurred to German naval strategists contemplating a war with England. By severing—or "strangling"—in the imagery favored by advocates

of blockade—the lines of communication of a nation utterly dependent on trade, Japan might be brought to terms, and without needing to dispatch the battle fleet west of Pearl Harbor.⁴⁸

Yarnell's strategic ideas were reflected in an agreement between the United States and Great Britain worked out in January 1938 by Capt. Royal E. Ingersoll, the head of the War Plans Division and Capt. Tom Phillips, R.N., his British counterpart. The United States would be responsible for interdicting Japanese commerce within the Western Hemisphere, while Great Britain would act along the Malay Barrier and in the Indian Ocean; together the two navies would cut Japan's trade with the world beyond East Asia.⁴⁹ An understanding negotiated between two senior naval captains did not commit their governments to action in the event of war. And their agreement did not specifically mention the submarine as a weapon of blockade. Nevertheless, the plan not only foreshadowed the manner in which the two navies divided responsibilities when war came, but also reflected the shift in American strategic thinking from the assumptions of War Plan Orange to the idea of long-range blockade in the service of economic warfare.

Germany's conquest of Western Europe in 1939-40 precipitated the recasting of American naval strategy in the Pacific. War Plan Orange, which Adm. J.O. Richardson, Commander in Chief, US Fleet, dismissed as better suited to extracting shipbuilding appropriations from Congress than to fighting a Pacific war, was set aside.⁵⁰ A more realistic plan advocated by Richardson in October 1940 would embody "long-range interdiction of enemy commerce."⁵¹ In January 1941 Richardson wrote Stark that his "Plan Dog," which assumed on the part of United States naval forces a waiting attitude in the Pacific, required establishing defensive submarine patrols off the outlying US-controlled islands of Midway, Johnston, Wake and Palmyra. But in the event Japan entered the war, US submarines should "make an initial sweep for *Japanese merchantmen* and raiders in the Pacific."⁵²

That Japan would indeed enter the war, and at an early date, was one of the assumptions under which joint British and American military and naval staff talks were conducted in Washington in late March 1941. The conferees agreed that allied strategy for the Far East would be defensive, but US naval forces would nevertheless be engaged "offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power."⁵³

Six weeks later the CNO advised Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, that he had decided to assign all long-range US submarines to the Pacific. Because these newer craft were the warships best suited to conditions in the Pacific, he explained, "the CNO has decided that as many United States submarines as possible shall be used on the strategic offensive, and be operated in far distant waters where the greatest density of enemy naval operations will occur."⁵⁴

Ten days after sending this dispatch, Stark approved "Rainbow 5," the strategic plan that prevailed down to US entry into the war.⁵⁵ As Royal Ingersoll, assistant CNO at the time, later told one of the committees investigating the Pearl Harbor attack, Rainbow 5 assigned the Pacific Fleet a largely defensive role. "There were other offensive tasks against Japanese communications and shipping," Ingersoll went on, "but those were largely tasks for submarines."⁵⁶

What tasks did Ingersoll have in mind? For all its voluminous detail, Rainbow 5 is an ambiguous document—at least insofar as the employment of submarines is concerned. On the one hand, the plan enjoined commanding officers to respect the rules limiting submarine warfare.⁵⁷ On the other hand, Rainbow 5 prescribed missions inconsonant with the rules. For the main task to be assumed once war with Japan commenced was to "Establish and maintain maximum practicable submarine patrols against Japanese forces and communications near the Japanese homeland."⁵⁸ Specifically, Rainbow 5 provided for stationing submarines off Yokohama, Nagasaki and Shimonoseki, in the Bungo and Kii channels, in the straits of Tsushima, between Korea and Japan, and Tsugaru, separating the home islands of Honshu and Hokkaido.⁵⁹ A submarine captain required to respect the rules on submarine warfare in waters certain to be under the constant surveillance of Japanese air and naval forces would have put his ship and crew in extreme jeopardy. But Rainbow 5 made no such demand, despite its injunction on obedience to international law. For all Japanese merchantmen were expected to be armed or to be operating under the authority of the Imperial Japanese Navy. In these circumstances, the rules on submarine warfare did not apply. "Specific instructions on this subject," the war plan promised, "will be issued later."⁶⁰

That unrestricted submarine warfare was expected to be the practice at least in certain regions of the Pacific was made clear in the paragraph authorizing fleet commanders to proclaim "strategical areas" into which, it will be recalled, any merchant ship that ventured would be considered fair game.⁶¹

In the spring and summer of 1941 the boundaries of these strategical areas in the Far East were the subject of discussions between the British and American naval commanders in chief. An exchange of correspondence on these discussions provides an additional fragment of evidence on American intentions with respect to the use of the submarine. Comdr. R.D. Coleridge and Maj. R.F.G. Jayne, secretaries of the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington, asked Comdr. L. R. McDowell, their US naval liaison, whether "combat zones," as they described them, were the equivalent of what the British called danger zones, "in which submarines will be given authority to sink merchant ships at sight." The British Government, they explained, "has always been and remains opposed to unrestricted submarine warfare." But as

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an act of reprisal in the war against Germany, the British had been driven to torpedoing enemy merchant ships; in the event of war with Japan, the same policy might need to be extended to the Pacific. Did the American Government concur in this?⁶²

The question of strategical areas had been under study by American naval authorities for some time, Commander McDowell replied. Further, on several occasions during the past year the subject had been a matter of communications between the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, especially with respect to actions the Asiatic Fleet might take under existing war plans (a reference to Rainbow 5). "It is apparent that it would be the purpose of declaring strategical areas, should circumstances require and justify such action, to wage unrestricted warfare not only by submarines but by aircraft." Justifying such a step would not necessarily require similar action by the enemy. But the United States was on record, McDowell went on, as being opposed to unrestricted warfare. In view of this, "until the United States is at war, it obviously would be impracticable for its Government to adopt any policy other than the one which has heretofore been set forth on numerous occasions. It is, therefore, judged expedient to let final decision wait until the actual outbreak of hostilities."⁶³

The Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, who McDowell had in mind, was Adm. Thomas C. Hart. Stark, in writing to Hart in November 1940 said, "I believe that the Allied objective should be to reduce Japan's offensive power through economic starvation."⁶⁴ Unfortunately, the only surviving communications on submarine warfare between the CNO and his fleet commander arise in dispatches they exchanged on the very eve of war. In response to Hart's request to be relieved of his command, for instance, Stark—who wanted to keep an officer whose judgment and experience he valued greatly right where he was—replied that his successor "must have a profound knowledge of the employment of the most important weapon he will have at his disposal—the submarine."⁶⁵

Nevertheless, Hart's diary affords indirect clues—some of them rather cryptic, given the admiral's discretion in professional matters—as to the role submarines were expected to play in the theater where war with Japan was expected to begin. The circumstances in which Hart issued his unrestricted warfare order also merit attention.

The oldest admiral in the US Navy serving afloat, his retirement delayed in order to put his great experience to use in a command whose responsibilities far exceeded its means, Hart had little confidence in the war plans sent him from Washington. They smacked too much of the Naval War College's theoretical perspectives, he told his diary, bore too little of the impress of experienced Pacific hands.⁶⁶ And in the manner of a field commander in every time and place, he constantly complained of being kept in the dark by

the high authorities in the capital.⁶⁷ He knew that great events were afoot, believed that the Japanese might strike the Philippines without warning at any time, and was determined to be as ready as his resources in men and ships allowed.⁶⁸

The importance Hart attached to submarines is clear. On 14 November 1940, two days after Stark had cabled his remark on the strategy of economic blockade, Hart expressed his enthusiasm and relief at the news he was to receive "another reinforcement of five big submarines!"⁶⁹ At month's end, three of the five arrived: "three of the largest and newest submarines that the Navy owns."⁷⁰ On 5 December, Hart learned that more submarines would be coming out to join those already sent him. "Haven't been informed about several things which I need to know about all these reinforcements," he went on.⁷¹ Whether these things included the rules of warfare under which submarines would operate, he did not say. In any event, on 20 December, two more fleet submarines arrived, completing the five he had been promised, and by mid-January Hart had them out performing tactical exercises.⁷²

Toward the end of September 1941, Hart received word that he might possibly be sent six more submarines.⁷³ An additional 12 boats and a submarine tender are mentioned in a diary entry of 24 October, and on 8 November Hart wrote that "I got eight more big Submarines this afternoon." A week later Rear Adm. Richmond K. Turner, Director of War Plans, recommended to the Director of Ship Movements "that every effort be made to expedite the completion of long-range submarines and their assignment to the U.S. Pacific Fleet."⁷⁴

Reinforcing the Asiatic Fleet with the newest long-range submarines had the obvious purpose of helping defend the Philippines from a Japanese seaborne invasion. Concentrating fleet submarines in the Pacific could have been recommended for several reasons, among them enhancing the deterrent value of the battleships riding at anchor in Pearl Harbor.

In any case, on 27 November 1941, in the dispatch quoted at the beginning of this paper, Stark set forth the rules of warfare under which submarines in the Pacific were to operate when the war with Japan broke out.⁷⁵ A day earlier, Hart wrote in his diary that he had just received from Washington—"straight from the horse's mouth"—what amounted to a war warning, and he had set about making last-minute preparations.⁷⁶ For the last ten days of peace he had in hand as guidance in making these preparations Stark's "additional instructions" to conduct unrestricted submarine warfare.

In the event hostilities broke out without a formal declaration of war, Stark's instructions provided that the same rules would probably apply, but only on the further advice of the CNO.⁷⁷ The attack on Pearl Harbor fitted this contingency exactly. Such evidence as is available suggests that Hart did not await instructions. On the contrary, he appears to have issued orders to conduct unrestricted warfare before Stark sent out the same command from Washington.

Awakened in his Manila quarters by an aide at 3 a.m. local time on 8 December with news of the attack on Pearl Harbor, minutes later Hart broadcast the command: "*Japan started hostilities. Govern yourself accordingly.*" At 3:45 a.m. he sent a second message: *Submarines and aircraft will wage unrestricted warfare.*" At 5:15 a.m. he informed local commanders that submarines would depart Manila that afternoon. At 7:12 a.m., in accordance with Hart's orders, the Commander Submarines, Asiatic Fleet, Capt. John Wilkes, ordered S-38 to its patrol station off the entrance to the Verde Island passage, the main channel into the Lingayen Gulf, where Japanese forces were expected to land. "Mission," the orders read, "unrestricted attack." At 7:31 a.m., orders went out to S-36 to patrol the entrance of Lingayen Gulf between Bolinao and San Fernando: "Wage unrestricted warfare."⁷⁸

In the meantime, at 2:28 p.m. Washington time (9:28 a.m. in Pearl Harbor), Admiral Stark called President Roosevelt to confirm the attack on Pearl Harbor. According to Harry Hopkins' diary, the main source on Roosevelt's actions on the day of the attack, the President told Stark "to execute the agreed orders to the Army and Navy in event of an outbreak of hostilities in the Pacific." The conversation ended before 2:30, when Roosevelt called Steve Early, his Press Secretary.⁷⁹ Hopkins' account makes no mention of unrestricted warfare. In an interview with Samuel F. Bemis twenty years after the phone call in question, however, Stark claimed that he had read to Roosevelt a draft of the telegram bearing the famous order, and the President had told him to send it.⁸⁰

The CNO's order went out at 5:52 p.m., Washington time.⁸¹ But Hart's order to the Asiatic Fleet had been sent four hours earlier than the Washington dispatch; indeed, it had gone out 13 minutes before Stark even called Roosevelt to confirm the Pearl Harbor raid. And precisely at the moment the CNO's general order to conduct unrestricted warfare was issued in Washington, Capt. Wilkes was issuing specific orders of the same kind to the captain of S-38.

It would appear that Hart jumped the gun, setting aside the rules on submarine warfare before the Chief of Naval Operations, speaking for the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, had authorized him to do so. In view of Stark's dispatch of 27 November, however, it seems quite likely that Hart regarded the thoroughly unambiguous attack on Pearl Harbor as authorization enough. And even if Stark's recollection of his Sunday conversation with Roosevelt was faulty, the "agreed orders to the Army and Navy" the President had in mind when he spoke to the CNO might possibly have included the "additional instructions" with respect to submarine warfare conveyed in the dispatch sent the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, ten days earlier. In any event, Stark's order of 7 December merely confirmed his instructions of 27 November and the tendencies of two decades of submarine development.

The history of the submarine between the wars offers a case study of the relationship between strategic planning, weapons development, and the conduct of foreign policy, and especially of the links between capabilities and intentions with respect to the use of force.

By adhering to arms control treaties limiting submarine warfare, the United States proclaimed that it did not intend to use the submarine against merchant vessels except in the manner prescribed for surface warships by international law. These agreements were concluded, however, with an eye to mediating opposing views between former associates in the war against Germany, and to reassuring an American public strongly disposed against the submarine; they were negotiated on behalf of a navy committed to Mahanian conceptions of naval warfare, in which the revolutionary weapon was expected to play at best an auxiliary role in the grand actions between battle fleets that were to take place somewhere in the grey mists of the Atlantic.

In the Pacific, however, the United States faced a different set of circumstances, and as early as the end of the First World War, submariners pushed for a submarine built to meet them. The Navy committed itself to producing such a weapon, but not until the mid-1930s did a submarine capable of the performance the developers had in mind actually put to sea.

In these same years, the Navy's strategic thinking with respect to war in the Pacific underwent a profound shift. Realists argued for a strategy that would compensate for the vulnerability of the Philippines and the inadequacy of forward naval bases by taking advantage of the weaknesses of Japan.

Japan was an island nation, as dependent as Great Britain on trading by sea. Economic blockade was the answer to the American strategic problem, and the fleet submarine the answer to how such a blockade might be conducted. Such an answer made sense, however, only if the limits on the manner in which submarine warfare was to be conducted were removed. Otherwise, the pressure that could be exerted on Japan would fall far short of strangulation, and submarine crews were far more likely than their targets to become the victims of sudden death. From the late 1930s, as the likelihood of war with Japan increased, the gap between what the United States intended and what it was capable of with respect to submarine warfare narrowed to the vanishing point.

From this perspective, the order to wage unrestricted submarine warfare against Japan seems less a decision than a foregone conclusion. The development of the submarine and the evolution of thinking about submarine warfare in the interwar period illustrate a tendency that Felix Gilbert recently noted. One of the most important consequences of the world wars of this century, he observes, has been that "the decision-making process is no longer centered exclusively at the top—the head of the government or the military commander; their choice is limited by previously made decisions and arrangements in the construction of the implements of war."⁸²

In light of Gilbert's remark, the decision to wage unrestricted warfare looms less large than the decision to build a long-range submarine, the resolution of the technical problems that such a project raised, and the decision to pursue a strategy of economic warfare. The history of submarine development also affirms that when the responsible authorities find in their hands a weapon that promises to make the waging of war more efficient, they will use it.

On the morning of 11 December 1941, USS *Gudgeon*, with Lt. Comdr. E.W. Grenfell at its helm, left Pearl Harbor to conduct unrestricted submarine warfare in the Bungo Channel, the first American warship to enter Japanese waters since the attack on Pearl Harbor.⁸³ On the morning of 31 December, Adm. Chester W. Nimitz assumed command of the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor on the deck of the submarine *Grayling*. Nimitz liked to say he chose *Grayling* because the Japanese attack had left no other deck available.⁸⁴ In view of the importance submarines were to assume in the war he was to conduct, the former submariner could hardly have made a better choice.

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Notes

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2. Stark's order can be found in Theodore Roscoe, *United States Submarine Operations in World War II* (Annapolis: US Naval Institute Press, 1949), p. 5.

3. Charles A. Lockwood, *Sink 'Em All: Submarine Warfare in the Pacific* (New York: Dutton, 1951).

4. Quoted in Arthur S. Link, *Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917* (New York: Harper, 1954), p. 215.

5. Raymond Aron, *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations*, trans. Richard Howard and Annette Baker Fox (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1973), p. 37. For a different view of the matters discussed in this paper see Ernest Andrade, Jr., "Submarine Policy in the United States Navy, 1919-1941," *Military Affairs*, January 1971, pp. 50-56.

6. Samuel Eliot Morison, *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II: Vol. IV, Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1949), p. 190.

7. Roscoe, p. 19.

8. W.J. Holmes, *Undersea Victory: The Influence of Submarine Operations on the War in the Pacific* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966), p. 46.

9. Clay Blair, Jr., *Silent Victory: The U.S. Submarine War Against Japan* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1975), p. 106.

10. A. Pearce Higgins and C. John Colombos, *The International Law of the Sea*, 1st ed. (New York and London: Longmans, Green, 1945), p. 336. The same language is to be found on the same page of the sixth edition (1967).

11. Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC. (Cited hereafter as OA.) Sea Frontier Commands, Series III, Box 69. Record of a conversation between Adm. Little, RN, and Rear Adm. Turner, 7 December 1941.
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12. *Trials of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 11 November 1945-1 October 1946* (Nuremberg, Germany, 1948), pp. 378-381.
13. Samuel Flagg Bemis, "Submarine Warfare in the Strategy of American Defense and Diplomacy, 1915-1945," Unpublished Manuscript, Yale University Archives, p. 1.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 24.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 26.
16. *Ibid.*, pp. 28-29.
17. OA. Fleet Dispatches. OpNav to CinCAF #271422.
18. Navy Department, Office of Naval Intelligence, Historical Section, Publication Number 7, *The American Naval Planning Section London* (Washington: US Govt. Print. Off., 1923), p. 473.
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23. OA. Admiral Thomas C. Hart Diary, 30 May, 5 August, 6 September, 29 September, 3 November, 1 December 1921.
24. Chester W. Nimitz, "Military Value and Tactics of Modern Submarines," US Naval Institute *Proceedings*, December 1912, p. 1198.
25. OA. General Board 420.15 Hearings (1920) (Cited hereafter as GB) Director of Plans Division to CNO, 13 January 1920.
26. OA. GB 420.15 (1920) Preliminary Design of Fleet Submarines, p. 161.
27. OA. GB 420.15 (1920) Director of Plans Division to CNO, 13 January 1920.
28. OA. GB 420.15 (1920) Preliminary Design of Fleet Submarines, p. 171.
29. OA. GB 420.15 (1920) Bureau of Steam Engineering: Fleet Submarine, Great Cruising Radius, 3 February 1920.
30. Mahan's aversion to commerce raiding is expressed in his most famous book, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1889), but see especially, his *The Influence of Sea Power Upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793-1812*, 2 v. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1892-94).
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34. William Roger Louis, *British Strategy in the Far East, 1919-1939* (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1971), pp. 97-99.
35. OA. GB Circular 438.1001, 12 September 1921; Action of the General Board of the Navy in Connection with the Conference on the Limitation of Armament, 1921-1922, v. I. GB to Secretary of the Navy, 30 November 1921.
36. It was "necessary," Root told Rear Adm. William Rodgers, "to do something striking and vivid that could be easily grasped by the man in the street." By early January 1922 the American naval advisory committee to the American delegation had received 422,488 messages urging abolition of the submarine and only 4,199 favoring retention. Buckley, pp. 115, 117.
37. Dingman, p. 209; Roskill, pp. 327-28; Richard W. Leopold, *Elihu Root and the Conservative Tradition* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1954), p. 160; Philip C. Jessup, *Elihu Root*, v. II (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1938), pp. 145-56.

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41. Louis Morton, "War Plan Orange; Evolution of a Strategy," *World Politics*, January 1959, pp. 221-50.

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43. On this see the remarks of William H. McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force and Society since A.D. 1000* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 292-94.

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45. National Archives, hereafter cited as OA. Strategic Plans Division Records, Series III, Box 64. Plan 0-1 Orange, "The Royal Road" 1934. Emphasis in original.

46. OA. Strategic Plans Division Records, Series III, Box 73. Director of Fleet Maintenance Division to Director of War Plans Division: Employment of Blue Submarines, Orange War, 28 April 1936.

47. NA. Record Group 80, Box 208. J. R. Defrees, ComSubFor: Submarine Organization with the US Fleet, 12 August 1936. The commander of the submarine force regarded tactical maneuvers with the fleet as pointless.

48. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York. President's Secretary's File, Navy. Adm. H. E. Yarnell to Adm. William D. Leahy, CNO, 15 October 1937. Leahy was sufficiently impressed with Yarnell's ideas to forward them to President Roosevelt, from whom they elicited an enthusiastic response. Admiral Leahy to President Roosevelt, 8 November 1937; Franklin D. Roosevelt to Leahy, 10 November 1937. See also Waldo H. Heinrichs, Jr. "The Role of the United States Navy," in Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto, eds., *Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations, 1931-1941* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), p. 212.

49. Heinrichs, p. 214.

50. *Pearl Harbor Attack; Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. 79th Congress.* (Washington: US Govt. Print. Off., 1946), part 14, p. 968.

51. *Ibid.*, p. 970.

52. OA. Records of the Strategic Plans Division, Series III, Box 147. J. O. Richardson, CinCUS Flt. to H. R. Stark, CNO, 25 January 1941.

53. Samuel Eliot Morison, *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II: Vol. 3, The Rising Sun in the Pacific* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1948), p. 51.

54. OA. Strategic Plans Division, Series III, Box 97. CNO to CinC Atlantic Fleet, 16 May 1941.

55. OA. Strategic Plans Division, Series III, Box 147 F. CNO 26 May 1941. Navy Basic War Plan. Rainbow No. 5.

56. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, part 26, pp. 459-60.

57. OA. Strategic Plans Division, Series III, Box 147 F. CNO 26 May 1941. Navy Basic War Plan. Rainbow No. 5.

58. OA. Strategic Plans Division, Series III, Box 147 F. Task Force Seven (Undersea Force) 3252a Special Information.

59. *Ibid.*

60. *Ibid.*

61. *Ibid.*

62. OA. Additional Documents Relating to Unrestricted Submarine Warfare. R.D. Coleridge and R.F.G. Jayne to L. R. McDowell, Washington, DC, 21 August 1941.

63. OA. Additional Documents Relating to Unrestricted Submarine Warfare. L.R. McDowell to R.D. Coleridge and R.F.G. Jayne, Washington, DC, 20 October 1941; Asiatic Fleet Dispatches. Copy of R.N. Dispatch, Action Admiralty Info. CinC. China No. 278/475/1831. 21 October 1941.

64. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, part 14, 973.

65. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, part 16, H. R. Stark to T.C. Hart, 1 November 1941.

66. OA. Hart Diary, 14 August 1939, 6 December 1939, 14 February 1940.

67. *Ibid.*, 15 October, 20 October 1939; 15 September 1940; 6 November, 8 November 1941.

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70. *Ibid.*, 30 November 1940.

71. *Ibid.*, 5 December 1940.

72. *Ibid.*, 17 January 1941.
73. *Ibid.*, 27 September 1941.
74. OA. Strategic Plans Division, Series V, Box 105. Director War Plans Division to Director, Ship Movements Division, 15 November 1941.
75. OA. Asiatic Fleet Dispatches. OpNav to CinCAF #271422.
76. OA. Hart Diary, 27 November 1941 (26 November in Washington).
77. OA. Asiatic Fleet Dispatches. OpNav to CinCAF #271422.
78. OA. Asiatic Fleet Dispatches. #080345, #080712, #080731; Hart Diary, 9 December 1941, for an account of the events of 8 December.
79. Robert Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins, An Intimate History* (New York: Harper, 1948), p. 431.
80. Bennis ms., p. 33.
81. *Ibid.*
82. Felix Gilbert, "From Clausewitz to Delbrück and Hintze: Achievements and Failures of Military History," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, December 1980, p. 19.
83. Holmes, p. 19.
84. E. B. Potter, *Nimitz* (Annapolis: US Naval Institute Press, 1976), p. 19.



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Jon Oliver

IN MY VIEW . . .

With Friends Like the Press, Who Needs Enemies?

Sir,

As a former journalist, I am in complete agreement with Captain Wentz that America needs a "War Press Act." I am also convinced that the majority of Americans, given their current level of sophistication, would support such an act. In stating the reasons for my views, however, I will not give the press as many benefits-of-the-doubt as did Captain Wentz, for in discussing the press in general, one is not dealing with an "unknown quantity."

To begin, the press, and by its own admission, has adopted an attorney-like adversarial relationship with the US Government. Given this role it has a mandate to be an ardent critic of the government, including those actions undertaken by our naval and military forces. The implications of such a posture thus become apparent where press coverage of military activities is involved, particularly since the press generally opposes military action of any scope for any reason.

Second, the press has demonstrated time and again its careless disregard for national security matters in its rush to be "first with the news." This is often demonstrated by the airing of "leaked" information to the general public and to any potential enemy agents who may wish to take notes. In this regard, the press apparently believes that it is better suited than policy makers and military leaders to determine what constitutes sensitive information. Interestingly, the press reacts with moral indignation to intelligence gathering operations ("spying") conducted by the government, yet when apprehended in similar situations, it claims a constitutional right to do so.

Third, the press has lost much of the credibility that it once enjoyed with the public. This is due largely in part to the increased competition within the media community and the ratings "wars." Because of this, once objective news reporting has taken a backseat to tabloid-style sensationalism by the press in its quest for a greater share of the media audience. Given this scenario, one must seriously question whether the press can demonstrate enough responsibility to be entrusted with *any* news of a sensitive nature regarding military actions.

Lastly, the press, obviously through a bloated sense of self-importance, has appointed itself as the "watch dog" of government and the "guardian" of the

citizen's "right to know" without any mandate from the public to perform in such a capacity. For these reasons and more, I believe that the public would support a War Press Act.

If this sounds like a scathing indictment of the press in general, it is. However, I have awarded it no undeserved laurels.

Bill Baggett
Smyrna, Tennessee

Plumbers, Garbage Men, and Undertakers Will Survive

Sir,

The debate stirred up by Captain William M. Shaw III, USA in his commentary "Clausewitz: A Non-Strategy for Today," was properly placed in better perspective by Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., USA, and then further drew a firm response from Lieutenant Commander Joseph M. Saur, USN as to whether the American people "seek peace at any price." This leads me to a comment as to what seems to have really happened to the masses of our people.

The problem is not only with Americans, but with any heavily industrialized and technologically advanced society, whether in Western Europe, Eastern Asia, urban Africa, Australia and South America.

When life-support needs of a people no longer require total concentration—be it matters of food, shelter, clothing or personal security—the skills, knowledge and understanding of what really is required to obtain these essentials tends to disappear. "Somboddy else," often some government activity, is expected to make and keep things right. The plumber, the garbage man, the supermarket food supply, the police and firemen, the Army, Navy and Air Force, even the undertaker, all become some distant and semi-invisible folk who are automatically operating to keep life on the normal course and pattern.

The farther one is removed by generation gap or social position from ever having had to take care of any of this by one's own self, the greater the belief that it all happens easily without any personal interjection.

American personality and character have not really degenerated from their historical strengths; rather, the high-tech environment, like an opiate, dulls and changes the perception. Perhaps the intellectually elite are almost irreversible, but "down on the farms," "deep in the mines and mills," and "trucking those 18-wheelers along our life-line highways" are men and women who still understand the fundamentals of life support and true freedom, just as in the pioneer days of old.

When disaster hits, be it from natural or man-made assault, here lies our strength with the capability for correction and rehabilitation.

Always an optimist, trusting in God and my fellow-men, I'm sure we'll make it well into the 21st century with or without our politicians, environmentalists, scientists, social security, welfare and even the newspapers and TV commentators' advice. After that I doubt that I'll be able to help.

Raymond J. Schneider
Rear Admiral, US Navy (Retired)

PROFESSIONAL READING

On Reorganizing the Pentagon

Rear Admiral S. A. Swarztrauber, US Navy (Retired)

What's wrong with the Pentagon? The enormity and complexity of the problem are bewildering and it was not much comfort to find similar frustrations reflected in each of the three books listed below. No one expert can give satisfying diagnoses and remedies. The three authors differ considerably on "What's wrong" and "What to do?" But on comparing and contrasting their points of view—frequently 180 degrees apart—some of the reasons behind the problem start coming into focus.

Every examination of the problem eventually has to focus on the Pentagon's organization. One quickly learns that in the case of "our" Pentagon, the word "organization" is little more than a euphemism for "power struggle." The struggle is by no means one involving only the armed services, the office of the SecDef, and the defense agencies. The larger battle goes on outside the Pentagon among those who compete for its domination—the White House, the Congress, and industry, to mention the most important. Indeed, the struggle is as big as the Constitution itself, and today the Pentagon is the prime example of the separation of powers contest that was born with our Republic, and flourishes unabated today.

Pentagon organization has been either a simmering issue or a boiling issue—but never dormant—since 1944. Late in 1983, it came to a boil again when the JCS openly split with the SecDef and endorsed a proposal to give

Rear Admiral S.A. Swarztrauber recently retired from active duty during which time he served 14 years in joint and combined billets, including eight in the Pentagon. He holds a Ph.D. in international affairs and writes widely on US national security affairs.

the JCS Chairman a seat on the National Security Council. At the same time the press carried accounts of "guerrilla warfare" being waged by the SecNav on Capitol Hill to save his 600-ship Navy in open conflict with an enraged DepSecDef.

The three new books which shed so much light on this boiling pot were all published in 1983. They offer us the expert opinion of individuals who have served in the executive branch, the legislative branch, and the armed forces. Unfortunately, we are missing the view of the defense industry, the fourth major protagonist. But the three we have give us more than a generous plateful. Each, in his own way, declares that the present DoD organization is deficient, but that is where the similarity ends. The books:

Barrett, Archie D. *Reappraising Defense Organization: An Analysis Based on the Defense Organization Study of 1977-1980*. Washington: National Defense University Press, 1983. 325pp. \$6

Krulak, Victor H. *Organization for National Security: A Study*. Washington: United States Strategic Institute, 1983. 160pp. \$8

Yarmolinsky, Adam and Gregory D. Foster. *Paradoxes of Power: The Military Establishment in the Eighties*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983. 154pp. \$15

The Author and His Approach

Krulak. Retired Marine Lieut. Gen. Krulak fought in three wars, served in the Pentagon, and was actively involved in the discussions preceding the National Security Act of 1947 and its subsequent amendments. He is currently a Vice Chairman of the US Strategic Institute. Krulak's focus is on the damage being done to national security by the mushrooming bureaucracy. He characterizes the OSD as an 88,000-man gargantua which produces a sort of institutional bloat that saps our soldierly strength.

There is no mincing of words in this book. He harshly criticizes the executive department's invasion of the congressional sphere and the substitution of amateur civilian opinion for professional military advice. On one occasion his words remind us of the biblical prophets: "Without [Congress'] vigorous action there is little hope and less likelihood that we will mend our ways before the brutality of war forces change upon us, and that may well be too late."

Krulak's approach is historical. He starts by reviewing the constitutional, nineteenth century, and legislative antecedents of our military establishment. He establishes clearly that the Founding Fathers intended that the Separation of Powers Doctrine apply to the armed forces—most especially to the armed

forces. George Mason is quoted, "The purse and the sword ought never to get into the same hands."

Then, from personal experience and research, Krulak articulates the political struggle that took place between 1944 and 1947. One of the most contentious issues was whether or not to establish two new positions: a defense secretary and an armed forces chief of staff. The Army said "yes" and the Navy said "no." Eventually a compromise was worked out and the 1947 Act established a weak SecDef with no armed forces chief of staff.

Krulak offers fascinating insights into the events of the Truman and Eisenhower years. Both gentlemen desired a very strong SecDef with extensive budget control. Not satisfied with the 1947 Act, Truman called for another round of studies in 1948. Referring to what followed as the "Process of Erosion," Krulak accuses Congress of yielding to executive department pressure in the enactment of the amendments of 1949, 1953, and 1958. The service secretaries lost their cabinet status. They and the JCS were eclipsed by one powerful defense secretary and the newly created, but weak, JCS chairman. In the separation of powers contest, the scale had taken a decided tilt toward the White House.

From 1958, Krulak leads us through the growth of the gargantua. What had been envisioned in 1947 as a staff of fifteen to twenty-five \$10,000-a-year civilians and officers ballooned into an 88,000-strong OSD that led to the disastrous results in the Bay of Pigs, the Vietnam War, and the Desert I hostage rescue attempt in Iran. The system doesn't work, says Krulak, so it is time for change.

This book is easy to read, crisp, colorful, and straight to the point.

Yarmolinsky. Adam Yarmolinsky offers us the viewpoint of a high-level OSD civilian official. He was Special Assistant to Secretary McNamara during the Kennedy administration and a Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary during the Johnson administration. He now practices law in Washington. He was assisted in writing this book by co-author Gregory Foster of ABT Associates, who is also a contributing editor to *Orbis*. Their approach is a broad-brush survey course on the military establishment and arms control. It appears to be a collection of individual papers fleshed out and edited into book form. It contains a great many useful facts, figures, and events interspersed with personal philosophy.

Yarmolinsky's experience at the highest levels of the defense bureaucracy peeps through with his use of that familiar Pentagon style: "Some observers say Others argue Still others believe"

Yarmolinsky, who is referred to as the senior author, acknowledges the assistance of Gregory Foster, who provided essential facts and ideas, on an extraordinarily tight timetable. This timetable may account for some errors concerning the JCS which went uncorrected, as well as a few apparent

contradictions that probably could have been explained had there been more time.*

Without doubt, the author knows the Pentagon and what makes it tick. But his views run counter to those of the military who work there. The Pentagon years under Kennedy and Johnson are seen by military leaders as the most dismal. Yarmolinsky, conversely, defends the OSD leadership of that period most vigorously and enthusiastically. He points to the Five-Year Defense Program (FYDP) and Systems Analysis, inaugurated during the Kennedy administration, as OSD's finest hour.

One of his "Paradoxes of Power" (from the title) declares that the larger a military establishment, the harder to control its hureaucracy. He does not attack the Pentagon organization, per se, but rather its inertia, its unmanageability, and the attitude of its military members. Yarmolinsky considers it dangerous that "the country is not able to preside over the military." He sees it imperative to achieve more and better civilian control over the armed services. He views military spending as bad for the economy and the military-industrial complex as inconsistent with the good of the Republic.

Another of his paradoxes states that we must deter because we cannot defend. As a co-sponsor of the Senate Nuclear Freeze Resolution he joins those who believe we already have all the nuclear deterrent we need. He asks paradoxically, "How can we live peacefully with such a large military establishment? But on the other hand, how can we live without it?" He closes the book with a chapter on arms control which clearly reflects his conviction that arms control—more than reorganization—is the answer to the problem of the Pentagon.

The entire book flows with a smooth, conversational style. It has the air of authority that comes with personal experience. The approach is as liberal as Krulak's is conservative and will probably do well in campus book stores.

Barrett. Dr. Barrett is a member of the professional staff of the House Armed Services Committee. Although never a member of Congress himself, he is ex-Air Force, his approach will be well received by Congressmen. Congress is constitutionally responsible for maintaining the armed forces and better than half of this book is dedicated to the maintenance of functions; more specifically, to getting a better handle on

*For example, on page 28 he refers to the "weekly JCS session"—they meet much more frequently—and inaccurately describes the sequence in staffing JCS decisions. One of the contradictions concerns arms control. On page 40 he laments that "ACDA has not exerted a significant impact on the defense establishment in its 20 years of existence." Yet on page 8 he acknowledges that "nowadays the military takes it for granted that it cannot discuss new weapon systems . . . without considering the arms control implications . . ." On page 134 he credits the ABM Treaty of 1972 as preventing serious destabilization. Under that Treaty, the military cancelled and dismantled a multibillion dollar program and complex.

such items as procurement, R&D, logistic support, maintenance, and certain Congressional pet projects like health care.

According to Barrett, the Act of 1947 as amended provided a legislative model—or functional wiring diagram—which has been short-circuited. Despite the language of the law, the uniformed services and the SecDef have emerged with positions of strength and influence out of proportion to their legal mandates. As a result of these distortions we suffer from inadequate military advice for the President and an ineffectively managed armed services.

Of the three books, Barrett's follows the most subdued or pragmatic approach. There are no charged quotations or warnings here. He uses as his framework for analysis the Defense Organization Study (DOS 77-80) conducted between 1977 and 1980—thrust on an unwilling Pentagon by the Carter White House. DOS 77-80 is a package of five studies, one each dealing with the DoD headquarters, the National Military Command Structure, defense resources, defense agencies, and combat effective training. The author served as an executive secretary for one of them. Toward the end of the Carter term, attention became riveted to the hostages in Iran and interest in DOS 77-80 waned. No formal integrated report was ever submitted. Barrett hopes his book will resurrect the project.

Given the complexity of the issue, and faced with reams of documents, Barrett's task was enormous. To make his research product more digestible, he split the work and followed parallel tracks to two sets of conclusions and recommendations. One track deals with the "employing arm" of DoD—SecDef-JCS-CinCs. The other deals with the "maintaining arm"—SecDef-Services-Component Commanders.

After analyzing and synthesizing the five studies, Barrett adds his personal assessment. There are four choices, he concludes: maintain the status quo, fine-tune the present system, limited reorganization, and major reorganization. He selects the option that would steer DoD's organization back toward the model intended by Congress.

Former JCS Chairman, General David C. Jones, in the book's introduction, praises Barrett's scholarship and his work with the Congress. But Jones hopes that bolder changes will be attempted, noting that Barrett's "recommendations are very modest. Politics, after all, is the art of the possible and perhaps Arch [Barrett] is right in his assessment of what is possible. Nevertheless, I dare to hope that our actions may yet match our rhetoric when we proclaim that national security must be above politics" In 1982, the year before he left office, General Jones publicly indicted the Joint System. This fanned the flames under the simmering pot and by late 1983, things were moving again in Congress.

Barrett's book is scholarly; it is organized and reads like a text. It would be most valuable to anyone seriously trying to understand the Pentagon.

The Problem

Krulak. The central issue, according to Krulak, is that the “warmaking competence of the military professional is blanketed by a suffocating institutional hierarchy.” This indictment can be broken down into three components.

Presidents do not receive the military advice they need. Presidents have taken the easy—but dangerous—path in seeking an increasingly powerful SecDef. Krulak quotes Maxwell Taylor: “Often Presidents and Defense Secretaries have not wanted the military around during policymaking.” The author adds that “sometimes military advice was not sought because of an advance conviction that it would not be palatable.” A former JCS member complained that “what they are looking for is a unanimous point of view. They don’t want disagreement.” Presidents hope that a strong SecDef will settle the disagreements and shield the White House from controversy. The result, Krulak says, is that we have not won militarily since WWII, at which time the JCS were in constant personal contact with the President.

Excesses and abuses of civilian control cause failures. The American fighting man is perfectly contented with and committed to the principle of civilian control of the military. But a dangerous distortion of that principle occurs when a president becomes insulated from his military advisors and when four or five echelons of OSD officials, with little or no military knowledge, become involved in “micro-management” of purely military matters. Krulak cites a number of examples. There was one OSD official who ordered that a specific photo-reconnaissance mission in Vietnam be flown at 100-foot altitude, ignoring the objections of the field commander, with disastrous results. Krulak also blames costly procurement debacles, such as the TFX, on an OSD staff that tried to force its unprofessional decisions on unwilling services. Most SecDefs, he points out, are trained on the job. Few passed the primer stage before they were replaced—some 2.4 years on the average.

Our military professionalism is endangered. This problem is perhaps the most sinister, as it affects the character of the US fighting man. Since 1958, the admirals and generals have had to learn a new trade, mastering the “self-nourishing civilian bureaucracy,” at the expense of their traditional role, the mastery of warfare. “By the sheer weight of bureaucratic pressure, the nation’s military leadership has been encouraged to minimize its broad and basic commitment to ‘support and defend the Constitution.’ In place of that commitment there is implicit in the system encouragement for them to dedicate themselves to support and defend the Secretary of Defense—and all of his Under and Assistant Secretaries as well—whose views they are adjured to endorse in unison before a Congress depicted more and more as the enemy.”

Yarmolinsky. Yarmolinsky identifies a wide range of problems created by the military establishment. Most fall into one of the four summaries below.

By its sheer mass and momentum, the military establishment is wasteful, inefficient, and out of control. It is the largest organization in the United States and touches every facet of American life. Yet it is not a monolithic structure. Yarmolinsky sees it as a "modern structure of prestressed concrete, held together by the tensions between opposing forces." No one has yet figured out a way to get their arms around the problem.

The establishment represents an elaborate ritualistic process, the net effect of which is to fudge accountability and to make speedy and clear decisions extremely difficult. This leads to wasteful duplication of effort, e.g., four individual "air forces"; cost overruns, 2900 Trident design change orders within three months; inflation and unemployment; and dislocation of capital and skilled manpower.

The Pentagon organization employs two percent of the American work force and yet its products offer no consumer satisfaction other than the pleasure members of the armed forces may take in flying planes or firing weapons. And despite this huge investment, Americans are discovering more and more things that their military cannot do.

Alliances and coalitions make the establishment immune to supervision and change. Its broad reach and long tentacles into Congress, the public, private, and foreign sectors, have forged an armor of "floating coalitions" that cut across organizational lines. Yarmolinsky depicts the armed services as being in league with industry and Congress so as to undercut OSD efforts to control the Department. With thousands of retired officers in industry, the combined lobbying abilities of industry and services are greatly superior to those of OSD.

On the other side of the coin, Yarmolinsky believes that OSD officials are denied access to needed information and expert military advice. This puts them on the spot. They are reluctant "to make adverse judgments on complex issues of military research and development; a wrong decision against a weapon system could, just possibly, mean defeat for the United States in a future conflict, while a wrong favorable decision would only mean unnecessary dollars for defense."

The Congress is no help in bringing the services under control, regrets Yarmolinsky. That body has "sought to perpetuate interservice competition . . . a situation in which one service could be played off against the others." Yarmolinsky is most annoyed at Congress' attempts to micro-manage the affairs of OSD. He compares GAO's activities vis-à-vis the DoD as very similar to OSD's program analysis activities vis-à-vis the armed services.

Attitudes of military men are hard to change. Traditional values of military men have been conditioned by years of intense training to fight for the objective at

any cost and by fierce competition within their own service structures. Accordingly, says Yarmolinsky, they are somewhat less responsive to judgments of outside observers. Thus, there occurred a tragic disconnect between senior military commanders and their civilian superiors during the war in Vietnam, and even more effective civilian control of the military could not have redeemed it. But there are signs of change, in Yarmolinsky's opinion. Since the advent of the AVF, our soldiers no longer serve because of a patriotic calling but because of their need for an occupation. Exit hero image; enter the bureaucrat. Although this is a painful—even controversial—process, thinking men of this dangerous nuclear age will learn to bear “the pains of transition from the heroic to the bureaucratic model—realizing that bureaucrats can be heroes too, but it's harder”

Efforts to curb the military establishment by arms control have been ineffective. The very existence of the military establishment constitutes a danger of nuclear war—a war that might be the end of civilization. Still, comments Yarmolinsky, we seem committed to an all-out arms race, while giving lip service to arms control. He believes arms control could provide a practical constraint on the “uncontrolled expansion of the U.S. and Soviet military establishments.” But, he qualifies, arms control runs counter to the short-term parochial interests of the military bureaucracy and therefore, it cannot succeed without Presidential commitment, which it lacks.

Barrett. Barrett logically presents two versions of the problem. First he examines in detail the criticisms of the Pentagon that emerged from DOS 77-80, as follows:

- JCS is unable to give military advice from national perspective due to service bias.
- National Military Command Structure is inadequate during crises.
- JCS avoids giving advice when division of their budget shares is at issue.
- JCS, as a committee, is an inappropriate institution for directing operations.
- Joint Staff is too dependent on services' input.
- CinCs are too weak and component commanders are too strong.
- Too much micro-management by OSD; OSD should stick to broad policy issues.
- Decision making is overly concentrated at SecDef level and Service Secretaries are underemployed.
- Excessive layering of management levels.
- Imprecise lines of authority.
- Difference of opinions are submerged, depriving the President of needed important information and advice.

Barrett also gives his own assessment of where the problems lie and they can be broken down into four areas.

The legislated channels of responsibility are being ignored. We have drifted away from the Constitution and the National Security Act which provide one channel for employing the armed services and another for maintaining them. A situation has evolved wherein SecDef, working directly with the uniformed services, is performing both the employing and maintaining functions simultaneously by means of a *de facto*, unofficial chain of command through the services to the component commanders and fighting forces. The *de jure*, or legislated chains of command are mostly bypassed, leaving the CinCs fairly well out of the picture and relegating the service secretaries to a window dressing role.

The SecDef is doing the service secretaries' jobs and is neglecting his own. Just as Krulak criticizes the SecDef for doing the JCS' job, Barrett criticizes the SecDef and OSD for having usurped the maintaining functions of the service secretaries. Clearly the law assigns a very wide range of maintaining functions, including R&D, to the service secretaries. But just as clearly, the OSD, under its broad coordination authority, has taken over in the maintenance area. The service secretaries have practically become ministers without portfolio. Meanwhile, the SecDef has become so extensively involved in the details of managing the services, that he has precious little time left to concentrate on the broad national defense policy issues—which the law requires him to do. Virtually all participants in DOS 77-80 agreed that DoD had become overly centralized except the OSD participants themselves.

The defense structure is rigidly resistant to change. The natural human tendency is to protect one's turf. Nowhere is this more true than in the Pentagon. Every one of its components can be expected to defend against any threat by any other component that would reduce its influence, invade its domain, or challenge its essential role, its independence, its budget, or its morale. Barrett documents resistance by SecDef/OSD to any and all DOS 77-80 recommendations for organizational changes which would strengthen the joint structure or service secretaries. The services, too, have a long history of resistance when it comes to sacred parochial cows. They will even oppose change when it may appear on the surface that they may be getting something for nothing, especially if that change may interfere with what they perceive to be their traditional missions or roles. For instance, the Navy did not want polaris SSBNs at first. They resisted getting involved in riverine warfare and opposed the idea of floating warehouses for the RDF. The Army was so skeptical about air power they gave up the Army Air Corps. They wanted nothing to do with Green Berets nor ABMs.

Inter-service rivalry is a problem, but a manageable one. Barrett does a first-rate job with the phenomenon of bureaucratic conflict. He reminds us that the Founding Fathers deliberately institutionalized conflict. Conflict is an instinctively human trait that will inevitably surface when people or

organizations interact, particularly on matters of distribution of property. Barrett draws on James Madison and *The Federalist* to point out that conflict, even with its potentially disastrous results, is legitimate. (Krulak emphasizes this point, too.) Barrett argues that cooperation and conflict can coexist beneficially and that a wise manager can manipulate, design, tailor, or structure conflict to serve as an effective management tool, even, ironically, in the resolution of conflicts themselves.

Recommendations

Krulak. His recommendations are brief and unambiguous, and there are two of them.

First, “get the OSD out of the professional area of warmaking, which is the proper province of the JCS.” Krulak would limit the role of the SecDef to the logistic, fiscal, budgetary, and administrative aspects of our national security structure. Most important: the military chain of command must pass directly from the President to the fighting forces via the JCS.

Second, “guarantee to the Commander-in-Chief and the Congress the unfiltered counsel of the nation’s military leaders, as represented in the corporate body of the JCS.” But this body, says Krulak, should not include a JCS Chairman. The concept of a JCS has proven its case, but the concept of a JCS Chairman has not. It is time to acknowledge that reality and to eliminate the office. Krulak holds that no one man, civilian or military, can give the President proper advice on the broad spectrum of land, sea, and air warfare that is required.

Yarmolinsky. Yarmolinsky does not conclude with recommendations like the other two authors. But his recommendations, which appear throughout the book are yet clear, and some fairly leap at the reader.

The President should take a vigorous personal lead in arms control. Otherwise, the military bureaucracy will dominate the scene.

“Increase civilian control of (1) overall budgets; (2) research and development; (3) force structure; (4) contingency planning; and (5) actual military operations.” Yarmolinsky opposes further increases in defense spending. In fact, he speculates, the recent Reagan increases may, paradoxically, reduce the overall effectiveness of the military establishment. The present system, dominated by the military-industrial-labor-congressional complex is totally inadequate. “To maintain effective civilian control over the military budget . . . the civilian authorities must involve themselves deeply in . . . control of R&D and control of force structure” The principal device available to the civilian leadership for controlling actual military operations, advises Yarmolinsky, is through the development and promulgation of rules of engagement.

Convert the US military from a warfighting to a constabulary force. Such a force would consider war as an interruption of its normal duties. "In this situation, military attitudes are as important as military functions If the military is to evolve, even over a long stretch of time, into an essentially constabulary force, great changes in the symbolic values of the military within American society must be achieved." Which leads to another recommendation.

Reshape attitudes of career military officers. "Senior military commanders need to understand and share the objectives of their civilian superiors Enhancing civilian control . . . is to some extent a matter of education, and the educational process is a life long one." He suggests more ROTC and fewer service academy officers, in the mix, plus more in-service education at civilian universities. There should be created satisfactory career lines for officers specializing in politico-military relations and even the possibility of lateral entry for civilian specialists into the officer ranks.

Barrett. After considering four broad alternatives suggested by DOS 77-80, Barrett selects "Limited Reorganization." He admits that maintaining status quo is a perfectly viable alternative under the premise that the cure may be worse than the malady. Fine-tuning the present system would solve little, and lacking legislative backbone, may not even survive a change of administrations. A major reorganization is simply not politically feasible, Barrett reckons. Thus, he opts for modest congressional action, which by the fall, 1983, seemed to be gathering momentum on Capitol Hill, despite OSD opposition. Barrett's limited reorganization proposal would attempt to restore separation between the employment arm function and the maintenance arm function as envisioned in the language of the 1947 Act as amended. Two parallel legislative actions would be involved.

Streamline the maintenance arm. Barrett recommends integration of the departmental headquarters of the services. The service secretariats would cease to exist and the service staffs would thenceforth serve both secretary and service chief. The secretary would be restored as the bona fide manager of his service. Service chiefs would serve as chief of staff in the real and traditional sense of the term. The chiefs would handle joint matters in the JCS arena, having a personal staff to assist them, and the vice chiefs would deal with purely service matters—pretty much as is the case at present. Barrett makes a strong and convincing case for this, but it presupposes that the SecDef can be persuaded to release the reins. Decentralization in this manner could free the SecDef to spend more time in dealing with external entities and in executing his legal responsibilities to define high-level national security objectives.

Strengthen the employing arm. Several actions recommended by Barrett would, using his words, "institutionalize a joint perspective."

- Strengthen the JCS Chairman. Formally give him an independent voice, and memberships on senior advisory bodies such as Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council. Assign him a dedicated staff. Establish him as principal link between SecDef and CinCs, eliminating JCS from chain. Assign him responsibility to review service and agency budget proposals and to submit his recommendations to SecDef.

- Strengthen the CinCs. Designate the CJCS as their single uniformed superior. Give them increased responsibilities in readiness evaluation. Assign responsibility for joint training and doctrine to RedCom.

- Increase independence of Joint Staff. Terminate services' coordination of joint papers. Insure Joint Staff receives guidance from White House and SecDef. Revise personnel procedures to insure assignment of best qualified officers.

Reviewer's Critique and Assessment

After having studied the considered opinions of three expert Pentagon observers, we are still left hanging up in the air. Obviously, they cannot all be right, and just as obviously, we cannot implement all their mutually exclusive recommendations.

Why has the Pentagon turned in such an unenviable performance? Krulak says there has been too much civilian control. Yarmolinsky claims there has been too little. Barrett believes that it has been a failure to maintain a tidy separation between civilian control of the maintaining and employing arms.

Who is to blame? Krulak blames successive power-grabbing administrations and submissive congresses for the fix we are in. Yarmolinsky blames the unholy Congressional-Service-Industry alliance. Barrett blames human nature—man's instinct to protect and expand his turf.

What to do? Krulak advises we get rid of the JCS Chairman and get the SecDef out of the JCS' business. Barrett recommends we strengthen the JCS Chairman and get the SecDef out of the service secretaries' business. Yarmolinsky recommends more SecDef control of both the JCS' and service secretaries' business.

Krulak. Krulak warns that we must take dramatic remedial action to restore sound military advice to the President before it is too late. I do not believe the problem is quite as urgent and dangerous as he suggests.

Krulak himself acknowledges that presidents do not want heavy doses of military advice in peacetime. The squeaky peacetime wheels will get the grease, even when the president is a military man like Eisenhower. So, are we to force military advice down an unwilling president's throat?

The real reason we lost at the Bay of Pigs, in Vietnam, and at Desert I in Iran was far more fundamental than lack of military advice. It was available. But none of the presidents involved—for reasons right or wrong—saw those situations as vital to the nation. Kennedy, Johnson, and Carter viewed their social, economic, and domestic political problems as more important to the nation's interests than dealing with a security problem. They never shifted mental gears to a military mode as did Roosevelt during World War II.* So it was business as usual, and we muddled through with our existing defense organization machinery.

Americans have an organizational bent. We create great organizations which we hope will function under all circumstances. But when a really major emergency arises, which might put that organization to the test, our nature is to improvise—to do it *ad hoc*—and to circumvent existing wiring diagrams. At the outset of World War II, we did just that, creating new organizations, such as JCS and OPA, changed names and missions of others, and totally mobilized the national resources.

In the event of another bona fide national emergency, we would do likewise. No commander in chief in his right mind would try to fight a major war with our present defense organization. The first thing he would do would be to summon his service chiefs to the Oval Office. There would suddenly be a huge OSD staff of program analysts, comptrollers, net assessors, R&Ders, and other miscellaneous bureaucrats idle and available for duties related to the war effort.

As much as I agree with Krulak—especially on the problem of micro-management by OSD—I do not believe his recommendation on JCS advice will be acted upon in peacetime. And even if Congress were to enact a Roosevelt-JCS type of relationship, the president would be too absorbed in social, economic, and political issues to listen. What we need and must have, then, are a few, less sweeping changes that will guarantee us a military structure of professional fighting men—equipped, trained, and ready—whose leaders can make a rapid move across the river to the White House when the President calls.

Yarmolinsky. Yarmolinsky says that the most important mission of our military establishment is no longer to fight war but to deter it. In order for the military establishment best to carry out this mission, we must bring it under control through increased civilian control, arms control, and reshaping the way military men think.

While I agree wholeheartedly with the importance of deterring nuclear

*I feel quite certain that Krulak would have better words for the Grenada operation. That one enjoyed the personal commitment of the President and the military was not overwhelmed by micro-management of the operation. Grenada proved that even our present system can be made to work—given those right conditions.

war, I do not see how Yarmolinsky's formula will do it. He says our military establishment must be structured to deter because it cannot adequately defend. He calls this a paradox, but to me, it is more a case of flawed reasoning. It confuses *means* with *end*. He says we must deter (means) in order to avoid nuclear destruction (end). He fails to acknowledge that deterrence is a worthy end in itself—that we must defend in order to deter. The USSR will be deterred by significant warfighting potential. The USSE will not be deterred by a military establishment run by a bureaucracy of nonprofessionals, debating arms control proposals, and restructuring itself as a constabulary force.

Yarmolinsky strongly emphasizes arms control. Arms control and disarmament schemes are as old as recorded history. Isaiah wrote of beating swords into plowshares. None—neither the simplest nor the most elaborate attempts—have ever prevented war among the signatories.

Historically, arms control enthusiasts have relied on both dreams and fears to promote their cause. Great dreams of peace produced the short-lived Concert of Europe, League of Nations, and Pact of Paris. The framers of the United Nations said to themselves, "This time it will be different." Similarly history tells us of the great fears of mass annihilation generated by a series of "ultimate weapons," the crossbow, gun powder, and aerial bombardment. Yarmolinsky now repeats old arguments, "This time, with nuclear weapons, it's different." We live in the midst of a recurring cycle wherein man's belligerent nature overcomes his noble thoughts. If we are to rely on arms control to prevent a nuclear holocaust, then we are in serious trouble, indeed.

Yarmolinsky is also of the school that equates general war with nuclear war and, consequently, as one which might end civilization. Many of this school then reason that general war is obsolete. The logic that follows is a very slippery slope. Warfighting forces are judged obsolete and forms of unilateral disarmament gain respectability. According to this logic we can get by with a constabulary force and silo-sitters.

But this reasoning is wrong on three counts. First, there is no compelling reason for a country at war to use nuclear weapons, especially if it might eliminate the possibility of achieving its wartime objectives. Even Hitler, with back to the wall, did not employ biological or chemical weapons, presumably deterred by the consequences of retaliation.

Second, nuclear war would not end civilization. That theatrical horror scenario is used as a dramatic closing argument to "rest the case" against war, and for disarmament. No one but an insensitive barbarian would challenge it. But reality is not so simple. The *real* horror of nuclear war is that man *would* survive. The survivors would endure incalculable heartache and adversity. But man, with his proven ability to survive famine, flood, and plague—nuclear winters notwithstanding—would be left to pick up the pieces and start the next cycle.

Third, war has not become obsolete. To believe so is to deny all history and human nature. There will be wars, minor wars and major wars: perhaps nuclear, perhaps not, perhaps worse. For these reasons we should do everything in our power to deter war, to delay it, or to minimize its effects on us. We Americans will be challenged as long as we are "King of the Mountain." If we are unwilling or unprepared to think the unthinkable, we may be condemned to enduring it.

It is fashionable these days to speak about there being no winners, only losers, in war. This is not exactly new. In retrospect, did the United States really win World War II? Or would it be more accurate to say we lost the least? As unsettling as this reasoning is, it is, unfortunately, all relative.

To get a handle on the military establishment, Yarmolinsky would change its "mentality" in two ways. First, he would increase civilian control—vertically and horizontally—of every facet of Pentagon endeavors. Second, he would reeducate the military to think more like, and share the objectives of, the civilian leadership. Unless Yarmolinsky seriously has it in mind to amputate America's warfighting arm, his logic escapes me. At this time in our history, when we have the most to lose, we need the most skillful and dedicated warriors we have ever had. The President and the Congress need sound military advice more than ever. The time-honored principle of civilian control of the military should not be subverted for purposes of civilianizing the military. In effect, Yarmolinsky's proposals would do just that, and would lead to the demise of the Republic.

Military and naval science—warfighting—is a profession which, like any other, requires decades to master. We seek financial experts to run the Treasury Department. Just as the President selects men who have tilled the soil and who have engaged in collective bargaining to lead the Agriculture and Labor Departments, respectively, he should seek men who have studied, practiced, and tasted combat as his Pentagon managers. We do not need more civilian control of the Pentagon; the President, the Secretaries, and the Congress are certainly adequate, and clearly what the Founding Fathers envisioned. What we need at the Pentagon is more professional control, not on-the-job trainees from business and academe. There is a seldomly considered source of this type of professional military leadership and expertise: the retired officer community. Why not seek and appoint the best available experts for *all* of our executive departments?

Barrett. Barrett is concerned with OSD's encroachment into the maintenance function. This has been an incremental process over a period of decades. The cumulative effect of the process is not what the Congress originally had in mind. Barrett proposes to return, incrementally, towards an organizational arrangement that properly accounts for congressional constitutional and legislated preeminence in the maintenance function.

Congressional acquiescence in the step-by-step accretion of power by OSD must now be recognized by Congress as a series of mistakes. One of the biggest mistakes was stripping the service secretaries of their cabinet status. For, thereafter, they no longer possessed the necessary clout to perform the tasks that Congress left on the law books for them to perform. Barrett's proposal to streamline the maintenance function might give the service secretaries the wherewithal to reclaim their lost authority. This would be "half a loaf" which we should not reject out of hand as insufficient.

There is one untidy detail. Barrett speaks of integrating the three service headquarters staffs. While there are three service secretaries, there are four service staffs. Under Barrett's proposal, the SecNav would find himself with two chiefs of staff—the CNO and the Marine Commandant. It might require some fancy foot work to tidy this up.

Under Barrett's recommendation to beef up the joint structure, the strengthened JCS Chairman would be responsible for delivering military advice to the President in two forms. First, he would offer his own independent view, representing the CinCs. Second, as JCS spokesman, it would be his duty to report to the President whenever the JCS were not in agreement with his own assessment, and why.

This proposal would amount to a "quarter of a loaf," provided HR 3718 is approved, assigning the JCS Chairman a seat on the National Security Council as a co-equal with the SecDef. At least one man in uniform—representing the expertise and capabilities of one of the four services—would be a regular in the White House. Even though the JCS Chairman would be "filtering" the advice of his JCS colleagues, he would be better equipped for this role than a civilian official. This quarter loaf would be another step in the right direction.

Assessment. America has traditionally pushed its military establishment to the back burner in peacetime. This time, the military was also buried, file cabinet by file cabinet, beneath an enormous, entangling bureaucracy.

That bureaucracy has not optimized the combat readiness and warfighting ability of our armed forces. It is certainly too cumbersome and inefficient to be useful in time of war. It exists primarily because of a fundamental flaw in the organization of DoD—the unprecedented centralization of authority in one executive. It contradicts the principle of separation of powers; it violates the sound management principle of span of control; and it attempts to homogenize heterogeneous entities.

Constitutional separation of powers. When successive presidents sought to delegate their defense budget headache, Congress acquiesced. When SecDef instituted an elaborate PPBS to accommodate the President's wishes, Congress acquiesced again. Congress accepted this incremental invasion into

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its domain because it still had an ace up the sleeve—its direct relationship with the services.

In 1949, when the service secretaries lost their direct access to the President, a century-and-a-half-old delicate balance was upset, they did retain their special relationship with Congress. The services' power base, quite naturally, shifted toward Capitol Hill. Now, when a service's pet project is pruned by SecDef and fails to make it into the Administration's budget, the service resents it. When that service then presses its own budget version before the Congress, OSD cries "insubordination." Depending on where you sit, the SecDef/OSD, the Congress, or service(s) become the "enemy." Major resources—time, funds, and manpower—are committed to protecting one's "turf" against the "enemy."

Remarks made by Yarmolinsky, Krulak, and Barrett confirm this. Moreover, their remarks also make it clear that the Executive Branch is out in front in this separation of powers contest. Barrett and Krulak—in the losers' corner—recommend turning the clock back. Yarmolinsky, on the other hand, matter-of-factly declares that the constitutional checks and balances are now irrelevant.*

Congress, probably regretting having yielded so much, is now fighting its way back. The GAO audits, annoying to OSD, and the War Powers Act, annoying to presidents, are examples of Congress' attempt to reassert its waning control over national defense issues.

If push came to shove, neither the elaborate OSD system of military procurement and budget controls nor the War Powers Act would stand up to a constitutionality challenge before the Supreme Court. (One needs only to reread the first few pages of the Constitution.) The Court has already spoken once on this issue. In 1850 it held that the duties and powers of the President as Commander in Chief were purely military. Yet today, post-World War II events have produced this Executive-Legislative "Mexican stand-off."

The uniformed leaders are caught in between, which paradoxically, is sometimes bad and sometimes good, depending on who is judging. They sorely resent the progressive diminution of their role as advisors to the President. A few years ago the CNO, in his capacity as Senior Naval Advisor, wrote to the President in utter frustration, complaining that his advice was not reaching the White House. He was sharply rebuked by the SecDef.

It is true that the amendments to the Act of 1947 have force-fed some inter-service cooperation that had not existed before. But ironically, much of the cooperation that has emerged has come about because of the services' common-adversary relationship with the OSD, and not because of common

*Yarmolinsky, p. 96. "The three checks on the power of the military provided in the Constitution . . . have proved largely irrelevant to the central dilemmas of civilian control in the second half of the twentieth century." <http://www.digitalcommons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol37/iss3/35>

philosophy, purpose or mission. The services, sensing the power struggle between the Branches, actually find themselves able to play one side against the other. From a privileged position on the E Ring, I have observed some remarkable about-faces and some surprising truces among strange bed-fellows, agreeing to support one another's programs. The OSD fights back, trying to divide and conquer. The Congress audits the OSD.

The bureaucracy, the entangling coalitions, and the tension between opposing forces depicted so graphically by Yarmolinsky, grow and grow on. They will continue to do so, inevitably, around the super magnet known as SecDef.

Span of Control. The Constitution declares there to be two principal functions of the federal government: first, the defense and second, the general welfare of its citizens. At the end of the 1700s there were five executive departments—State, Treasury, War, Navy, and Justice—reflecting those constitutional functions demanding the most personal attention of the Chief Executive. Said another way, those were the functions least prudent for delegating to someone else, or so one would think. In fact, War and Navy have lost their cabinet status, delegated to someone else. Many other functions, not mentioned in the Constitution—Agriculture, Education and Labor, to mention a few—have been elevated to cabinet status.

In effect, the presidential function of Commander in Chief has been delegated. The SecDef has been formally inserted into the chain of command between the Oval Office and the fighting forces. The fact that there exists this delegation is cause enough for concern, but the manner in which it has been delegated is far more disturbing. It is widely accepted as a principle of sound management that the effective span of control of a good leader is between seven and nine, maybe ten subordinates. Our defense bureaucracy is organized so as to place over 30 high-level officers and bureaucrats under the SecDef's formal, line supervision. These are deputy, under, and assistant secretaries, service secretaries, agency directors, members of JCS, CinCs and aides. The SecDef cannot possibly devote sufficient personal attention to those with solid-line wiring diagram relationships with him. Without manageable-span-of-control supervision, waste, inefficiency, unaccountability, and bureaucracy grow.

We seem compelled to put all of our eggs in one basket. The military establishment is the largest organization in the United States. It employs more people—4,700,000—than any other. It accounts for over 70 percent of federal procurement. Its mission is the most important of any assigned to the federal government. All other executive agencies and departments are dwarfed by comparison. Even if divided into its three services—Army, Navy, Air Force—the smallest among them would still dwarf the other

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departments. Should we really divide executive responsibility so unevenly and then expect there to exist one man wise and strong enough to control it?

Homogeneity vs. Heterogeneity. The Founding Fathers did not see the Army and Navy as similar or homogeneous organizations. In the language of the Constitution, the Army and Navy were treated in distinct terms, in different sub-paragraphs, and with separate funding procedures.

Nothing has changed. The missions of the Army and Navy—and now, the Air Force—are still different, as different, for example, as the missions of the Commerce and Agriculture Departments. Moreover, the philosophies of professional soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are pronouncedly different. They see themselves very differently—*raison d'être*, approach to problem solving, attitudes, and every-day procedures. During my 14 years in joint and combined assignments, I frequently found I had more in common with foreign naval officers than I did with American officers of the other services.

It must be presumed that the 1949 decision to consolidate the three service departments into one was conditioned by the prevailing but faulty reasoning that the missions of the services had been superseded by that of deterrence. But deterrence is not a mission, it is an objective, and the real missions of the services did not go away. If consolidation of related missions were the driving criterion, then combining Navy and State would make just as much sense. The Air Force would go quite nicely with NASA, and so forth.

Consider an analogy. Another US Administration, concerned with streamlining government operations, might conceivably decide to consolidate all government entities concerned with the national economy. The Departments of Commerce, Labor, and Treasury with selected agencies would be logical and prime candidates for inclusion in the new Department of the Economy. It is likely that these components would quickly oblige the Administration with a consensus on how best to structure and manage the economy? Would it serve the national interest if a powerful Economy Secretary submerged dissent and achieved a consensus by coercion?

The architects of the amendments to the 1947 Act somehow saw a homogeneity among the armed services that simply does not exist. They are heterogeneous in more ways than they are homogeneous. To homogenize them would be to destroy them.

It is a very difficult task to try to homogenize heterogeneous units, especially if the units do not wish to be homogenized. This task employs scores of thousands of OSD bureaucrats. It will require hiring some more before either (1) they are able to succeed as Yarmolinsky urges, or (2) a President and a Congress decide it was a bad idea in the first place.

Irony of ironies, an ex-military man, President Eisenhower, was a major participant in the creation of the defense bureaucracy. In his earnest attempt

not to appear partial to the military, he helped sire a monster far more menacing than the military-industrial complex he seemed to dread. Could he comment today, I believe he would agree.

The only sure solution would involve painful dislocations for a lot of well-meaning and patriotic folks. But sooner or later the SecDef must be separated from the services, and the service secretaries restored to cabinet status with access to the President. Let them manage the maintenance arm on behalf of the Chief Executive for the Congress.

This is not to say we couldn't use a SecDef. On the contrary, let him manage the employing arm for the Commander in Chief. His functions might include: oversight—not command, but oversight—of the joint structure; management of those defense agencies determined to be truly joint; and coordination of all international military affairs. He should also assume the duties of the White House National Security Assistant. This would be a very important office, with a very important man, performing a formidable task—but one far more manageable than the one that exists today.

Should the Congress wish to adopt its own form of PPBS and FYDP, it would certainly be within its prerogative to do so. It is that body's Constitutional responsibility to determine the size, composition, and armament of the armed forces.

Whereas Barrett proposed "half a loaf," the foregoing must be considered a full loaf, and one that is probably too large for appetites either in the White House or on Capitol Hill—at least at this point in time. It may be we have not suffered enough—in Krulak's words—to demand change. Barrett would say this recommendation is not within the realm of the politically possible. Yarmolinsky would not see this as a problem, much less the proposed as a solution.

By the oath we pledge, we are sworn to "support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic" It is very uncomfortable to stand by and observe distortion of the checks and balances of the Constitution we are to defend. We suspect that unless our Executive and Legislative Masters are both contented with their working relationships under the Constitution, we are courting disaster.



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If you want a single fundamental reference on the subject of naval weapons, classified or unclassified, *U.S. Naval Weapons* is it—it is meaty and filled with information without being the least bit dull or opaque.

William D. O'Neil

Friedman, Norman. *U.S. Naval Weapons: Every Gun, Missile, Mine and Torpedo Used by the U.S. Navy from 1883 to the Present Day*. Annapolis, Md.: US Naval Institute Press, 1983. 287pp. \$24.95

Once again, Norman Friedman has produced a fine and useful book of reference. Anyone with a professional or personal involvement in naval weapons will find much of interest and value in it. As is usual with Dr. Friedman's books, this one is meaty and filled with information without being the least bit dull or opaque.

Its title notwithstanding, the book's coverage is not restricted to weapons, but also includes weapons control systems and most detection and tracking systems (the chief exception being shipboard radar systems, the subject of another of Dr. Friedman's books). The bulk of this effort is narrative in form, divided into six topically oriented parts: Guns (Surface Fire); Fleet Air Defense Before 1945; Underwater Ordnance; Fleet Air Defense After 1945; Air-to-Surface Weapons; and Surface-to-Surface Missiles. Each part has an introduction giving a general overview, followed by chapters devoted to specific systems or categories of systems—"Gun Design and Development, 1883-1983," "Sonar Systems," "Fighters in Fleet Air Defense," "Harpoon," etc. There is also a general chapter on "Antisubmarine Strategy and Tactics." The story starts with the dawn of the "New Navy" in the 1880s; there is no coverage of earlier systems.

The organization of these chapters is fundamentally historical; they tell the story of each system's development and how one system led to another. In most cases there is considerable description of the decision process and of the positions taken by the bureaus, OpNav, SecNav, and other players. The systems are described in terms of their gross physical characteristics, basic principles of operation, general performance, and relationship to other systems. At least one good black-and-white photo or diagram is provided to illustrate nearly every system.

The narrative sections are followed by 45 pages of densely packed appendixes, which provide additional discrete data. Together, the narrative and appendixes furnish information on virtually every system the Navy has so

Mr. O'Neil is the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Naval Warfare

much as considered over the past century. The comprehensiveness and precision of the information inevitably falls off somewhat as the most recent systems are reached and security becomes a significant consideration. For the most part, however, Dr. Friedman has avoided the kinds of gross inaccuracies that books on weapon systems commonly fall prey to (thus depriving professionals of a good deal of innocent merriment which they are accustomed to derive from such works), largely by being very careful about his sources and refusing to accept ill-informed speculation when hard information is lacking.

Books such as this are not without their dangers, which are perhaps magnified here by the solid virtues of this one. There is a fine air of completeness and certitude that clings to the book's accounts of weapons and their development, lent not by any immodest claims on Dr. Friedman's part but by his careful and precise accumulation of detail. "Surely," one is likely to say to oneself, "here at last is the true and veritable story." And to be sure, in most cases it is the nearest thing to the true and veritable story that has been seen in print, or ever will be seen. But it is by no means the full truth, and indeed the full truth would in most cases lie beyond the reach of this or any other book.

Naval weapon systems have always represented substantial feats of engineering and organization, all the way back to Tyre, and our century has seen their complexity growing exponentially. The decisions on major systems are bound up with power, money, pride, and diverging alternate futures for great institutions—and men (and nowadays women) contest them with all their passion. The truly important moves in the development histories often are not recorded, and often the records that do exist were written with an eye more to advantage than to accuracy. Naturally it is impossible to deal with all the labyrinthine details in such a book as this, even if the necessary information were available.

Even "hard facts" about weapon design and performance can be treacherous. The design of a major weapon system may involve many hundreds of interlocked critical choices. Dr. Friedman has sought (with varying degrees of success) to select and illuminate a few of the most important design issues for some systems, but for the most part confines himself to straightforward descriptions of system characteristics. As a result it is often difficult to form any very precise idea of the physical principles which underlie a system's operation, or to understand the constraints and tradeoffs which shaped it. Nor are the descriptions sufficient, in many cases, to provide a clear picture of the system's operating sequence or performance. Finally, there is very little data on effectiveness in service. In all of these matters, of course, the author is handicapped by the outright absence of much of the vital data, and to some extent by his own lack of any extensive experience in weapon system design, development and testing.

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Limitations it has, yes, but make no mistake: this is an excellent book. No more solid, reliable, comprehensive compendium on US naval weapons will be found anywhere. If you want a single fundamental reference on the subject, *U.S. Naval Weapons* is it.

Russett, Bruce. *The Prisoners of Insecurity—Nuclear Deterrence, The Arms Race, and Arms Control*. San Francisco: Freeman, 1983. 192pp.

The thesis of this book is that the most fundamental questions about national security and arms control are political rather than technological, and there exists an elite that perpetuates a myth that arms control and security questions should be left to the experts. The purpose of the book, then, is to consider some of the basic questions that should be addressed by the "conscientious" citizen and to provide some of the technical information necessary to an informed discussion.

The author, a professor of political science at Yale University, views the arms race and war as an acute problem and makes no apparent attempt to present his arguments dispassionately. Intended to provide data to support the basic arguments of the nuclear arms activist, the book is an excellent primer on the subject.

The centerpiece of the book is the prisoners' dilemma. This is a game where two people are arrested for a crime and held incommunicado. The prosecutor does not have enough evidence to convict them; but each is told that, if he confesses first, he will be set free—if his accomplice con-

fesses first, he will receive a maximum sentence. If both confess on the same day, they will receive stiff sentences. If neither confesses, they will be convicted of some lesser crime for which the prosecution has sufficient evidence. On reviewing the choices in this game, each player is better off if he does not trust his accomplice and confesses, even though they are both likely to end up worse off than if they could trust each other to cooperate. The author draws the analogy to the security dilemma where both sides arguably would be better off if they devoted their resources to social programs rather than to defense but where the consequences of misplaced trust are indeed dire.

The author prepares the reader to enter into arguments on how to reduce the stakes of the prisoners' dilemma by tracing the history of the Soviet-American arms race and analyzing stable deterrence. All of the arguments as to why arms races are bad—guns vs. butter, increasing the destructiveness of war, and arms races as a cause of war—are trooped out. But he then makes it apparent that most of these arguments miss the mark. The key is an element of trust that requires some degree of communication between the superpowers. This communication can be open, including exchange of technical data

and on-site inspection of weapons systems; or it can be sanctioned, permitting surveillance and other means of information collection. The more open the communication, the more confidence each side can have in the intentions and capabilities of the other. From the discussions of crisis stability and the history of arms control in the remainder of the book, one can make a strong case for why communications with the Soviet Union are unlikely to improve and why confidence-building measures are so fragile as to have no lasting effect.

The author conveys the fear and frustration of the nuclear protest group and argues for a nuclear freeze, no first use, and so on down the agenda. But the arguments are unconvincing precisely because the author admittedly falls back on faith and does not offer solutions to the principal dilemma; opening up the Soviet Union and bringing it into the community of nations. I was pleasantly surprised to find the author stating, "If there were easy solutions, we would have taken them by now." Though the author sees the problem of nuclear arms as acute, he offers no short-term solution—only a first step and hope.

I could not help but conclude that the author was incorrect in his primary thesis. This is indeed a subject for experts. The book skips along the surface of a wide range of issues and convinces the reader that serious study is required to have a truly informed opinion. Anyone who could reasonably argue all of the

facets of the nuclear policy would be considered fairly expert. However, the author reserves the term "expert" for one who knows how to calculate the cost effectiveness of nuclear weapons and in doing so reflects a peculiarly Yale judgment that one who understands nuclear weapons effects must not understand the social, political, and economic aspects of current nuclear policy. Overall, the author does succeed in making the case that democracy demands an informed public, and he has contributed a very readable introduction to the complex issues of nuclear arms.

JOHN T. HANLEY, JR.
Oakdale, Connecticut

Freedman, Lawrence. *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983. 473pp. \$10.95

Kaplan, Fred. *The Wizards of Armageddon*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983. 452pp. \$18.95

Lefever, Ernest W. and Hunt, E. Stephen, eds. *The Apocalyptic Premise: Nuclear Arms Debated*, Washington, DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1982. 429pp. \$14 paper \$9

The ground swell of public interest in nuclear weapons, their use, control or elimination, stimulated a flood of activity in the bookstalls, with at least three dozen new volumes coming off the presses this year. These are three of the best. Lawrence Freedman, professor of war studies at the University of London, and Fred Kaplan, an American journalist,

are less concerned about where nuclear arms are taking us than about how we got where we are. Ernest Lefever and Stephen Hunt, both prominent in the field of ethics and public policy, offer thirty-one selections reflecting a wide range of views on nuclear arms policy by political activists, religious leaders, government authorities, scholars, and policy experts. The three books together offer an excellent guide for strategy making.

Freedman and Kaplan both look back to the origins of nuclear war, and both give credit to Bernard Brodie for pioneering concepts of nuclear strategy around the principle that the purpose of the military establishment is no longer to win wars but to avert them. Theorizing on how best to avoid nuclear war soon produced the alternative of how to fight, and perhaps win, one. The debate between the deterrers and the warfighters has been with us ever since. Perhaps the most original contribution by either side came from the polemicists who sort out the debaters as the MAD men (for mutual assured destruction) and the NUTS (for nuclear use theorists).

When Bernard Brodie joined the Air Force planning staff as a consultant in 1948, he embodied the intellectual split between the deterrers and the warfighters. Earlier Brodie had supported, as a means of keeping nuclear war limited, the idea of both sides targeting only military facilities, deliberately avoiding cities. When he determined that up to two million civilians would still be killed

in a "counterforce" war, he abandoned this idea, then joined the Rand think tank where other scholars were investigating similar alternatives to Armageddon. The development of the hydrogen bomb shocked Brodie and other scholars. A purely counterforce strike was then defined as one killing *only* two million civilians and Brodie thought that strategy had reached a dead end. His interests shifted to attempts to keep nuclear war limited, which seemed hardly likely; he left Rand in 1966 to return to teaching and further study the psychological causes of war.

Both Freedman and Kaplan develop the intellectual history of nuclear war through the eyes of the strategists themselves. Freedman's thesis is that nuclear strategy is cyclical and repetitive. "Much of what is offered today as a profound and new insight was said yesterday; and usually in a more concise and literate manner." Kaplan sees their world as excessively narrow, operationally naive, dominated by military hardware where capability equates to intent. The warfighters and deterrers, arms controllers and first strikers, the counterforce, counter-value, or conventional responders are carefully analyzed to show strengths and weaknesses and the overall fragility of the body of theory itself.

What differences have the nuclear strategists really made? Secretaries of Defense other than James Schlesinger have read few books about nuclear strategy before taking office, their decisions in office more often

than not followed political or technological imperatives of the moment. Think tank advice from organizations such as Rand supports service dogmas. Offered on a paid and privileged basis, is it or can it be compatible with the integrity of decent scholarship? Brodie had serious reservations about the whole concept of nuclear war. Because officials "will not pay for unfriendly advice (twice)," he was never popular with Air Force officers with whom he had to work. It is at this point that the apocalyptic debate of Lefever and Hunt may be of greatest utility in suggesting alternatives.

Lefever and Hunt believe that quality of the current debate on nuclear arms on both sides of the Atlantic is marred by simplistic slogans, doubletalk, misplaced fears and distorted statistics; it has hardly served the long term objective of "peace with freedom and justice." The 31 essays represent a wide variety of sources and diverse views, and are never far from the moral and ethical aspects of atomic warfare. Part One offers an excellent discussion of arms control issues, US-Europe oriented, with sound views from both sides of the Atlantic. The peace movement is developed in Part Two, including several fine selections on Soviet manipulation of peace sentiments in the West and the "Active Measures" by the KGB seeking to separate the United States from its European allies. Part Three, "The Apocalyptic Premise," offers a platform for the prophets of doom like Jonathan Schell, and after doom

like Herman Kahn, Michael Kinsley, and Jack Greene. Part Four, "The Churches and Modern Arms," covers succinctly the current issues raised by both Catholic and Protestant clergy and the burden on government officials to choose between their consciences as illuminated by church teachings, and their professional careers and commitments. Pundit George Will claims that the technology of modern arms "has driven us to a deterrence policy based on a practice that was once universally condemned, holding enemy civilian populations as hostages." But even before Hiroshima, he adds, injuries inflicted on noncombatants were not just collateral effects of war; they were "deliberate results, on a vast scale, of tactics tailored to conventional weapons." Part Five offers the official views, United States, Soviet and British, for control of armaments. A highly useful "focus" precedes each of the essays and an excellent bibliography corresponding to the five sections of the text offers an excellent guide for further study.

The professional officer, whatever his particular bent, will find in these books a splendid study guide, first in reviewing the limitations on nuclear strategies developed by past experts in the field, and second, the limitations on future strategies placed by moral and ethical constraints on public policy. From both, far better concepts of nuclear strategy should certainly emerge.

DR. PAUL R. SCHRATZ
Arnold, Maryland

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Peri, Yoram. *Between Ballots and Battles: Israeli Military in Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983. 344pp. \$39.50.

The course of events in Lebanon over the past two years has significantly sharpened Israeli internal opposition towards their own military policy. For the first time in five wars, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) did not have the public's total unswerving support. The Kahane Commission was an example of this divided opinion and, even though it gave almost complete exoneration to the army involvement in the Sabra and Shatilah massacres, it was clear that the divisive effects of Lebanon exposed the inherent controversy within the Israeli civil-military relationship.

Yoram Peri's timely book on the growing conflict between the political establishment and the military has been made even more useful because of the recent "strategic consensus" agreement between Washington and Tel Aviv. Peri, who is presently teaching political science at Tel Aviv University, was a political advisor to Yitzhak Rabin in 1974 and 1977.

He skillfully details the political involvement of the IDF from its early days to the present and shows how the centrality of the security issue dominates every Israeli political decision. Moyshe Dayan once described their fixation on security by saying that small nations don't have foreign policy; they have defense policy. Also, the protracted conflict against the Arabs has developed a

concept of the citizen soldier once described by an IDF general as "a citizen on eleven months of annual leave." However, the debacles of the early days of the Yom Kippur War began to cause Israeli public opinion to waver in its absolute trust of the military leadership and question if security matters should really be sacrosanct and shielded from public scrutiny.

Traditionally, the IDF has been considered to have strong central civilian control. It is here where Peri shows remarkable chutzpah by directly challenging the theory of such noteworthy authorities on the IDF as J.C. Hurewitz, Amos Perlmutter and Nadaf Safran. *Between Battles and Ballots* is well researched and factually detailed. Much of the book is based on Peri's Ph.D. thesis, and he provides much evidence to support his theory that the IDF is now a strong, almost independent force taking part in top decisions of the Israeli government. He makes his case by first showing how the military has become a crucial avenue to top political jobs. His detailed analysis discusses the former officers who have moved directly to the posts of prime minister, deputy prime minister, defense minister and many other key posts. He points out that many of these officers devote considerable active-duty time and energy to obtaining these political posts. For example, nearly 20 percent of the local political parties in a recent municipal election were headed by officers. Peri also outlines the essential weakness of the political

system which is supposed to control the military. His accounts of the relationships between prime ministers, defense ministers and chiefs of staff are very revealing and they provide insight into some of Israel's crucial political-military decisions through the years. Another bit of evidence put forth by Peri is that the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza since 1967 has given the IDF an expanded civilian policy-making role at the cabinet level as they deal with the administration of those areas.

This is a useful book for readers interested in Israel's role in the contemporary Middle East. Well organized with impressive footnotes and bibliography, it manifests the fears of a segment of Israeli society who see the growth of the military's political power as dangerous. In fact, Peri's closing statement does not rule out an eventual military takeover of Israel. Perhaps David will become Goliath.

E.V. BADOLATO
Colonel, US Marine Corps
Naval War College

Buck, James H. and Korb, Lawrence J. *Military Leadership*. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1981. 270pp. \$22.50 paper \$9.95

The premise of this collection of articles on military leadership is that there are no well defined set of concepts that describe what a military leader is or should be, and that attempting to define such a set may be futile because leadership is so situationally dependent. A postscript

by Professor Sarkesian pessimistically concludes that:

"It is the human, moral, and ethical dimension of leadership that are least susceptible to quantification and precise empirical design. Having noted this, it is appropriate to close with the observation that it is unlikely that researchers and practitioners will find precise answers to the concept and exercise of leadership."

So we are told that leadership is too hard to figure out, but here are what some learned people think about it anyway. The learned range from among others: a historian, a psychologist, a philosopher, and a battalion commander. Distinctions between management and leadership are referred to in about half of the articles. Some conclude managers require different skills than leaders; some conclude that one can't be a leader unless he is a manager; and some conclude that the values of management are inconsistent with those of leadership.

The collection of articles are organized around three main topics: theory, special contemporary issues, and leadership in the field. This group of articles would make a good set of readings for students and teachers in an executive course at a senior service school. Especially the theoretical articles which discuss ideas from the viewpoint of several disciplines: organization theory, psychology, and philosophy. Students in senior service schools could test the concepts derived from this set of articles against their experience both as leaders and followers. Students could

then either accept, reject, or modify some of the ideas derived from those disciplines as they apply to military leadership.

I disagree that uncovering basic laws of characteristics of good military leadership is too hard. If the subject is worth writing about, it is worth rigorous and scientific inquiry that attempts to objectively identify these characteristics. Nowhere in the book is a discussion of what such a research design might look like, except that Dr. Korb poses some important questions that might be the frontispiece of such an inquiry. These are:

- How can the system provide for the effective assignment and promotion of military professionals?

- Is it possible to determine what abilities a potential leader should possess?

- Is leadership a subject that can be taught? If so, how?

- How can unit leaders be perceived as such when military command is centralized to such a high degree?

- Can the military maintain its community basis; units their social cohesion?

Perhaps a research design that starts with those military persons who, by the standards of the services, are good leaders might lead to the discovery of important characteristics of military leadership. Once identified, these "leaders" could be further investigated by asking those who were their followers if and why these individuals were perceived to be good leaders. Response bias aside,

I believe that followers know who they would like to go to war with and who they wouldn't, and they probably can identify why they feel that way.

FRANCIS G. SATTERTHWAITE
Naval War College

Sims, Robert B. *The Pentagon Reporters*. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1983. 177pp. \$5.50

At last! A scholarly work about the Pentagon press corps, and its ways of doing business, that is entertaining, informative and does not read like a textbook.

Bob Sims is a descriptive writer of quality. His considerable E-Ring experience, as the public affairs assistant to secretaries of the Navy from both political persuasions, gives him a valuable insight into both the workings of the Pentagon bureaucracy and the men and *woman* (yes, just one) who constituted the Pentagon press corps in 1982. Captain Sims wrote his book while serving as a senior research fellow at the National Defense University. He was able to weave his historical research, interviews and insights into a highly readable manuscript that brings to life the people, and their motivations, who report defense news.

The Pentagon press corps is more mature, and more geographically stable, than their news media colleagues at other Washington institutions. For instance, the Associated Press' Fred Hoffman has toiled at the Pentagon for 22 years, and is not loath to sharply correct transient newsmakers and spokespersons who are

less than precise in their statements about past defense policies and programs. Ike Pappas of CBS News, until he was reassigned to other duties recently, had been a regular in the Pentagon newsroom for seven years. However, Sims has detected a trend by senior news editors to rotate their reporters more frequently than before, to keep them being watchdogs, rather than lapdogs, of the "beats" to which they are assigned.

Sims traces the relationship between the military and the news media, which has always been adversarial, but only rarely hostile. He explores the motivations, thought processes, attitudes, deadline pressures ("Speed.Accuracy.Speed.") and professional competitiveness of the reporters who collect, interpret, and disseminate military news. That news contributes to the public's opinion and understanding of DoD policies, programs, and personnel. Some of these correspondents also exert significant influence over Congress' understanding of military matters. For instance, George Wilson of the *Washington Post* only slightly overstated what Capitol Hill insiders have known for at least 25 years. "The only thing politicians read are the newspapers. They don't have time to read briefings. They don't have time to read reports that the Pentagon sends them. So when you go to a Congressional hearing, you'll see that about half the questions are provoked by what the guy reads over his coffee in the newspaper—which is usually the *Washington Post*."

The Pentagon Reporters covers all

elements of the Pentagon press corps; the wire services, daily newspapers, news services (Scripps-Howard, etc.), news magazines, technical and policy publications, broadcasting, foreign news agencies (Reuters), and US government outlets such as the US Information Agency and the Voice of America. Sims interviewed the newsperson representing each medium to ascertain his personal background and the inspiration that brought him into journalism, and the twists and turns of fate that placed them in the newsroom of the Pentagon. In this book the people he interviewed discuss journalism ethics, attitudes, leakers, show-offs, and whistle-blowers. They explain why they are uncomfortable when their patriotism or loyalty or honesty is questioned. In general, according to Sims, the reporters' ultimate national defense goal is the same as the goal of those in the defense establishment they report about—they want a strong and safe America. Sometimes, Sims continues, their profession calls on them to pursue that goal in ways that seem inconsistent, often wrong, to those who are not journalists. They report defense news, not manufacture it. But they are not infallible. And they, correctly, have their pointed critics. Caspar Weinberger was quoted as saying, "I have . . . the greatest respect for the profession, and it is only that respect that leads me occasionally to point out things that are in error."

What is most notably missing in Sims' book is a skeptical appraisal, or ranking, of the best and worst of the

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news media representatives who cover the Pentagon, and why. But perhaps that omission is an inevitable consequence of an active-duty officer writing about influential persons with whom he continues to have frequent contact. Nevertheless, this is a first-class piece of research and writing and should be read by every military officer who wants to better understand and appreciate the influence of military reporting, and military reporters, on their professions.

JAMES E. WENTZ
Captain, US Navy
Naval War College

Hosmer, Tephon T. and Wolfe, Thomas W. *Soviet Policy and Practice toward Third World Conflicts*. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1983. 318pp. \$23.95

In assessing the behavior of the Soviet Union in the developing world, several generally discernible patterns can be analyzed. In *Soviet Policy and Practice toward Third World Conflicts*, Hosmer and Wolfe have outlined some of the overall strategy that seems to be at the heart of Soviet expansionism since the Second World War. Given the current Soviet/Cuban involvement in the Caribbean and Central American regions, the book is a particularly timely study of the USSR's policy and attitude toward the Third World.

The work is very tersely and concisely written, and probably originated as a Rand Corporation study, as both the authors have worked in that organization. It

contains a number of simple maps, an excellent bibliography, and extensive notation. As such, it functions well as a basic outline of Soviet adventurism since WWII, and could be quite useful as a guide to more in-depth research. It was obviously written to provide the reader with an overview of major trends, and it succeeds admirably in that capacity. In the first part of the text, the overall Soviet involvement in the developing world is traced from an economic, political, and military standpoint. The second section is concerned with more specific analysis of military action in the Third World, including particular emphasis on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as a possible paradigm-shift to an even more adventurous policy. The book concludes by offering some thoughts on future trends in Soviet involvement as well as possible US responses to such maneuvers. It is well-organized and cleanly written throughout, setting out factually and impartially the Soviet record in the developing countries. The authors refrain from discussing US response along the complicated road from 1945 to the present, as that would have been beyond the scope of their work.

The most convincing section of the book is contained in the final two chapters, where Hosmer and Wolfe discuss possible future trends in the Third World and propose several US responses. The authors convincingly point out factors that suggest increased Soviet adventurism (improvements in Soviet power projec-

tion capabilities, changes in the balance of power, experience and infrastructure, cooperative intervention with surrogates, rising radicalism and instability in the Third World, and the validation of Soviet Great-Power credentials). The factors that might tend to diminish Soviet Third World involvement are also covered well, including economic constraints, US policies and actions, and diverging interests, among others. Overall, the authors believe that Soviet policy will continue to be aggressively opportunistic—willing to take advantage of situations that arise, but not part of some master plan for world domination. This is a thesis supported both by historical fact and current information.

In terms of US response, the authors offer a four-point prescription:

- Demonstrate US interests early and convincingly.
- Maintain credibility of possible US escalation.
- Recognize limitations of linkage.
- Emphasize crisis management and anticipatory involvement.

Clearly, these are all sound judgments. The more interesting and difficult question, however, is one upon which Hosmer and Wolfe do not touch: How does a government *convince the public* to endorse such demanding and possibly dangerous policies, particularly in the post-Vietnam period? This is at the heart of the current controversy surrounding US responses to external force

involvement in Central America. The answer, of course, is informing the public of the seriousness of the threat and the need for strong response by the United States. *Soviet Policy and Practice toward Third World Conflicts* is one such effort to bring such information before the public. By illustrating the complexities of Soviet policy and attitudes, Hosmer and Wolfe have made a significant contribution to the continuing debate over the meaning and response to Soviet adventurism in the developing world.

JAMES STAVRIDIS

Lieutenant Commander, US Navy

Markey, Edward J. *Nuclear Peril*. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1983. 183pp. \$14.95

In *Nuclear Peril*, Congressman Edward J. Markey (D., Mass.), an opponent of both nuclear energy and nuclear weapons, inadvertently reveals a remarkable degree of political opportunism. A critic of nuclear energy during the late 1970s when the Three Mile Island incident made such criticism fashionable, an advocate of non-proliferation in the early 1980s when India's Tarapur and Iraq's Osirak made that an attractive issue once again, and a promoter of a nuclear freeze when public interest was mounting, Markey has always focused on the particular nuclear issue receiving public attention and appears to have the most political potency.

Perhaps to demonstrate consistency, but more likely to demonstrate leadership in the nuclear area,

Markey has sought to connect all of these issues. He sees a direct connection between nuclear energy and nuclear weaponry: "The ultimate problem with nuclear power is nuclear bombs." Even though there are obvious connections between civil and military uses of nuclear energy, Markey clearly distorts those connections. For him, nuclear reactors are bomb factories, and for him the presence in a country of nuclear fuel or uranium oxide is dangerous.

In *Nuclear Peril*, Markey gives primary attention to non-proliferation issues, especially to the 1980 controversy over US supply of nuclear fuel to India's Tarapur reactors. However, he seems chiefly interested in opposing nuclear power. Indeed, he defines the proliferation issue in technical terms (i.e., as the spread of nuclear power plants and associated facilities, and the consequent technical capacity to produce nuclear weapons). From this perspective, which was embodied in the Carter policy, the proliferation issue cannot genuinely be resolved in a world in which nuclear energy is used to provide electrical power.

The solution to the proliferation problem, then, as Markey sees it, is to end nuclear power production and exports. And he advocates both the "dismantlement" of nuclear power plants in the United States and getting the United States out of the "nuclear export business." He argues this simple solution to a complex problem cautiously. For apparently he has discovered that you cannot seriously

advocate an immediate termination of nuclear power production either in this country or abroad, or an immediate termination of nuclear exports (particularly to countries with which the United States has agreements or contracts, and that accept full-scope safeguards), in the existing political atmosphere in the United States. Regardless, the effects of such proposals, even if they never become national policy, could harm US efforts to reestablish ourselves as a reliable supplier and to reassert leadership in non-proliferation policy.

Unless one believes Markey to misunderstand the issues totally or, more likely, to be first and foremost a critic of nuclear energy, it is difficult to understand why he takes the positions he has. He desires that the United States reassume global leadership on non-proliferation policy, and he believes that if the United States phases out nuclear energy and exports, its example will have the desired worldwide effect of terminating nuclear power production and commerce. He does not seem to understand that his recommendations would lead to an effective renunciation by the United States of its non-proliferation leadership, and to the "Pontius Pilate" approach to non-proliferation that has been so appealing to some members of Congress.

That Markey does not fully accept the logical consequences of his argument is evident in his decision concerning the use of leverage. Of course his policies would not allow leverage over the nuclear programs of other states. He argues that not only has

such leverage not been used, but that it should not be used: "Nuclear power is simply too dangerous a commodity to be a bargaining chip in world diplomacy." How, then, is the United States to exert leverage? With the full panoply of US political, economic and military power and influence—these, according to Markey, can and should be brought to bear in the struggle to prevent further proliferation. This argument assumes that non-proliferation is the most important problem in the world, and that it should shape US foreign and trade policies. Such is a dangerous and absurd argument.

If the United States followed Markey's advice, it would indeed cut the use of nuclear energy worldwide, but it would not change the tendencies for states to proliferate. Rather, both "problem states" and those seeking energy security would develop their own facilities for enrichment and reprocessing. These are both more difficult to safeguard and pose graver proliferation risks than the existing commercial facilities do under international safeguards.

Markey argues for the union of the antinuclear (energy) and the nuclear freeze (weapons) movements in this volume, as he has since in congressional and other public fora. He appears to understand the problems involved with fusing two disparate movements with divergent interests, but he seems to believe that public interest lobbyists and a grass roots movement can achieve success within Congress. He understands correctly that the great majority of Congress-

men are neither strongly committed for nor against nuclear energy, and that actions of the administration and of lobbyists, as well as expressions of public opinion can definitely influence their behavior. And this is what he proposes be done.

DONALD M. KERR
Los Alamos National Laboratory

Perl, Raphael. *The Falkland Islands Dispute in International Law and Politics: A Documentary Sourcebook*. New York: Oceana, 1983. 722pp. \$45

For those of us eager to see an in-depth analysis of the international law implications of the 1982 Falklands War, this book is disappointing. The reasons for disappointment are attributable not so much to the content as to the volume's title, combined with the timing of its publication and the layout of its cover.

The book appeared early in 1983, with the Falklands War still fresh in mind. The first nine words of the title are emblazoned in large type across its cover and on its spine. The subtitle, "A Documentary Sourcebook," appears on the cover in letters one-fifth the size of those in the main title. They do not appear at all on the spine. The first sight of the book invariably draws an incredulous comment or question on how the author could possibly have written such a lengthy analysis of a just-concluded war.

Unfortunately, the book is not really about the 1982 war over the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, and what analysis it contains is a mere 55 pages

long. Those 55 pages are devoted to the century-and-a-half argument between Argentina and Britain over the islands' sovereignty. The vast bulk of the book consists of photocopied reproductions of documents relevant to the sovereignty dispute and—beginning with page 419—the 1982 war.

True, an analysis of the sovereignty dispute is worthwhile, and yes, a collection of documents on the Falkland Islands "dispute" is useful, and so is the 27-page historical chronology by Everette E. Larson. Nevertheless, one begins reading the book with hopes somewhat dashed.

There are, moreover, other disappointments. Some are not so significant—for example, it is cheaply printed and bound, as if done in haste. A bit more significantly, some of the reproduced documents—including Pope Alexander VI's famous Bull of 1493, which appears not in Latin but in Spanish—are not translated into English.

The analysis of the sovereignty dispute that begins the volume is a well-researched account that focuses on the legal position of the two antagonists. The geographical and historical facts are marshaled and shifted through the international law doctrines concerning modes of territory acquisition and self-determination. The author concludes that it "is impossible to arrive at a definitive answer as to who has the right of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands." However, he does suggest that original sovereignty rested with Spain until Spanish abandonment in

1811 and that this dereliction was followed by Argentine occupation in the 1820s, but that this occupation gave rise only to "an inchoate title to the Islands, based on expectancy." Then, after the 1833 ouster of the Argentinians by Great Britain (with US assistance), the British began a 150-year occupation that began in "bad faith," but which arguably perfected eventual title in Britain. This conclusion is certainly defensible, but the background analysis by the author could have been stronger.

Mr Perl's analysis is followed by Everette E. Larson's chronology of events bearing on the sovereignty dispute, beginning with the Papal Bull and ending with the 20 June 1982 surrender by Argentine personnel on Thule Island, South Sandwich Islands, to the British.

The book then presents its reproductions of 52 relevant documents. This section of the volume covers 603 pages and includes several United Nations documents arising out of the 1982 conflict. This should be of value to anyone interested in researching either the sovereignty dispute or certain of the events surrounding the war. It is not particularly useful to those who wish to investigate the international law issues arising from the use of force by both sides or the conduct of the hostilities.

The book ends with a 31-page bibliography, also the work of Everette E. Larson. There is no index.

JON L. JACOBSON
University of Oregon
School of Law

Kellett, Anthony. *Combat Motivation: The Behavior of Soldiers in Battle*. Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff, 1982. 362pp. \$38

At one time or another during their careers, most military commanders speculate about what motivates their men to fight. George Washington, for example, wrote to the Congress that, "Three things prompt men to a regular discharge of their duty in time of action: natural bravery, hope of reward, and fear of punishment." Trotsky had the last of those three factors in mind when he wrote about the Red army that, "The command will always be obliged to place the soldiers between the possible death in the front and the inevitable one in the rear." Other military writers such as Ardant du Picq and S.L.A. Marshall have maintained that soldiers are motivated primarily by feelings of comradeship.

All of these aspects of motivation and many others are covered in *Combat Motivation*. Since much of the book goes well beyond what a behavioral scientist would call motivation, the book's subtitle, *The Behavior of Soldiers in Battle*, is actually a more accurate description of the contents than the title itself. There are, for example, sections on training, military discipline, organizational policies such as troop rotation and descriptions of combat in addition to discussions of such standard motivators as patriotism, religious beliefs, punishments and rewards.

The book is based largely on a report prepared for the Canadian Department of National Defence and

published in 1980. The purpose of the study was to review the subject of combat motivation for the purpose of improving the leadership, administration and training of the Canadian armed forces. The result is an interesting admixture of behavioral science and military history. The examples are taken largely from 20th century wars and from British, Canadian, and American actions in particular. The readers should not expect to find any startling new theories about combat motivation, but rather a thorough review of the subject.

The biggest surprise perhaps is that, except for a brief comment near the end of the book, *Combat Motivation* contains no discussion of frustration as a combat motivator. This omission is not the result of an oversight. The author explains that the study is concerned with external motivators and that such internal factors as instincts, self-actualization and frustration are not included. Although the subject of frustration has been accounted for, so to speak, its absence is unfortunate nevertheless. Frustration as a cause of aggressive behavior is a subject that has received attention by both behavioral scientists and military men. John Dollard, an authority on the subject of frustration as a producer of aggression and the author of a World War II book on the behavior of men in battle, wrote in one of his works, "This study takes as its point of departure the assumption that aggression is always a consequence of frustration." He goes on to say that the aggression "may be directed at the

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object which is perceived as causing the frustration or it may be displaced to some altogether innocent source." Compare that scientific view with that of a former Marine writing of his experiences as a young corporal during the Korean war. "The rest of the day is filled with a wide variety of interesting projects: policing the area (picking up cigarette butts, scraps of paper, etc.), rifle inspection, troop and stomp (drill, marching, etc.), personnel and tent inspections, classes, hikes, training problems, night problems. This is what is called 'harassing the troops.' It is suggested that we take out our resentment on the Chinese later."

The omission of frustration as a combat motivator notwithstanding, *Combat Motivation* is still the best overall review of the subject available. As such it deserves the attention of professional soldiers and others interested in understanding what motivates men in combat.

TED GATCHEL
Colonel, US Marine Corps
Naval War College

Maroon, Fred J. and Beach, Edward L. *Keepers of the Sea*. Annapolis, Md.: US Naval Institute Press, 1983. 256 pp. \$45.00 (\$75.00 in a bonded leather edition)

The advertising for this volume includes quotes by Admirals Arleigh Burke and Thomas B. Hayward which use the words "amazing," "discriminating," "irresistible," "nostalgic," "exciting," "unique," "scintillating," and "action-packed." Not being of a mind to compete with

former Chiefs of Naval Operations in a contest of superlatives, I shall resist the temptation to add to their list. This book contains the finest collection of photographs of the operating Navy and Marine Corps ever published. Fred Maroon is not only the finest of technicians with a "lens" but a true artist at capturing naval forces against the vastness of the sea and sky. His portfolio is held in place by the sort of consistent mortar one would expect of Captain Beach.

More than haze gray ships, black submarines and silver aircraft, the US Navy of today is truly reflected in the faces of the officers, crews and trainees as captured by the camera of Fred Maroon. There is the self-choreographed ballet of the carrier's flight deck crew to the accompaniment of screeching jets, slamming catapults and compressing landing gear. There is the concentration and stress in the faces of USS *Richmond K. Turner* crewmen on the manila highline during a personnel transfer at sea. The determination of Naval Academy plebes completing their year-long rite of passage by climbing Herndon Monument to place a cap at the peak. You can feel the bewilderment on the faces of young Marines as "the gunny" explains why they are hunkered in the mud with rain drenched ponchos—the tired concentration of watchstanders in the control station of a submarine, in the CIC of a destroyer or in the ready room of a carrier. And most of all, the pride and necessary cockiness that make men in their teens and early twenties the masters of machines costing hundreds of millions

of dollars—young men who pay the price daily for our nation's need to deploy forward its Navy. All this and more is here.

One of the first things any author or speaker must do is to decide what he is not going to say or write. Some Navy specialists, such as the land-based air antisubmarine warfare community, may feel slighted at there being no photographs of P-3Cs. Some might wish for more shots of underway replenishment, exploding weapons, heavy weather operations, etc., but they will appreciate the book in toto as a beautiful photographic tour de force.

Others might find fault with Ned Beach's tendency toward clichés, but his style makes *Keepers of the Sea* meaningful to a much larger audience. In fact it would be a superb gift to parents and friends from the plains and mountains, who still have difficulty imagining how we spend our time at sea. Some copies will be going from Newport to Vermont for just that reason. (If you're an Institute member it's only \$36.00) This book will provide many hours of enjoyment to the old sailor, the modern steamer and to those as yet uninitiated. Any American will be proud of the Navy shown here.

D.G. CLARK
Captain, US Navy

Reilly, John C. Jr. *United States Navy Destroyers of World War II*. New York: Sterling Publishing Company, 1983. 160pp. \$16.95

Definitive published material on the US Navy's warships—the objec-

tives behind their designs, the designs themselves and the successes and limitations of those designs—has been all too scarce until very recently. One might have considered this lack almost a national trait since most developed countries, even those suffering defeat and heavy loss, have produced highly specific combatant ship design histories. Perhaps the foremost in all these efforts was Dr. Oscar Parkes' *British Battleships* published in 1956, which still sets a world standard. But there are also the excellent Italian series organized according to ship type, published during the sixties, and, more recently, the German submarine studies by Eberhard Rossler. Not to be ignored are the extraordinary British works on destroyers by Edgar March, and on cruisers and battleships by Alan Raven and John Roberts; the French efforts by Henri Le Masson and the extensive work of the Japanese. All have the common thread of access to official correspondence, plans and photographs.

Until the midseventies, however, similar design studies of US warship types were rare, superficial, and incomplete. One reason for this may have been the reluctance of US publishers to support works which required extensive research for what was perceived as a very limited market. The Naval Institute professional and nonprofit, was more concerned than other publishers with the missing technical histories. As a result, after an extended gestation period, they published Robert O. Dulin and William H. Garzke's *U.S. Battleships in World War II* in 1976, followed four years

later by the same authors' *Allied Battleships in World War II*. Most recently the Institute has produced *U.S. Destroyers* by the prolific Norman Friedman, its most ambitious design history to date. This volume's drawings by A.D. Baker and definitive accounting of each design, based on official records, approach the quality of the best German and British works. Its only major flaw is that it is late by some twenty years. Now in this late flood of technical histories, comes a second definitive US destroyer work which covers much the same subject but over a more limited time span.

United States Navy Destroyers of World War II by John C. Reilly, is an outstanding work. Furthermore, at \$16.95 it is an exceptional value. Within its covers is the best collection of photographs of the war years' destroyers yet published; even better, most are dated, greatly increasing their worth. The author pays attention to detail while maintaining a good overview of the Navy's design objectives. He has divided US destroyers into four generations: the 68 pre-World War I "broken deckers"; the mass produced four-stack flushdeckers of World War I; the London Treaty ships of the thirties (DD 348 to 420); and finally, the *Benson*, *Gleaves*, *Fletcher*, *Sumner* and *Gearing* classes. The book deals almost exclusively with the ships of the last two generations.

Each class, starting with the eight ships of the *Farragut* class (DD 348-355)

of FY 1932-33, is described in its own chapter. With the aid of referenced official documentation, the developing requirements of each class are outlined, providing a feel for the give and take between Opnav's requirements, normally as represented by the General Board, and the technical bureaus which were called upon to develop the design. As each class is reviewed, including pictures from commissioning to the end of the war, an impression can be gained as to how dynamic destroyer design was, particularly during the immediate prewar period. Unthinkable now, then there was a new destroyer class each year with significant changes from their predecessors.

These ships up through the early *Benson* and *Gleaves*, bore the brunt of the war's demands through 1942 after which the first *Fletchers* began reaching the fleet in the Pacific. The latter's larger size permitted greater flexibility in adjusting their armament and control systems to meet the rapidly increasing Japanese air threat. The *Fletchers*, arguably the best all around destroyer class of World War II (measured in fighting ton miles, say), were followed by the *Sumners* and their near sisters, the longer legged *Gearings*. All are covered by Reilly in detail, there being 16 continuous pages of *Fletcher*-class photographs alone.

The final years of the war saw the operational emphasis for destroyers in the Pacific shift from surface actions to carrier task force escorts. This led to picket duty during the invasion of Okinawa. The kamikazes and Bakas

encountered then and there led to even greater emphasis on antiaircraft armament and warning capability on the destroyers as the invasion of Japan was considered. The resulting increased 40 mm installations as well as the specialized *Gearing*-class radar picket designs are covered adequately.

There is a final chapter covering official ruminations on future destroyer designs based on the lessons of the war. The new ships always, as now, were larger than their predecessors. The book's conclusion provides a thoughtful review of fleet escort thinking on into the postwar years. Finally, there are appendixes on destroyer stability, war damage, basic Navy organization for 1934 and 1944, and lastly, a summary of destroyer characteristics by class. There is no listing of individual destroyer names and numbers. Perhaps there could be some criticism of the chronological detailing of events which occasionally overlap or are repeated. A complete reading is required to ensure capturing all of the detailed design considerations covered.

Destroyers in World War II should be in the library of anyone concerned with destroyers, past or future. Much of the information contained has been unavailable for too long. All we need now is to convince the publishers to print these priceless photographs on better paper.

RICHARD F. CROSS
Alexandria, Va.

Mannix, Daniel P. IV, ed. *The Old Navy: Rear Admiral Daniel P. Mannix*

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1984

III. New York: Macmillan, 1983. 294pp. \$16.95

Compiled from letters, journals, and diaries, an excerpt from this memoir by Rear Admiral Daniel Pratt Mannix III has appeared in *American Heritage*, and the book has been selected as an alternate choice by both the Military Book Club and the Naval Institute Press. This does not, of course, guarantee that *The Old Navy* will necessarily be to everyone's liking. Some people may question the admiral's memory in spots, just as others may wince at his old fashioned anecdotal style. Nonetheless, Daniel Pratt Mannix IV has done a commendable job in editing his father's papers. With assistance from the Naval History Division, he has produced a beguiling memoir of a navy moving from post-Civil War insularity to the threshold of world power.

The memoir opens in 1882 with recollections of Mannix's childhood in China as the son of a Marine captain on loan to the Chinese government as a torpedo expert. It concludes with his final cruise in command of a destroyer squadron in the Levant, a cruise which witnesses the consolidation of Turkey under Kemal Ataturk.

Most intriguing, and highly symbolic, is an early chapter concerning the Spanish-American War. Granted leave from Annapolis in order to take part in the war, Midshipman Mannix hustles aboard the USS *Indiana*. At the Battle of Santiago Bay, he watches a dejected Admiral Cervera being taken into custody, "I never

felt so sorry for anyone in my life," and along with the rest of Sampson's fleet receives prize money (Midshipman, \$267) and a tumultuous hero's welcome in New York Harbor. In retrospect, Mannix adds a passage that deserves quoting, as it epitomizes the nostalgia of a number of officers of his transitional generation:

"It is now fashionable to jeer at the Spanish-American War. Even so, it had something. The tropical setting, the background of palms, white surf and blue sky, the chivalry of the enemy, the shortness of range . . . the absence of submarines and the type of warfare they represent, the fact that it was largely a war of movement and things took place out in the open with flags snapping in the breeze, the sea salt in our faces, and our ships speeding through the water as blue as turquoise and white with foam, the staccato sequence of events, the fact that when it was all over we knew who had won."

Graduating from Annapolis, Mannix moves through a variety of duty stations which reflect the Navy's growing commitments. He moves with zest and with a resolve characteristic of his era. If, as an ensign, he cuts a foolish figure leading a shore party into Buffalo on the day of McKinley's assassination, he analyzes the fiasco and later earns promotion to Lt. (jg.) by coolly defusing a red-light district riot in Pensacola. Moreover, whether ashore or afloat, Mannix exudes a puckerish humor all his own. A fine raconteur, his best yarns are those

from his cruises to Edwardian England, Imperial Germany, Russia, and Japan during the Dreadnought Period. In Kiel, for example, he averts a duel between an American midshipman and a German officer by ordering a bowl of brandy "smashes" and then proposing toast after toast until all parties are too tipsy to do anything but sing "Oh Susannah." Bidding the Navy adieu, the Germans go ashore in ignorance of the apples adorning their helmet spikes.

By the time Mannix concludes a tour with the 1918 Yankee Mining Squadron, one can sense his disillusionment with the industrial commercial America which has evolved since his youth as a midshipman aboard sailing vessels. Increasingly, he has little use for civilians. One senses too, his impatience with the drift of post-WWI diplomacy. Assigned as an escort to foreign delegates at the 1921-22 Washington Disarmament Conference, he comes away unquestionably bitter. "It was at the height of the pacifist craze . . . we Navy men were ordered to be present but to keep quiet . . . I don't know what good it did to force us to be present except to humiliate us."

Nonetheless, through his final cruise—a cruise during which he swims the Hellespont—Mannix retains an optimism and vitality characteristic of a generation. Throughout the book one is reminded that "The Old Navy" is also the Navy which produced Admirals King, Nimitz, Halsey, and Spruance, a breed which would serve its

country well. Although Mannix retired in the 20s he was, in a sense, one of them. However quaint or long ago their Navy may seem, the reader is likely to agree with Daniel Pratt Mannix IV that we are living today on their bounty. In short, this entertaining memoir is highly recommended to The New Navy.

JOHN S. PETERSON
The Military Bookman
New York City

Woodward, David, *Sunk! How the Great Battleships were Lost*. Winchester, Mass: Allen and Unwin, 1982. 153pp. \$17.95

It is difficult to say exactly what audience Mr. Woodward had in mind when he wrote this book. Surely not lovers of the history and lore of the famous battleships since the organizing principle of the book, as evident in its title, is how they all were sunk. Battleship buffs, as we know, revel in the glory of the great ships, not in their demise.

Neither is Mr. Woodward apparently interested in writing for historians. Although the subject is obviously a historical one, the fifteen short chapters of the book are decidedly slanted toward the loss of a ship or ships rather than the full story. In short, this is a book about losers, not winners. To this writer it seemed odd indeed to look at Jutland, Tsushima, or Pearl Harbor from this restricted point of view. Admittedly, the reader will find himself leaving Mr. Woodward frequently and referring to his

library to get "the rest of the story."

The style of the author is patently anecdotal. Although Mr. Woodward refers to many sources, including correspondence and some personal conversations, there are no footnotes and there is no bibliography. In one instance, for example, in preparing the reader for Pearl Harbor, Mr. Woodward retells of his personal strategic talks, in 1932, with a certain unnamed and retired Soviet vice admiral, a conversation which, to him, clearly foretold of the rise of Imperial Japanese naval power.

All of this is not to say that the book is not interesting reading. Ranging from the Austro-Prussian War in 1866, when the Italian battleship *Re d'Italia* was rammed and sunk by the Austrian *Ferdinand Max*, to the sinking of the *Yamato* in 1945 at the end of World War II, the book is a fascinating collection of sea stories. The author knows his subjects well and has a winning way of retelling each incident. He often quotes unusual sources, such as the diary of the gunnery officer in the *Lützow* in action against the *Lion* at Jutland, or Commander Semenov, who, having no particular appointed duties in the *Suvarov*, watched and took notes at Tsushima, as the great Russian fleet was sunk before his eyes.

Since Mr. Woodward can obviously spin a yarn with the very best, perhaps it is his editor who should be faulted for the book's organizing principle of sunken ships instead of the overall excitement, glory, and

heroism of the actions which are the most important part of all naval history and lore. For every *Hood* there is a *Bismarck*, and for every *Bismarck* a *King George V*, yet to focus on just the demise of a ship or ships seems too narrow a view. Would that we shall not now have a series of books on sunken destroyers, cruisers, submarines and aircraft carriers despite the best efforts of Mr. Woodward or his editor.

MICHAEL B. EDWARDS
Commander, US Navy

Snyder, Louis L. *Louis L. Snyder's Historical Guide to World War II*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982. 838pp. \$39.95

The *Historical Guide to World War II* is an encyclopedia of information about the war, arranged alphabetically, with entries ranging from a few sentences to many pages in length. It also includes some data charts on weapons systems ("German Aircraft Data," "Order of Battle of the Waffen-SS"), the original texts of some important documents and statements ("Atlantic Charter"), and a chronology of the war. The information ranges from the very basic ("Nuremberg Trials," "Arleigh Burke," "Battle of Midway") to the exotic ("Moon Planes," "Fort Eben Emael," "Waldteufel").

As a compendium that one might throw on the shelf at home, the *Guide* is too detailed—questions on the "Dam Busters Squadron," for example, seldom come up in general discussion. On the other hand, as a

serious reference work for scholarly use, the volume is far too thin and sketchy. It might have some appeal for the serious World War II buff, or find a place amidst the reference works in certain libraries. The book is Professor Snyder's latest in a long series of works on a variety of international topics and the war, and one has the feeling that he is using many of the scraps of information and research that have collected over the years. The result is an interesting and cleverly written volume, but the need for such a book is ultimately questionable—virtually all of the important information can be easily found in a general encyclopedia or in any of the countless books (including Professor Snyder's own) already written about the Second World War.

The most interesting aspect of the *Guide* is its information on the cultural, economic, and social aspects of the war. Entries on "Resources, Battle for" or the personality pieces on various leaders are neatly fitted into the overall flow of the war. Also worthy of note is the long and detailed index and the entries dealing with the literature, songs, and newspapers of the war years, subjects not normally contained in such studies.

Overall, the *Historical Guide* is highly readable and useful for quick, general research on the war, roughly at the level of a college undergraduate who needs some quick facts for a paper. For the dedicated World War II buff, it represents a means of putting much information into a convenient form for quick use. One

is left with a sense, however, that Professor Snyder's evident talents of research and writing might be better utilized in more important efforts than this.

JAMES STAVRIDIS
Lieutenant Commander, US Navy

Tilford, Earl H. Jr. *Search and Rescue in Southeast Asia*. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1980. 212pp. \$7.50

This is a story of ghosts, of heroic people and dramatic events which increasingly haunt the reader as he moves through the story and relives the history within the covers of Major Earl Tilford's book *Search and Rescue in Southeast Asia, 1961-1975*.

Tilford has packed a tremendous amount of information into about 120 or so pages of text in a 212-page work, a tribute to the rigorous standards of scholarship and tight writing so evident in his book. The thoroughness of the research is evident in the bibliography and the ample footnotes and most of his material was derived from primary sources, including interviews with those involved.

This is a story which cannot miss. Of the elites in the Vietnam War, none stood higher than the men in the Air Rescue Service (renamed in 1966 the Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service). These men, in their slow and vulnerable craft, routinely had to overcome the deep, skeletal fear which afflicted all of us who felt the enemy's breath as they risked everything to save a man. While this book is primarily about

Air Force rescue operations, the roles of the other services are not ignored.

Tilford's brief historical introduction reveals some surprises, such as the fact that a few helicopters were in use in the final weeks of World War II. (Read the book to find out where and why, and be even more surprised.)

Serious thought was given to air rescue during the RAF-Luftwaffe battles in 1940, and the Americans became deeply involved upon their commencing air operations in Europe and the Pacific. The Korean War and the French colonial war in Indochina enhanced the rescue role of the helicopter while revealing its limitations.

As Tilford points out, the American involvement in Indochina in the early sixties found the rescue forces ill-equipped and unprepared to recover downed crewmen or isolated troops, and air rescue always lagged a step behind as combat operations increased in intensity. Their coming of age is well described as the Air Rescue service moved up from the severely limited H-43 through the HH-3 "Jolly Green Giant" to the Buff, or "Super Jolly Green" H-53.

As the author so rightly notes, air rescue is often an afterthought in peace, and when war breaks out too many lives are needlessly lost because the needed equipment and training are generally years "away."

Typical of the dangers faced by the rescue forces was the experience of the HH-43 crew which departed a forward site in Laos to rescue a

downed F-105 pilot. As they moved in the waiting communist troops opened fire at point-blank range, downing the chopper and capturing the crew. The copilot, kept in harsh conditions in Laos, made a heroic attempt at escape after a year, but was recaptured. Tilford reports that the pilot was murdered by a peasant. Those, including this reviewer, who were in Udorn in 1965 remember the details as briefed at the time—he was given away by peasants, then beheaded by the Pathet Lao.

Crews flying over North Vietnam had a rule of thumb on rescue: up to the Black river there was a good chance of rescue; between the Black and Red rivers, one's chances for rescue dropped sharply, but a save was possible; beyond the Red river, log it out (although a few daring saves were made in Route Packs 5 and 6).

If the worst happened, crews were better off being taken in North Vietnam than by Communist Laotian guerrilla forces. To the North Vietnamese, an American flyer was a valuable pawn to be kept alive as political leverage; to the Laotians the prisoner was a bother to be disposed of as quickly as possible—hence it is not surprising to those who flew those missions that so many of the MIAs were lost in Laos. Besides, the jungle covered its scars quickly, so that wreckage rapidly disappeared from view.

There is one slight omission in the book when describing the search and rescue task force in action. This was the role played by an always unsung

group, the radar controllers ("Weapons Directors") at the area radar stations ("Brigham" at Udorn, "Invert" at Nakhon Phanom, etc.). While the airborne control ship Crown (later King) ran the show at the scene, the whole thing was organized and tracked by a young lieutenant or captain controlling the fleet at the radar station; Crown depended on him to track the force, mark the spot of a downed plane, effect the air refueling rendezvous for the supporting fighters, provide weather information, and more.

Search and Rescue in Southeast Asia contains several pages of photographs. For many, there can be no such thing as "overkill" when describing the dangers faced by the men of the rescue forces who so often risked so much in living up to their Service's motto "That Others May Live." Earl Tilford's work, valuable for both historian and the interested reader alike, does justice to those brave men.

PETER M. DUNN
Colonel, US Air Force
Defense Intelligence College

Stanley, Roy M. II. *Prelude to Pearl Harbor: War in China, 1937-41: Japan's Rehearsal for World War II*. New York: Scribner, 1982. 213pp. \$24.95

War books for American audiences sell better if Pearl Harbor is mentioned in the title. Relevance may also be suggested by claiming that prewar activities under study (such as Japanese operations in China) have an intimate connection

with the main event, in this case the Pacific War. On both counts, the titling and subtitling of Colonel Stanley's monograph are misleading. That the combat in China broke out four and a half years before Pearl Harbor does not make it the prelude to the naval air strike on Hawaii; that the Japanese army and air forces fought extensively in China does not constitute a rehearsal for the global war against the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands. Masked by these semantics is the fact that Stanley does document an extremely sound point: prewar allied intelligence lacked the scale, structure, and skill to collect and evaluate potentially useful data on the shadowy, underrated Japanese, even after their armed forces came out of the closet in China in 1937.

To Stanley's examples of benign American neglect could be added the unnerving experience of General Victor Krulak who, as a young marine lieutenant stationed in Shanghai in 1937, found his firsthand observations of innovations in Japanese landing craft and amphibious tactics pigeonholed and ignored by US higher headquarters. Krulak had forwarded detailed data and photographs on materials, design, and dimensions in his "Report on Japanese Assault Landing Operations Shanghai Area 1937," identifying such advances as modified hull bottoms and bow ramps. When Krulak later visited Washington in 1939, he traced his report to an obscure cubicle in BuShips, where an unknowing civilian employee com-

mented that the author must have been a crank who did not know the difference between a stern and a bow. If anybody important had taken notice of the document, Krulak was not aware of it. (See Richard H. Hoy, "Victor H. Krulak: A Marine's Biography," M.A. thesis, San Diego State University, 1974.)

But back to Colonel R.M. Stanley: an expert on photo interpretation, he has assembled a folio of more than 250 prewar and wartime photographs from open or declassified sources, and has spun a text around them, complemented by interesting excerpts from musty US training pamphlets and guides. The author is at his best in chronicling the Flying Tigers and his hero Claire Chennault. Knowledgeably captioned, the photos range from informative to picturesque. My favorite in the latter class is a posed photograph (vintage 1926) showing the wizened Old Marshal of Manchuria, Chang Tso-lin, and his surprisingly bookish-looking son Chang Hsueh-liang, towered over by an impeccably uniformed American regimental commander in Tientsin. Many photos, however, will interest only target analysts, devotees of military gear and uniforms, and ordnance buffs.

Stanley's writing style is often chummy, "The Japanese Army had an amazing talent for stepping on itself"; his transliteration of Asian (especially Japanese) names is erratic, inconsistent, and sometimes uninformed. Why, for instance, call the famous Japanese Kwantung Army

the Kanto Force or the Manchurian Army? More importantly, the historical underpinning of the text leaves very much to be desired. A particularly vexing example is Stanley's confused handling of the crucial Mukden affair of September 1931, where even his times are out of kilter. One also wonders about the feeble characterization of the modern Japanese officer corps as springing from aristocratic or *samurai* stock.

It is true that remarkably little of moment has ever appeared in English on the subject of the so-called China Incident; e.g., Frank Dorn's retrospective *Sino-Japanese War* (1974), Dick Wilson's journalistic *When Tigers Fight: The Story of the Sino-Japanese War* (1982), and Hsi-cheng Chi's illuminating *Nationalist China at War: Military Defeats and Political Collapse* (1982). Stanley's photographic survey can best be used with the other works in precisely the category selected for it by the publisher: as a reference album.

ALVIN D. COOX
San Diego State University

Bean, C.E.W. *The Story of Anzac*. Lawrence, Mass.: Queensland University Press, 1981. v. I, 662pp. \$36, v. II, 975pp. \$36. Volume I was first printed in 1921 and Volume II in 1924 in Sydney, Australia.

The Australian official history of World War I is justly renowned for its accuracy, clarity, and forthright judgments. There was no official censorship, and authors were able to express their opinions freely often to

the discomfort of their British military and academic counterparts. Thus, while British official historians concealed casualty figures to preserve Haig's reputation, the Australians wrote forthrightly and without fear of retribution.

C.E.W. Bean was the general editor of *The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918* and personally wrote the first two volumes which cover the creation of the Australian Imperial Force, its operations in Egypt in 1914 and 1915, and the Gallipoli campaign of 1915-1916. Bean in fact accompanied the Australians to Egypt as a war correspondent and in this capacity went with the Anzac Corps to Gallipoli. He was therefore able to supplement his research and extensive postwar interviews with participants with his own frontline experience.

The Story of Anzac is painstakingly detailed comprising about 1,400 pages of text plus maps, notes, and appendixes. Bean describes not only the operations of the Anzac Corps but also the activities of the British and Turkish forces. For anybody interested in examining the actions of the Anzac Corps right down to the company, platoon and even squad level there is no better source than Bean's volumes.

Bean's study is also a first-rate description of the problems inherent in amphibious operations. Gallipoli was, of course, the first major sea-borne assault under conditions of modern war. The author carefully describes all of the shortcomings of the expedition. He notes, for exam-

ple, that the Royal Navy's bombardment of the Turkish defenses though impressive was in fact inadequate and that once the troops were ashore the absence of effective communications rendered close gunfire support almost impossible. Moreover the lack of communications equipment made it difficult for unit commanders to direct effectively their subordinates. The terrain made it impossible for commanders to see much of what was happening; there were no accurate maps, and there were no observation aircraft. The Australians, therefore, usually had to rely on runners to relay critical messages. Runners often got lost or were shot by the Turks thus compounding command and control problems. Lack of proper beach control techniques delayed the flow of supplies and reinforcements ashore and hindered the efficient evacuation of the wounded.

During the interwar years the US Marines studied the Gallipoli campaign in order to learn from Allied problems and devise an effective amphibious assault doctrine. A reader interested in understanding the problems involved in mounting an attack from the sea will find Bean's study very rewarding.

Bean's work also shows why the Australians ultimately became the shock troops of the British Army on the Western front. The military historian Alfred Vagts drew a distinction between militarism and the military way. Militarism is a way of life based on caste, cult, authority, and belief in tradition for its own sake.

The military way emphasizes loyal-

ty, efficiency, and a focus on achieving objectives.

In the First World War the British Army was wedded to the first concept. For officers social connections were vital and criticism of superiors avoided at all costs. Textbook methods were gospel and as late as 1918 senior officers were still trying to launch cavalry attacks. The Australians by contrast were dedicated to the military way. Officers, for example, were chosen for their ability not because of their social status. The fact that the Jew, Sir John Monash, could become a general is indicative of this attitude. In the British Army he would never have received a commission as a junior officer. In the field the Australians quickly learned to do their jobs in the most efficient manner whether or not their methods were sanctioned by tradition. It was in the crucible of Gallipoli that the Australians learned their methods of waging war, and it is this process that Bean describes with painstaking care.

STEVEN ROSS
Naval War College

Pack, James. *Nelson's Blood: The Story of Naval Rum*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1983. 200pp. \$14.95

Despite the legend that gave rise to this book's title, Nelson's body was not returned from Trafalgar in a barrel of rum—and had he lived in 1970, Nelson would have applauded the termination of the daily ration of grog. However illustrious and venerable a service tradition must support a service need, Nelson would have been the first to recog-

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nize that the rum ration is out of place in the context of modern naval warfare.

Indeed, as Captain Pack shows in his astute and lavishly illustrated social history, its place in the Royal Navy was always ambiguous. Sailors drank rum in the West Indies for a century before Admiral Vernon, in 1740, sought to curb drunkenness by solemnizing the custom and putting it under official control, cutting the raw spirit with water and issuing this "grog" in limited amounts twice a day.

Grog time, and those occasions when the order to "splice the main-brace" set out an additional tot, became important moments aboard ship, a time of sociability providing the anodyne to relieve the discomforts of life afloat. The expectations and fond memories of the ceremony, the reluctance of the Board of Admiralty to terminate this special privilege of the Royal Navy, testify to the value it had as a morale booster and reward for the arduous hours at sea. Rum was called a seaman's "built-in stabilizer."

Yet Captain Pack's lively account shows that for all the nostalgia associated with the rum ration there was also, from the beginning, a dark side, the problem of drunkenness. While it was the province of the spirit to impart comfort and courage, its abuse led to disorder and incompetence. Captains over the centuries wrote to the Board warning that drunkenness was the curse of the service.

mately associated with drinking. To this problem the Admiralty responded with various palliative measures. Vernon's daily half-pint was gradually reduced. The mix of grog was changed to cut its potency. There was closer administration of the "pusser's rum."

The Admiralty moved very slowly. Abolition did not take place until well after the Second World War. Yet it was clear from the beginning of this century that the days of the tot were numbered. Changing social mores helped dissolve its mystique. Evidence came in on the effects of alcoholism. Alcohol related punishments were a burden on command. There was a reassertion of the popularity of beer, now possible to store in cans. In the mid-1950s only a third of the men took their rum ration. Above all, in the age of high technology, it was evident that the daily issue was not compatible with the necessary standards of safety and efficiency within the fleet.

Captain Pack concludes with a fine account of the intelligent way the Admiralty finally abolished the ration. Projecting its annual cost, they got the Treasury to give a lump sum worth nine years of rum to establish a Sailor's Fund for charitable purposes to naval personnel, and promulgated new rules for the purchase of beer aboard ship. In 1970, without opposition, and with no more than a sentimental look backwards, the long tradition of "Up Spirits" came to an end.

GEORGE W. BAER
Naval War College

Herwig, Holger, and Heyman, Neil M. *Biographical Dictionary of World War I*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982. 424pp. \$49.95

This dictionary presents a large number of biographical accounts, quite complete and authoritative, describing personages of importance who directed affairs in the most important belligerent nations during the First World War. The nations covered include Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Japan, Montenegro, Rumania, Russia, Serbia, Turkey, the United States, and the Vatican.

The two authors, both Europeanists, base their biographical sketches on the works of leading authorities or on memoirs, tracing careers in general but concentrating on activities during 1914-1918. Herwig and Heyman make an effort to avoid the dull flatness often associated with biographical dictionaries, including evaluative comments as well as descriptive information and introducing interesting and even amusing anecdotes or quotations.

The coverage is most useful for the European participants, reflecting not only the European specialties of the authors but the realities of the Great War. There are twenty-three entries for the United States by comparison with sixty-nine for Germany and fifty for Great Britain. This apportionment seems just and proper. American users are much more in need of biographical information about our allies and enemies than about the United States, the latter

information being familiar or easily obtained. This work should help American scholars to introduce enemies and allies more effectively into the American treatment of the First World War than is now the case.

Anything that can be done to strengthen the American understanding of the First World War is a contribution of significant import. Much of our mental baggage concerning international relations and national security has its origins in the catastrophe of 1914-1918. Americans all too often ignore this fundamental truth because we were late into the war. In any event the experience of the Second World War effectively aborted a truly comprehensive American appraisal of the earlier conflict, a circumstance that helps to explain certain shortcomings in our understanding of underlying events for the period 1939 to 1945.

The compilers deserve considerable praise for undertaking a taxing labor that should prove helpful to students of the First World War for many years to come.

DAVID F. TRASK
US Army Center of Military History
Washington, DC

Puryear, Edgar F., Jr. *George S. Brown, General US Air Force. Destined for the Stars*. Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1983. 306pp. \$16.95.

George S. Brown was a courageous soldier, a fine officer and perhaps even a splendid human being. Despite these qualities it is not certain that "... Brown was destined

to become one of the most brilliant air commanders in history." In another day, he might have become that, but by the time he grasped the levers of power it was beyond his reach. Even were Edgar F. Puryear's judgment on Brown's brilliance as an air commander correct, neither *Destined for the Stars* nor any other book published this early could support that conclusion.

Edgar Puryear was once on the faculty of the Air Force Academy and has written two similar books: *Nineteen Stars* and *Stars in Flight*. He claims a Ph.D. in Political Science and History from Princeton University and a law degree from the University of Virginia.

Notwithstanding impressive academic credentials, Puryear's methodology disqualifies the present work as sound biography or history. By an overwhelming margin, his sources are interviews granted by Brown's superiors, colleagues, and subordinates immediately after Brown's tragic death. The source material, therefore, is much more in the character of a eulogy than a suitable foundation for a worthy biography. Other sources are Brown's Officer Effectiveness Reports, interviews from his mother and brother, and his public speeches when he was Chief of Staff of the US Air Force and Chairman of the JCS. All these materials are handled in an uncritical way. Puryear did not do much archival research for *Stars in Flight*, and of course most of that kind of material on Brown is still classified. Yet he ignores most of the published

material that does relate to Brown's career. Rather, he covers General Brown's tenure as commander of 7th Air Force in Vietnam by stringing together a host of personal anecdotes without ever addressing the great airpower issues involved in the war. Given that Vietnam was a defeat, the worst in American history, Puryear can hardly take that as support for the notion that his subject was one of the "... most brilliant air leaders in history." Later, General Brown was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and was in the saddle for one of the saddest days in American military history, the fall of Saigon in 1975. Again, we cannot fault Brown for that humiliation, but neither is it any foundation for the claim of brilliance as an air leader.

Puryear's declared purpose is to tell those who aspire to lead their country the ways in which they might qualify themselves for the task. The method is to use the career of General George Brown as a model. In the final chapter, the characteristics to be cultivated are summarized. There is little doubt in my mind that Brown possessed them. However, the superficiality of the research so undermines the accuracy of the work as to destroy its worth as a credible guide for the younger generation—worse than that, it tends to widen the generation gap in a way detrimental to pride of service—being made up largely of the quotations from senior USAF generals, it is bound to be seen as the voice of the establishment.

Puryear and Presidio Press would

have been well advised to find someone experienced in the military profession to read the final typescript to save them from many of those other elementary mistakes that bring the book's overall worth into question. That would have prevented the Military Air Transport Service from becoming the "Material Air Transport Service," and would also have prevented reporting that in 1967 the USS *Liberty* was sunk, which she was not. There are many other obvious mistakes that careful editing would have prevented. Of these the most important is the failure to recognize in the *Mayaguez* incident that the Cambodian government had decided to release the crew of that captured American freighter before either the Marine landing on Kob Tang Island or the bombing of the Coral Sea had taken place.

This biography of George S. Brown, then, is a last testimonial from his friends—a eulogy and no more. When we do get a history of his stewardship of our national security, we will learn a great deal about crisis leadership, the way that the bureaucracy works, and about survival in Washington in times of political turmoil.

DAVID R. METS
Troy State University
Florida Region

Macdonald, Lyn. *SOMME*. London: Michael Joseph, 1983. 366pp. \$19.95

The Battle of the Somme opened with an artillery barrage of unprecedented intensity and duration herald-

ing the "Big Push" on 24 June 1916, and ended without achieving its objective over 300,000 casualties later on 21 November 1916. The end was sadly heroic. A forlorn band of ninety men from the Glasgow Boys Brigade Battalion (officially the 16th Highland Light Infantry) reported as "missing" had actually captured a length of battered German trench and held out six days longer. Reduced to fifteen "starving, filthy, frozen, exhausted" men, they were overwhelmed by unrelenting German counterattacks. The German major interrogating them said, "Is this what held the Brigade up for a week? Who are you and where have you come from?"

Lyn Macdonald's book gives the answer to that question. It is an account of *Kitchener's Army*—shipping clerks, errand boys, stevedores, railway porters, grocer's assistants, postmen—men who were transformed from patriotic, high-spirited groups of "pals" on a lark to cannon fodder, corpses and a few surviving soldiers. This is a superb but overwhelmingly sad piece of historical research and writing. The author establishes an objective, and achieves it. "This book does not set out to draw political conclusions and, although it is the story of a battle, it is more concerned with the experience of war than with the war itself."

The story is told in a remarkable series of eyewitness accounts that bring back to life and, death, the men and the times. The author's complete understanding of the battle and mastery of the terrain is the warp

through which is woven the woof-threads of personal experiences by the participants on her narrative loom, which produces a seamless literary fabric. The resulting tapestry is rich in color and texture: kilted Scots, the Australians and New Zealanders bronzed and blooded from Gallipoli, Canadians, 35 South Africans who paid their own passage to England to enlist in 1914, the Royal Naval Division (steadfastly retaining naval rank) and the "lads" of *Kitcheners Army*—an agglomeration of local groups of pals, buddies, workmates, fellow-townsmen. It is complete work. Nothing is neglected: Chinese labor battalions, the Zeppelin attacks on London (linked to experiences of soldiers evacuated to England because of glutting of the medical system in France), visits of the King and the Prime Minister to the battle, logistical snarls, meticulous staff work in planning broken down by the underlying false tactical assumptions and lack of any real strategy.

The very organization of the Army insured that the more than 300,000 casualties (over 90,000 dead) would decimate the male population of the communities sponsoring the "lads." The casualties that initially inundated the medical evacuation chain—military hospitals in France and England, civilian hospitals and finally private homes and public buildings—also littered the battlefield with bloated, blackened, rotting men and horses. Casualties also shattered the fighting units of the Army. One example, Corporal Jack

Beament of the Church Lads Brigade (Kings Royal Rifle Corps): "It was a horrible, terrible massacre. We'd lost all the officers out of our company. We lost all the sergeants, all the full corporals and all the NCOs right down to Herbert King who was the senior Lance-Corporal. He was my pal and he brought 'A' Company out of the wood. He rallied them and brought them out. There were more than two hundred of us went in. And Herbert brought them out. Sixty seven men. 'Thar was all."

At Delville Wood, the South African Brigade went into action on Bastille Day, 14 July 1916 three thousand strong; at roll-call when they came out, only seven hundred sixty-eight men answered. Two Australian divisions lost over six thousand officers and men in the month of July 1916.

As the story develops, the author is at pains to provide the reader with precise maps of all actions and annotated photographs both from ground vantage points and the air. She wants the reader to see all and understand everything about the terrain and leaves nothing to the imagination; just as the diaries and testimony of the participants do everything to put into the reader's mind the thoughts and words that allows one to recreate the events of the Somme.

It was a senseless, but historic, battle bridging the ages from a cavalry charge at High Wood on Bastille Day to the first use of modern armor, the tank-led assault on Flers, 12 September 1916. Both affairs were badly managed. The lancers' charge

was 12 hours too late to exploit a gap the infantry had made and should have moved into at once. The tank attack dissipated the shock effect by distributing 42 tanks over 15 kilometers. The Somme was conceived with a series of politically motivated designs rather than the result of sound strategic analysis. The grand tactic was faulty, the six-day artillery barrage did not pulverize the German defenses. It started badly with a disastrous ten minute pause in artillery support, which allowed the Germans to come out of their deep bunkers and man machine guns and inflict 57,000 casualties on that day alone. It ended badly, too.

The author does not judge. She uses the results of her own knowledge and the research support (largely volunteers from the 1981 Sixth Form of the Harvey Grammar School of Folkestone, England) which is diverse and international to let the reader have the ability to judge. Her book is the chronicle of a national tragedy that helped to disfigure Western European Civilization.

But it is really a soldier's tale, told by the fighting officers and men on both sides. Perhaps the worst indictment of the strategy and leadership in this phase of World War I is outside the covers of this book. Basil Liddell Hart writing about Passchendaele (as has Lyn Macdonald in a previous work) records the "remorse of one who was largely responsible for it . . . Growing increasingly uneasy as the car approached the swamp-like edges of the battle area, he (the general) eventually burst into

tears crying, 'Good God, did we really send men to fight in that?'"

WILLIAM F. LONG, JR.
Colonel, US Army (Retired)

Mack, William P. and Paulsen, Thomas D. *The Naval Officer's Guide*. Annapolis, Md.: US Naval Institute Press, 1983. 537pp. \$14.95

Bassett, Frank E. and Smith, Richard A. *Farewell's Rules of the Nautical Road*, 6th ed. Annapolis, Md.: US Naval Institute Press, 1982. 500pp. \$21.95

Two recent editions of classic naval works have been published by the Naval Institute Press, and both are solid additions to any maritime library. *The Naval Officer's Guide* and *Farewell's Rules of the Nautical Road* have been reference works of note for naval officers since their original publication in 1943 and 1941 respectively. Both editions are improvements and refinements of earlier efforts undertaken by highly qualified authors.

The Naval Officer's Guide is clearly aimed at the junior officer who has only recently been commissioned. It contains a wealth of very basic information covering such subjects as "The Importance of Our Navy," "Personal Administration," "Military Courtesy, Honors, and Ceremonies," and so on. It has detailed information on the various branches of the government involved with the Navy, as well as broad coverage of the naval forces themselves. Admiral Mack, a former superintendent of the Naval Academy, manages to

strike the right tone for the *Guide*—knowledgeable, accurate, and friendly. The edition is small and well-bound, a good choice for the ensign's scabag. While there is little in the volume that most officers have not mastered at the 0-3 point, *The Naval Officer's Guide* is still useful as a reference work for any officer's library. For their next edition, the authors might consider an appendix with the officer's recommended scabag, expanding the first chapter on the roles of the Navy, or improving the information for wives and dependents. The recommended reading list should be overhauled and the information on frocking needs to be updated. These are minor criticisms, however. Overall the *Guide* continues as a minor classic for generations of naval officers.

What can be said about *Farewell's Rules of the Nautical Road*?

First of all, this is a superb edition, published at a particularly timely moment. The dust is finally settling from a decade of tinkering with Rules of the Road, and the complete sequence of change, including the COLREGs and the new Inland Rules are all well laid out here. In fact, both sets of rules (International and Inland) are printed side-by-side, allowing for comparison and contrast during study. The illustrations are particularly clear and detailed,

and the notes provided by Commanders Bassett and Smith are useful and well-written.

Second, the sections of the book dealing with the interpretations and court rulings resulting from the rules of the road are well collected and intelligently presented. The useful appendixes are likewise well selected. There is precious little a mariner would need to know about the rules and laws of the nautical road that does not fall between the covers of this edition of *Farewell's*.

Together, the authors had a major impact on Navigational instruction in the Navy over the past decade when each served as chairman of the department of navigation at Annapolis. As the authors put it in their preface, "the book is dedicated to the proposition that obedience to the rules is the surest way to avoid collision." Having had the privilege of studying under one of the authors (Commander Dick Smith), I will personally attest that the clearest way to learn the rules (short of taking course work from one of the authors) is to study this sixth and best edition of *Farewell's*. This volume is a mandatory purchase for any marine library or naval officer—don't go down to the sea in ships without a well-thumbed copy firmly in hand.

JAMES STAVRIDIS
Lieutenant Commander, US Navy



Naval War College Naval Warfare History Research Grants

As originally conceived by the founders of the Naval War College, the philosophy of education of the college was predicated on a strict requirement for the study of naval warfare history. Stephen B. Luce, Alfred Thayer Mahan and their associate naval reformers of the late 19th century spoke and wrote persuasively of the science of naval warfare and of immutable principles of strategy and tactics that were discoverable through historical study. While the idea of principles was subsequently viewed as highly questionable and never fully endorsed, the analysis of the past for illustration of recurring themes remained a vital part of the study program of the college. This continuing emphasis formed the basis for the inauguration by the college of a naval warfare history monograph series in 1975.

The Historical Monograph Series consists of book-length studies on naval warfare history which are based in part on sources located in the college's Naval Historical Collection. Publication is managed jointly by the Collection and the Naval War College Press, and completed volumes are normally printed by the GPO and made available by the Superintendent of Documents or the college.

Funding for the series is provided in part by the Naval War College Foundation an association of friends of the college which also provides funds to support research by qualified candidates. Information regarding research grants is available by writing to the President, Naval War College, Newport, R.I. 02841. Grant applications should consist of a detailed project proposal, schedule for completion, and budget information.